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get $ex \rightarrow ey$
- From axiom ③ $x=y$ ✓

- This informal proof can be turned into a formal one
- Once "Formal proof" is formalized can prove following (very reasonable) theorem:

Thm (Soundness of first-order logic)
if $T \vdash \phi$ then $T \models \phi$

Gödel showed the converse is true!

Thm (Completeness of F.O.L.)
if $T \models \phi$ then $T \vdash \phi$

a priori a challenge to prove:
From knowledge ϕ is true in every model of T
need to pull out of air an actual proof of ϕ !

Def'n T is inconsistent if for some sentence ϕ we have $T \vdash \phi \wedge \neg \phi$

Corollary T is consistent iff T is satisfiable

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PF ($\Leftarrow$) if there is $M \models T$ then
 T is consistent since s/w by soundness
there is φ s.t. $M \models \varphi \wedge \neg \varphi$, contradiction
($\Rightarrow$) if T has no models then (trivially)
 $T \models \varphi \wedge \neg \varphi$ for some (actually every)
 φ .

But then $T + \varphi \wedge \neg \varphi$ by completeness!

Corollary (The compactness theorem)
a theory T is satisfiable iff every
finite subset $\Delta \subseteq T$ is satisfiable

PF ($\Rightarrow$) if $M \models T$ then for any
finite $\Delta \subseteq T$ we have $M \models \Delta$
($\Leftarrow$) - if no such M then $T \models \varphi \wedge \neg \varphi$
for some φ , by prev. corollary
- since proofs are finite there is a
finite $\Delta \subseteq T$ sufficient to prove $\varphi \wedge \neg \varphi$
 $\Rightarrow \Delta$ is unsatisfiable. ✓

Compactness Theorem looks innocent,
but it is very powerful.

Ex (Finiteness is not first-order axiomatizable)

Fix $\mathbb{Z}$. Sp's T is a $\mathbb{Z}$ -theory
s.t. there are arbitrarily large

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finite models of T . (i.e. $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}$ there is $M \models T$ s.t. $|M|$ finite but $> n$)
 Then there is an infinite model of T .

PF: - For $n \geq 2$ let φ_n be

$$\exists x_1 \dots \exists x_n (\bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} x_i \neq x_j)$$

- let $T' = T \cup \{\varphi_2, \varphi_3, \dots\}$
- for any finite $\Delta \subseteq T'$, there is $N \in \mathbb{N}$ s.t. for all $n > N$, $\varphi_n \notin \Delta$
- fix Δ and let $M \models T$ w/ $|M| > N$ (such M exists by hyp.)
- but then $M \models \Delta$
- $\Rightarrow T'$ is finitely satisfiable
- $\Rightarrow$ (by compactness) there is $M \models T'$
- but then $|M|$ must be infinite and since $T \subseteq T'$, have $M \models T$ too ✓

$\hookrightarrow$ proof of compactness then above depends on syntactic notion of completeness
 $\hookrightarrow$ would be nice to have a semantic proof, i.e. one where we really build a model!

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Henkin Models

- T is finutely satisfiable if every finite $\Delta \subseteq T$ ^{has a model}
- Given a lang $\mathcal{L}$ and fin. sat'ble T , we build a model of (cl of) T .

- construction has 2 parts:

① we extend ~~$\mathcal{L}$~~ $\mathcal{L}$ so it has enough constants to "witness every $\exists$ existential statement implied by T " and extend T as much as consistently possible

② we let universe M of our model M consist of the constant symbols in $\mathcal{L}$!

↳ not quite... issue is: For distinct $c, d \in \mathcal{L}$ might have $T \models c = d$, or even $c = d \in T$!

↳ so: if we want $M \models T$ need to identify c, d in our universe.

↳ so: we do this for all such c, d and let M be resulting set
this works!

- We'll assume ① and do ② First then show ① can be done

- Construction requires a touch of set theory: just what a cardinal is and Zorn's Lemma

- ... $\uparrow$ read appendix A in back.

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Def'n Given $\mathcal{L}$, and $\mathcal{L}$ -theory T ,
say T has the witness property if for
every $\mathcal{L}$ -formula $\varphi(v)$ with one free var.
there is a constant symbol $c \in \mathcal{L}$ s.t.
 $T \models (\exists v \varphi(v)) \Rightarrow \varphi(c)$

Def'n A $\mathcal{L}$ -theory T is maximal if
for every $\mathcal{L}$ -sentence φ , either $\varphi \in T$
or $\neg \varphi \in T$.

Lemma Spss T is a maximal and
finitely satisfiable theory. If $\Delta \subseteq T$
is finite and $\Delta \models \varphi$, then $\varphi \in T$.
for some sentence φ .

Pf. if $\varphi \notin T$ then $\neg \varphi \in T$ by maximality.
But then $\Delta \cup \{\neg \varphi\} \subseteq T$ is a finite
subset of T w/ no model, contradiction
fin. satisfiability of T .

Theorem Spss T is a maximal and
finitely satisfiable $\mathcal{L}$ -theory w/ the
witness property. Then: T has a model.
In fact: there is $M \models T$ w/
 $|M| \leq \kappa$, where $\kappa = \#$ of constant symbols
in $\mathcal{L}$.

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PF. - let $\mathcal{C}$ denote set of const. symbols in $\mathcal{L}$

- define $c \sim d$ iff $c = d \in T$

Claim $\sim$ is an equiv. relation on $\mathcal{C}$.

PF: (refl.) given $c \in \mathcal{C}$, must have $c \sim c$ since $c = c \in T$ since o.w. $c \neq c \in T$ (by maximality) and then T not fin. sat.

(sym.) if $c = d \in T$ then $d = c \in T$ by fin. sat. thus $c \sim d$ iff $d \sim c$.

(trans.) if $c = d$ and $d = e$ both $\in T$ then $c = e \in T$ since o.w. $c \neq e \in T$ and T not fin. sat. Thus $c \sim d$ and $d \sim e \Rightarrow c \sim e$ ✓

- let $M = \mathcal{C} / \sim$ be the set of equiv. classes of constants under $\sim$

- will be universe of our model $\mathcal{M}$

- for each $c \in \mathcal{C}$, let $c^* = \text{equiv class of } c$
(so: $c^* = d^*$ iff $c \sim d$)

- so: $M = \{c^* : c \in \mathcal{C}\}$

↳ will interpret r in and ~~the~~ function symbols in $\mathcal{M}$ in natural way ... just need to check it makes sense.

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- Sps $R \in \mathcal{L}$ is n -ary rel'n symbol
- Sps $c_1, \dots, c_n, d_1, \dots, d_n \in \mathcal{C}$ and $c_i \sim d_i$ for all $i \leq n$.
- then ~~then~~ $R(c_1, \dots, c_n) \in T$ iff $R(d_1, \dots, d_n) \in T$
 o/w T not fin. set.
 $\Rightarrow$ if we let ~~then~~ $R^u = \{ (c_1^*, \dots, c_n^*) : R(c_1, \dots, c_n) \in T \}$
 then R^u is well-defined.

- Now sps f is n -ary func. symbol,
 $c_1, \dots, c_n \in \mathcal{C}$.
- Since $T \models \exists v f(c_1, \dots, c_n) = v$, by witness prop + maximality of T there is $c \in T$ s.t.
 $f(c_1, \dots, c_n) = c \in T$
- if $d_1, \dots, d_n, d \in \mathcal{C}$ and ~~and~~ $c_i \sim d_i$ and ~~and~~ $c \sim d$ then
 $f(d_1, \dots, d_n) = d \in T$ too
 $\Rightarrow$ can define $f^u(c_1^*, \dots, c_n^*) = c^*$ iff
 $f(c_1, \dots, c_n) = c \in T$

- $\hookrightarrow$ we've defined on $\mathcal{L}$ -structure $\mathcal{M}$
- $\hookrightarrow$ WTS: $\mathcal{M} \models T$
- $\hookrightarrow$ first: show terms behave as expected

Claim: Given $t(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ a term and $c_1, \dots, c_n, d \in \mathcal{C}$ we have $t^u(c_1^*, \dots, c_n^*) = d^*$ iff $t(c_1, \dots, c_n) = d \in T$

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Pf. ($\Leftarrow$) induction on construction of t
(you try!)

($\Rightarrow$) - Sp. $t^u(c_1^*, \dots, c_n^*) = d^*$. wts: $t(\vec{c}) = d \in T$

- Have $T \models \exists v \ t(\vec{c}) = v$

$\rightarrow$ by witness prop. there is $e \in E$ s.t. $t(\vec{c}) = e \in T$

- so by ($\Leftarrow$) direction, $t^u(\vec{c}^*) = e^*$

- so $e^* = d^*$, so end, so $e = d \in T$

- Since $T \cup \text{fin. sat}$, $t(\vec{c}) = d \in T$. $\checkmark$

Claim For all L -fmbs $\varphi(v_1, \dots, v_n)$
and $c_1, \dots, c_n \in E$ we have
 $M \models \varphi(\vec{c}^*) \iff \varphi(\vec{c}) \in T$

Pf. Induction ~~on φ~~ on φ

- If $\varphi \text{ is } t_1(\vec{v}) = t_2(\vec{v})$

then $M \models \varphi(\vec{c}^*) \iff t_1^u(\vec{c}^*) = t_2^u(\vec{c}^*)$

$\iff$ there is $d \in E$ s.t. $t_1^u(\vec{c}^*) = t_2^u(\vec{c}^*) = d^*$

$\iff$ (by claim) $t_1(\vec{c}) = d$ and $t_2(\vec{c}) = d$ both $\in T$

$\iff$ (by lemma) $t_1(\vec{c}) = t_2(\vec{c}) \in T$

i.e. $\iff \varphi(\vec{c}) \in T \checkmark$

- If $\varphi \text{ is } R(t_1(\vec{v}), \dots, t_n(\vec{v}))$

then $M \models \varphi(\vec{c}^*) \iff (t_1^u(\vec{c}^*), \dots, t_n^u(\vec{c}^*)) \in R^M$

$\iff (d_1^*, \dots, d_n^*) \in R^M$ where $d_i^* = t_i^u(\vec{c}^*)$

$\iff R(d_1, \dots, d_n) \in T$ (by prev. prev. claim)

$\iff$ (by lemma) $R(t_1(\vec{c}), \dots, t_n(\vec{c})) \in T$

i.e. $\varphi(\vec{c}) \in T \checkmark$

- Sps claim true for ψ, χ
- If $M \models \neg \psi(\vec{c}^*)$ then $M \not\models \psi(\vec{c}^*)$
 So $\psi(\vec{c}^*) \notin T$ by hypothesis
 So $\neg \psi(\vec{c}^*) \in T$ by maximality of T
- Conversely if $\neg \psi(\vec{c}^*) \in T$ then
 $\psi(\vec{c}^*) \notin T$ by fin. satisfiability of T
 So $M \not\models \psi(\vec{c}^*)$ by i.h. so $M \models \neg \psi(\vec{c}^*)$
- Next, $M \models \psi \wedge \chi(\vec{c}^*)$ iff
 $M \models \psi(\vec{c}^*)$ and $M \models \chi(\vec{c}^*)$
 iff (by I.H) $\psi(\vec{c})$ and $\chi(\vec{c}) \in T$
 iff (by lemma) $\psi \wedge \chi(\vec{c}) \in T$
- Finally, sps claim true for $\psi(\vec{v}, w)$
 and consider $\exists w \psi(\vec{v}, w)$
- If $M \models \exists w \psi(\vec{c}^*, w)$ then ~~by~~
~~there is~~ there is d^* s.t. $M \models \psi(\vec{c}^*, d^*)$
- by i.h. $\psi(\vec{c}, d) \in T$ and so $\exists w \psi(\vec{c}, w) \in T$
 by lemma
- Conversely if $\exists w \psi(\vec{c}, w) \in T$ then
 by witness property there is d s.t.
 $\psi(\vec{c}, d) \in T$
- by i.h. $M \models \psi(\vec{c}^*, d^*)$
 so $M \models \exists w \psi(\vec{c}^*, w)$ ✓

- this completes the induction
- we've proved in particular $M = T$
- observe: by our construction, $|M| \leq |e|$ ✓