

A Theory of Policy Sabotage

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June 10, 2019

Abstract

We develop a theory of policymaking that examines when policy sabotage—that is, the deliberate choice by an opposition party to interfere the implementation of a policy—can be an effective electoral strategy, even if rational voters can see that it is happening. In our model, a potential saboteur chooses whether to sabotage an incumbent’s policy by blocking its successful implementation. Following this decision, a voter decides whether to retain the incumbent, who is of unknown quality, or to select a challenger. We find that the incentives for sabotage are broadly shaped by the underlying popularity of the incumbent—it is most attractive when an incumbent is somewhat unpopular. If so, sabotage may decrease the probability the incumbent is reelected, even though sabotage is observable to the voter. We illustrate our theory with the implementation of the Affordable Care Act since its passage in 2010.

*We thank Peter Buisseret, Laura Doval, Sandy Gordon, Ian Turner, and Craig Volden, and seminar audiences at Emory, New York University Law School, and Yale for helpful comments and suggestions.

The Democrats ObamaCare is imploding. Massive subsidy payments to their pet insurance companies has stopped. Dems should call me to fix!

—*Donald Trump (Tweet from 10/13/2017)*

I can't stand rockin' when I'm in here, Cause your crystal ball ain't so crystal clear.

—*The Beastie Boys*

1 Introduction

A central tension in democratic theory concerns how imperfectly informed voters can either select representatives who act in their best interest, or sanction representatives who do not (Fearon 1999). To address this tension, scholars have developed an extensive literature that employs the theory of political agency to understand how and why reelection-minded representatives may choose to act in the best interests of voters, even if voters can only imperfectly observe whether representatives are actually doing so.¹

While the nuances of various theories differ, a ubiquitous theme of models of selection and accountability is that voters condition their retention choices on the observable actions of politicians. This makes perfect sense, as voters should use all available information at their disposal—in particular, policy outcomes. Given this, in a world in which one party seamlessly controls policy (such as in a parliamentary system with a sizable majority party), we would expect the leading party to avoid observable actions (as opposed to hidden ones) that decrease the chance of a successful policy outcome.

However, in a context where power is more fragmented, either because of institutional-based gridlock and/or party-based polarization, the motivations of competing parties are more complicated. In particular, the current era of partisan polarization in the United States has seen an apparent increase in the incidence of politicians engaging in “policy sabotage”—the deliberate effort to hinder the implementation of a policy enacted by the opposition party. For example, since 2010 congressional Republicans have sought to under-

¹See Ashworth (2012) for an outstanding review of this literature.

mine the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”)—an effort joined with full gusto by President Trump since he took office in 2017—and have not been shy about their intentions.² More generally, Lee (2016) argues that the increase in competitiveness for control of Congress has disincentivized minority parties from working on policy in a bipartisan fashion, and has instead encouraged a focus on activities that hurt the reputation of the party in power, such as “messaging” legislation.

From the perspective of theoretical models of accountability, policy sabotage poses a puzzle: why is sabotage a (potentially) effective strategy for either blocking policy implementation and/or damaging a party’s electoral prospects when voters can *see* it and update on its deployment as a strategy? In this paper we present a formal theory of policy sabotage that examines this question. We develop a two-period model in which a voter chooses to either reelect an incumbent or replace him with a challenger. Incumbents and challengers are each associated with an ideal spatial policy, and can be either low quality or high quality. This level of quality, which is not known to the voters, affects the probability that a policy will translate into a successful outcome.

The key innovation of the model is that there is a potential “saboteur” who can interfere with implementation of policy. The saboteur can be conceptualized as a bureaucrat or an out-party, depending on the relevant context. Specifically, the saboteur can choose to let the policy be implemented, which means that the policy will succeed with some positive probability that is based on the incumbent’s quality. Alternatively, the saboteur can sabotage the policy, which will ensure failure. Importantly, unlike standard agency models with effort (e.g. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2017)), we assume that both implementing and sabotaging the policy are costless; this means the decision of whether to engage in sabotage is *not* one related to costly effort.

The voter and the saboteur are the strategic players in the model. For simplicity, we

² Trump’s tweet in the epigraph refers to the administration’s decision in 2017 to cut off billions of dollars in subsidies to insurers who enroll Americans through Obamacare—the subsidies were designed to help lower out-of-pocket expenses for low-income enrollees in the program (Pear, Haberman and Abelson 2017).

assume that the incumbent and challenger are non-strategic and passively committed to their ideal policies. Thus, the likelihood of policy success depends on their qualities rather than any sort of decision by the policymaker. (In practice, this simplification means the model is one of selection with respect to the incumbent policymaker, not accountability.) Importantly, in addition to ideology, both the voter and the saboteur have a shared preference for successful outcomes. The voter is assumed to be imperfectly informed about the incumbent's quality, but can learn more by observing the policy outcome (success or failure) as well as the saboteur's decision whether to engage in sabotage. Following the realization of the outcome in the first period, the voter chooses whether to retain the incumbent or replace him with a challenger. The game then repeats in the second period.

We present two versions of the model that differ in the information available to the saboteur. In the first version, the saboteur does not know the incumbent's quality, and thus holds the same uncertainty as the voter. We call this an *uninformed saboteur*. In the second version, the saboteur knows the incumbent's quality. This assumption, which we denote the *informed saboteur*, is more realistic if one believes that actors in government are better informed than voters about the quality of fellow policymakers.

The saboteur's dilemma is as follows. Assume he is ideologically closer to the challenger than the incumbent. Because sabotage ensures policy failure, the saboteur may choose to sabotage because it prevents the voter from learning about the incumbent's quality from policy outcomes. Such a blocking maneuver *may* increase the chance that the voter chooses to replace the incumbent with the challenger—but only under circumstances we discuss shortly. However, the fact that the saboteur also cares about the success of the policy may push him in the opposite direction—especially because implementing the policy is costless.

The voter's dilemma is as follows. Suppose first that the voter believes the saboteur to be uninformed about the incumbent's quality, which is the simpler case. Then observing a policy success (which, recall, can only occur in the absence of sabotage) increases the voter's belief that the incumbent is of high quality—but only probabilistically. Sabotage, on the other

hand, prevents any learning from policy implementation from occurring because it blocks successful implementation. Sabotage will thus induce the voter to replace an incumbent she might have otherwise retained if and only if the incumbent is *somewhat unpopular*—that is, if the voter is inclined to replace the incumbent initially, but would be willing to retain him after success. Whether the saboteur actually chooses to sabotage such an incumbent, in turn, depends on whether he is willing to sacrifice a policy success to *suppress* the voter’s ability to learn more about the incumbent’s quality through policy outcomes.

The voter’s inferences and the equilibrium are more complex when she believes the saboteur to be privately informed about the incumbent’s quality. In this case, sabotage (and its absence) can itself signal information about the incumbent’s quality. If, for example, the voter believes the saboteur to be sabotaging a high quality incumbent to block the voter from learning the incumbent’s quality, then she will infer from *sabotage itself* that the incumbent is high quality and reelect him; thus, sabotage will backfire. Conversely, if the voter believes the saboteur to be sabotaging a low quality incumbent to signal that they are low quality, then sabotage will harm the incumbent’s prospects, which will incentivize the saboteur to sabotage the incumbent regardless of their quality. Thus, it is not obvious *a priori* what a rational voter will infer about the incumbent’s ability when sabotage occurs. Indeed, our analysis uncovers two particularly interesting equilibria that illustrate how sabotage can both communicate different information, and have different electoral effects.

The first equilibrium prevails when the incumbent is somewhat unpopular. In it, the saboteur sometimes sabotages both types of incumbents, but surprisingly, is more likely to sabotage a high quality one. Sabotage thus credibly signals to the voters that the incumbent is *high* quality, which perversely *helps* his reputation and his electoral prospects. Conversely, the absence of sabotage *hurts* the incumbent’s reputation—but not so much that a policy success cannot overcome that harm and carry him to reelection with a high likelihood. How can it be that a rational saboteur undertakes sabotage even though it helps the incumbent’s reputation? It is not because the saboteur thinks sabotage will harm the incumbent’s

reputation—he anticipates that rational voters will see through such a strategy. Rather, it is because the saboteur knows sabotage improve the incumbent’s reputation, but fears that absent sabotage a policy success could improve that reputation even more.

The second equilibrium prevails when the incumbent is *very popular*—that is, when policy failure would not induce replacement absent additional information. In this equilibrium, the saboteur sometimes sabotages a high quality incumbent, but *always* sabotages a low quality one. Sabotage thus credibly but imperfectly signals to the voter that the incumbent is *low* quality, which harms his reputation and electoral prospects. Paradoxically, the saboteur’s ability to credibly harm the incumbent’s electoral prospects via sabotage is precisely due to the incumbent’s initial popularity. When the incumbent is starting out so far ahead that the voter will retain him even after failure, there is no greater electoral incentive to sabotage a high quality incumbent than a low quality incumbent—the former is more likely to succeed, but both will be retained even if they fail. However, there remains a greater intrinsic *cost* to sabotaging a high quality incumbent, because it is more likely to prevent a policy success from which even the saboteur would have benefitted. This greater cost allows the saboteur to credibly signal the incumbent’s low quality via sabotage.

Related literature Though our paper is the first (to the best of our knowledge) to directly model the sabotage choice, it is connected to several related models in the accountability literature (e.g. Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2014). The closest analogue is Buisseret (2016), who develops a model with a proposer, a veto player, and a voter. Buisseret examines the difference between political systems in which competing factions are jointly appointed by voters, such as parliamentary systems, or separately appointed, such as in presidential systems. He finds that joint appointment institutions reduce the incentives for the veto player to engage in obstruction, thereby improving voter welfare. Conversely, in separate systems—as in the United States—veto players are more incentivized to engage in obstruction in order to establish a reputation for competence. While the mechanics of our theory differ from that of Buisseret, our model can be seen as extending his theory’s insights to address when policy

obstruction is rational for a competing party or politician.

In addition, our paper complements research on the role of challengers in democratic accountability. As Shotts and Ashworth (2015) note, most theories of accountability feature “passive” challengers who exist as alternatives to the incumbent (see e.g. Ferejohn 1986, Gordon and Huber 2002, Maskin and Tirole 2004, Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2008; 2014). In other papers, challengers do take affirmative yet limited actions, such as entering the race as an alternative to the incumbent and/or declaring a competing platform (see e.g. Epstein and Zemsky 1995, Gordon, Huber and Landa 2007). In contrast, Shotts and Ashworth (2015) develop a model in which challengers can make statements to voters about which of two policies is “correct” (in the sense of matching the true state of the world)—in some equilibria, these statements can affect whether the incumbent is retained (see also Lemon 2005, Warren 2012). Our model follows most of the literature in assuming a passive challenger. However, in some instances the saboteur works “on behalf of” the challenger in the hopes of defeating the incumbent—our theory can thus be placed in a broader class of models where actors take affirmative steps to try to bolster the chance of challenger victory.

In terms of its assumptions about what politicians and voters care about with respect to the production of public policy, our theory also builds on a burgeoning literature analyzing models in which policies have a valence or quality component (Lax and Cameron 2007, Ting 2009, Hirsch and Shotts 2012; 2015, Hitt, Volden and Wiseman 2017, Turner 2017, Hirsch and Shotts 2018). These models typically assume that all players value valence regardless of a policy’s ideological distance. Our model also makes this assumption; however, the fact that valence can influence the voter’s decision to retain the incumbent creates a *dynamic* incentive for sabotage because the saboteur values replacing the incumbent policy even more than its short term success. Thus, by integrating a principal-agent model that incorporates concerns over policy outcomes with a theory of democratic selection, we allow for sabotage to be rational (in some equilibria) even it though it carries the cost of reduced valence.

More loosely related is recent work on what opposition parties gain from engaging in the

tactics of delay and obstruction (Patty 2016, Fong and Krehbiel 2018). However, in these models the opposition party does not actually affect the ultimate implementation of policy, only its timing. In addition, how we model the relationship between incumbents and policy implementers is some ways the inverse of the model of accountability developed in Li (2018). In that model, a political appointee is of high or low type and produces outputs that correlate with his underlying type, which is unobservable to the politician who appointed him. The politician decides whether to retain the appointee, conditional on his output, whereas in our model the politician (incumbent) has no say over who the implementer is.

Finally, our model also speaks to the burgeoning empirical literature on “blame attribution,” which evaluates how citizens appropriate blame across policy-makers in the wake of policy failures (Healy and Malhotra 2013, 291-3). Much of this research focuses on how partisan cues may bias citizen evaluation of the actions of elected officials, particularly when blame may be plausibly distributed across multiple parties (as occurs frequently in a system of federalism) (see e.g. Arceneaux 2005; 2006, Malhotra and Kuo 2008, Healy, Kuo and Malhotra 2014). While there are no parties as such in our model, as we noted one interpretation of the saboteur is that of the out-party who can block implementation. Our model illustrates that the effects of sabotage, as well as the incentives to engage therein, are rich and multifaceted even when voters have no difficulty attributing blame for policy failures.

2 The Model

We model a game played by two policy-motivated actors; a decisionmaker V , interpreted as a voter, and a potential saboteur S (henceforth just saboteur), interpreted as an unelected actor in government who can influence policy-implementation by elected incumbents. At the start of the game there is an incumbent politician and a challenger—both are associated with a respective policy (which, in turn, the saboteur will chose whether to implement). Denote these policies $j \in J = \{I, C\}$, where I denotes the policy associated with the incumbent (i.e. the “incumbent” policy in place at the start of the game), and C denotes the policy associated with the challenger (i.e. the “challenger” policy). For presentational clarity, we

use male pronouns to refer to the saboteur and female pronouns to refer to the voter; at times we forsake proper grammar and refer to the incumbent or challenger using plural pronouns.

Each policy consists of a spatial ideology $x_j \in [-\infty, \infty]$; we assume without loss of generality that $x_I > x_C$. In addition, the incumbent and the challenger may be either of “low” or “high” quality, as denoted by $\lambda_j \in \{L, H\}$ —this type affects the likelihood that a successful outcome can be achieved with their respective policies.³ For simplicity, we abstract away from strategic policy decisions by politicians. The incumbent and challenger, who are exogenous and are not players in the game, represent elected politicians who passively implement their own ideal points and achieve successes based on their underlying quality.

The voter and the saboteur each have an ideal ideology x_i and suffer spatial loss from the distance of the policy’s position to their own ideal points. However, the players also have a shared preference for successful outcomes. Specifically, the policy j^t of the incumbent in period t must be implemented by the saboteur with “effort” $e^t \in \{0, 1\}$. Although we start with the terminology of effort to clarify the connection with standard principal-agent models, a key assumption in our model is that effort is actually free. Accordingly, “effort” should be interpreted as letting the policy run its natural course, while “no effort” means to actively interfere with its success via sabotage. We also use “implementing” and “sabotaging” to refer to effort and its absence, respectively.

Once the saboteur chooses whether to sabotage, the policy may succeed or fail ($y^t \in \{0, 1\}$). Player i places a value $\gamma_i > 0$ on success, so both players value successes. A policy j^t chosen in period t and implemented with effort e^t succeeds with probability $e^t \cdot q_{\lambda_j^t}$, where $0 < q_L < q_H < 1$ is the probability each type of policy succeeds if implemented. Thus, implementation allows the policy to succeed with a probability based on its underlying quality, while sabotage ensures failure. Finally, policy $j \in \{I, C\}$ is high-quality with prior probability $\theta_j \in [0, 1]$ (the qualities of the incumbent and challenger are uncorrelated, and

³For linguistic flexibility, we interchangeably refer to “incumbents” and “incumbent policies,” as well as “challengers” and “challenger policies.” Similarly, we sometimes refer to policies as either of low or high quality; this means the policies of low or high-quality politicians, respectively.

Parameter	Description
V	Voter
S	(Potential) Saboteur
$j \in J = \{I, C\}$	Policies associated with Incumbent and Challenger
$x_j \in [-\infty, \infty]$	Spatial ideology of policy
$t \in 1, 2$	Period
$\lambda_j \in \{L, H\}$	Low quality or high quality policy
$e^t \in \{0, 1\}$	“Effort” of saboteur (0 = sabotage, 1 = not sabotage)
$y^t \in \{0, 1\}$	Failure or Success of Policy
$\gamma_i > 0$	Value of success to player i (Valence)
$e^t \cdot q_{\lambda_{jt}}$	Probability of success ($0 < q_L < q_H < 1$)
$\theta_j \in [0, 1]$	Prior probability policy $j \in \{I, C\}$ is “high”
$U(x_i; x_I, x_C)$	Net policy benefit
$V(\hat{\theta}_I, \hat{\theta}_C; \gamma_i, q)$	Net valence benefit
$\Delta_{\lambda_i}(\pi_e^y)$	Impact probability for type λ_I

Table 1: Table of notation

each may have different prior probabilities of being high quality).

Players’ utility over the two periods is the discounted sum based on the ideology of the selected policies and their outcomes, i.e.

$$\sum_{t=1}^2 \delta^{t-1} \cdot (-(x_i - x_{jt})^2 + \gamma_i \cdot y^t),$$

where x_{jt} denotes the ideological location of the policy chosen in period t and y^t denotes the outcome in period t . Table 1 summarizes the model’s notation.

Sequence of play The game proceeds as follows.

1. Nature selects the incumbent’s quality.
2. Depending on the model variant, the incumbent’s quality is either revealed to the saboteur or not.
3. The saboteur chooses whether to implement $e^t \in \{0, 1\}$ the policy in office $j^t \in \{I, C\}$; this implementation choice (sabotage or not) is *observable* to the voter/decisionmaker.
4. The policy outcome ($y^1 \in \{0, 1\}$) is realized; this is also observable to the voter.
5. The voter decides to retain the incumbent and his associated policy ($j^2 = I$) or switch to the challenger and her associated policy ($j^2 = C$).
6. The second round of play occurs, and steps (1)-(4) repeat.
7. The game ends when the second period policy is realized ($y^2 \in \{0, 1\}$).

3 Preliminary Analysis

3.1 Second Period

In the second period there is no impending election. The saboteur thus always implements the policy ($e^2 = 1$); this is because effort is free, the policy will succeed with probability $q_{\lambda_j t} > 0$, and the saboteur values valence. Thus, from the perspective of an arbitrary player i with ideal point x_i and interim beliefs $\hat{\theta}_j$ about policy j 's quality at the end of the first period (beliefs that are computed from equilibrium), the expected future payoff from having policy $j \in \{I, C\}$ in place for the second period is

$$\gamma_i \left(q_L + \hat{\theta}_j (q_H - q_L) \right) - (x_i - x_j)^2.$$

Consequently, the second period *net benefit* of retaining the incumbent I rather switching to the challenger C consists of both a *net policy benefit* and a *net valence benefit*:

$$\underbrace{(x_i - x_C)^2 - (x_i - x_I)^2}_{\text{net policy benefit}} + \underbrace{\gamma_i (\hat{\theta}_I - \hat{\theta}_C) (q_H - q_L)}_{\text{net valence benefit}}$$

We denote the net policy benefit as $U(x_i; x_I, x_C)$. It is increasing in the ideological alignment of player i with the incumbent policy, and is positive iff $x_i > \frac{x_I + x_C}{2}$ (recall we have assumed $x_I > x_C$). We denote the net valence benefit as $V(\hat{\theta}_I, \hat{\theta}_C; \gamma_i, q)$ —this is increasing in player i 's valuation of valence i , and in the difference in her interim beliefs $\hat{\theta}_I - \hat{\theta}_C$ about the quality of the incumbent and the challenger. It is negative if the challenger policy is believed to be higher quality than the incumbent policy. It is also increasing in $q_H - q_L$, the probability a high versus low quality policy succeeds absent sabotage.

3.2 First Period

We now characterize first period play when the saboteur is privately informed about the incumbent's quality. The strategies of the two players take the following form:

- **Saboteur:** The saboteur's strategy is a probability of exerting effort $e_{\lambda_I} \in [0, 1]$ as a function of the incumbent quality λ_I . (In the model variant where the saboteur is

uninformed about the incumbent's quality, clearly $e_L = e_H$.)

- **Voter:** The voter's strategy is a probability of retaining the incumbent $\pi_e^y \in [0, 1]$ as a function of the saboteur's effort level e and the observed outcome y .

3.2.1 The Saboteur's Calculus

The saboteur's willingness to implement or sabotage depends on: (1) the effect of implementing on his contemporaneous valence utility, (2) the net future benefit of retaining the incumbent, and (3) the effect of implementing on the chance that the incumbent is retained.

Effect of implementation on first-period valence Implementing the policy results in success with probability q_{λ_I} , so the net valence benefit of implementation is $q_{\lambda_I} \gamma_S$.

Net benefit of retaining incumbent The saboteur's expected net benefit from getting the incumbent reelected is $U(x_S; x_I, x_C) + V(\mathbf{1}_{\lambda_I=H}, \theta_C; \gamma_S, q)$ since he is privately informed about the incumbent's quality λ_I .

Effect of implementation on retention probabilities The saboteur knows the incumbent's quality $\lambda_I \in \{0, 1\}$ and has beliefs (that are correct in equilibrium) about the probability the voter will retain the incumbent π_e^y down each path of play. He can thus calculate how much implementation will affect the probability that the voter retains the incumbent, which crucially influences his willingness to sabotage. Because the probability of success depends on the incumbent policy's quality λ_I , so too does the impact of implementation on the probability of retention. We henceforth call this quantity the *impact probability* for quality λ_I , and denote it as $\Delta_{\lambda_i}(\pi_e^y)$.

Should the saboteur engage in sabotage ($e = 0$), failure will result for sure and the retention probability will be π_0 . If he instead implements the incumbent policy ($e = 1$), it will succeed and fail with probabilities q_{λ_I} and $1 - q_{\lambda_I}$, respectively; the incumbent will be retained and defeated with probabilities π_1^1 and π_1^0 , respectively. The impact probability for an incumbent policy of quality λ_I is thus:

$$\Delta_{\lambda_i}(\pi_e^y) = (q_{\lambda_I} \cdot \pi_1^1 + (1 - q_{\lambda_I}) \cdot \pi_1^0) - \pi_0^0 = (\pi_1^0 - \pi_0^0) + q_{\lambda_I} (\pi_1^1 - \pi_1^0)$$

Total net benefit Combining the preceding observations, the net benefit to the saboteur of implementation is:

$$q_{\lambda_I} \gamma_S + \delta \Delta_{\lambda_i}(\cdot) (V(\mathbf{1}_{\lambda_I=H}, \theta_C; \gamma_S, q) + U(x_S; x_I, x_C)).$$

Implementing an incumbent policy of quality λ_i is a best response i.f.f. this quantity is ≥ 0 , and sabotage is a best response i.f.f. this quantity is ≤ 0 .

To simplify the analysis we henceforth assume that the ideological conflict between the saboteur and the voter is sufficiently large that that the saboteur would prefer to sabotage under relatively strong conditions. Specifically, as long as the impact Δ_H of sabotage is at least q_H , we assume the saboteur will want to sabotage a high quality incumbent ($\lambda_i = H$) even knowing that the challenger is both low quality ($\theta_C = 0$) and assured to fail ($q_L = 0$).

Assumption 1 Assume $q_H \gamma_S + \delta q_H (V(\mathbf{1}_{\lambda_I=H}, 0; \gamma_S, q_L = 0) + U(x_S; x_I, x_C)) < 0$

$$\iff \frac{-U(x_S; x_I, x_C)}{\gamma_S} > \frac{1}{\delta} + q_H$$

Assumption 1 amounts to a condition that the saboteur's relative ideological preference for the challenger is sufficiently strong. When it holds there is a unique strictly interior impact probability $\bar{\Delta}_{\lambda_i}(\cdot) \in (0, 1)$ for each incumbent type:

$$\bar{\Delta}_{\lambda_I}(\cdot) = \frac{q_{\lambda_I}}{\delta \left(\frac{-U(x_S; x_I, x_C)}{\gamma_S} - (q_H - q_L)(\mathbf{1}_{\lambda_I=H} - \theta_C) \right)} \quad (1)$$

above which the saboteur would strictly prefer to sabotage an incumbent of that type, and below which he would not. Because $q_H > 0$ (high quality policies generate more valence "today") and $V(\mathbf{1}, \theta_C; \gamma_S, q) > V(\mathbf{0}, \theta_C; \gamma_S, q)$ (high quality policies generate more valence "tomorrow"), it is straightforward that $\bar{\Delta}_H(\cdot) > \bar{\Delta}_L(\cdot)$. That is, the electoral impact of sabotage must be *higher* to induce sabotage of a high quality incumbent because the saboteur also values valence, so sabotaging high quality incumbents is intrinsically costlier.

3.2.2 The Voter's Calculus

When the voter makes her retention decision, she has already formed interim beliefs about the incumbent's quality, which we denote $\tilde{\theta}_I^{e,y}(e_L, e_H)$. These beliefs are calculated from Bayes' rule whenever possible, and are based on two observable actions: whether or not

the saboteur exerted effort e , and the valence outcome y (success or failure). The beliefs also depend what the voter thinks about the saboteur's unobserved strategy (e_L, e_H) — that is, the likelihood he that exerts effort for each type of incumbent. (The voter's beliefs about the challenger policy remain at the prior θ_C since the saboteur is uninformed about the quality of policymakers out of office.) The voter decides whether to retain the incumbent based on these beliefs. We examine the retention decision and the formation of beliefs in turn.

Retention Decision Given the voter's interim beliefs $\tilde{\theta}_I^{e,y}(\cdot)$ about the incumbent quality, her net benefit from retaining the incumbent is:

$$\gamma_V \left(\tilde{\theta}_I^{e,y}(\cdot) - \theta_C \right) (q_H - q_L) + U(x_V; x_I, x_C)$$

She will thus choose to retain the incumbent i.f.f. :

$$\tilde{\theta}_I^{e,y}(\cdot) \geq \theta_C - \frac{U(x_V; x_I, x_C)}{\gamma_V (q_H - q_L)} = \bar{\theta}_C(x_V, x_I, x_C; \gamma_V, q_H, q_L),$$

where $\bar{\theta}_C(\cdot)$ denotes the voter's *belief threshold* for retention. To isolate attention to conflict between the saboteur and the voter, we henceforth restrict attention to the region of the parameter space where the voter prefers to *retain* an incumbent known to be good, but *replace* an incumbent known to be bad—that is, where $\bar{\theta}_C(\cdot) \in (0, 1)$.

Belief Formation We next calculate the voter's beliefs after each observable outcome. First consider when the saboteur does not engage in sabotage ($e = 1$), so both success and failure are possible. After success and failure, the voter's updated beliefs are

$$\tilde{\theta}_I^{1,1}(\cdot) = \frac{\theta_I e_H q_H}{\theta_I e_H q_H + (1 - \theta_I) e_L q_L} \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{\theta}_I^{1,0}(\cdot) = \frac{\theta_I e_H (1 - q_H)}{\theta_I e_H (1 - q_H) + (1 - \theta_I) e_L (1 - q_L)} \quad (2)$$

Success causes the voter to revise her beliefs upward from what they would be after observing implementation alone, while failure causes her to update downward. Consequently, $\tilde{\theta}_I^{1,1}(\cdot) > \tilde{\theta}_I^{1,0}(\cdot)$, unless the saboteur's decision to implement the policy has already perfectly signaled that the policy is high quality ($e_L = 0$ and $e_H > 0$, implying $\tilde{\theta}_I^{1,1}(\cdot) = \tilde{\theta}_I^{1,0}(\cdot) = 1$) or low quality ($e_L > 0$ and $e_H = 0$, implying $\tilde{\theta}_I^{1,1}(\cdot) = \tilde{\theta}_I^{1,0}(\cdot) = 0$).

Next consider if the saboteur engages in sabotage $e = 0$, after which failure is assured.

After that failure, the voter's interim belief is:

$$\tilde{\theta}_I^{0,0}(\cdot) = \frac{\Pr(\lambda_I = H, e = 0)}{\Pr(e = 0)} = \frac{\theta_I(1 - e_H)}{\theta_I(1 - e_H) + (1 - \theta_I)(1 - e_L)} \quad (3)$$

Incumbent Popularity Equilibrium turns out to depend crucially on what the voter's beliefs and retention decisions would be if sabotage and effort were themselves uninformative about the incumbent's quality. We therefore also specifically characterize these beliefs, and term the retention decisions that they lead to the incumbent's initial *popularity*.

After sabotage, the voter's beliefs would just remain at the prior θ_I if sabotage were uninformative. The voter's beliefs after success and failure if effort were uninformative are $\tilde{\theta}_I^{1,y}(1, 1)$; that is, the beliefs characterized in equations 2-3 if the voter believed the saboteur to be *pooling on implementation* ($e_L = e_H = 1$). Denoting these beliefs as $\tilde{\theta}_I^y$ we have:

$$\tilde{\theta}_I^1 = \frac{\theta_I q_H}{\theta_I q_H + (1 - \theta_I) q_L} \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{\theta}_I^0 = \frac{\theta_I(1 - q_H)}{\theta_I(1 - q_H) + (1 - \theta_I)(1 - q_L)}$$

Clearly $0 < \tilde{\theta}_I^0 < \theta_I < \tilde{\theta}_I^1 < 1$ (failure and success are imperfect "bad news" and "good news" about the incumbent's quality, respectively). Using these beliefs we now divide the incumbent's initial popularity into four categories for the purposes of equilibrium analysis.

Definition 1 *The incumbent is said to be*

(VU) **Very unpopular** *i.f.f.* $\tilde{\theta}_I^0 < \theta_I < \tilde{\theta}_I^1 \leq \bar{\theta}_C(\cdot)$

(SU) **Somewhat unpopular** *i.f.f.* $\tilde{\theta}_I^0 < \theta_I \leq \bar{\theta}_C(\cdot) < \tilde{\theta}_I^1$

(SP) **Somewhat popular** *i.f.f.* $\bar{\theta}_C(\cdot) \leq \theta_I < \tilde{\theta}_I^1$

(VP) **Very popular** *i.f.f.* $\bar{\theta}_C(\cdot) \leq \tilde{\theta}_I^0 < \theta_I < \tilde{\theta}_I^1$

A popular incumbent is one who would be retained in the absence of new information (either from the saboteur's observed decisions, or from success and failure), while an unpopular incumbent is one who would be replaced. The distinction between a "very" and "somewhat" popular or unpopular incumbent is based on what the voter would do after observing success or failure (but inferring nothing from the absence of sabotage alone); she would follow her




Figure 1: The popularity of the incumbent and its relationship to retention.

prior for a “very” popular or “very” unpopular policy regardless of the outcome, but base her retention decisions on observed success or failure for a “somewhat” popular or “somewhat” unpopular policy. Figure 1 provides a visual summary of the definition of popularity.

4 An uninformed saboteur

We first consider when the saboteur is no better informed than the voter, so that the voter infers nothing *directly* from the saboteur’s decision. She thus follows her prior θ_I if she observes sabotage since it suppresses the revelation of additional information about quality via outcomes; otherwise she updates her beliefs to $\tilde{\theta}_I^y$ based on success or failure.

Proposition 1 *Suppose that the saboteur is uninformed about the incumbent’s quality. Then there is a unique sequential equilibrium⁴ in which the saboteur sabotages if and only if the incumbent is somewhat unpopular.*

Figure 2 summarizes the equilibrium; the top panel depicts the probability of sabotage, while the bottom panel depicts the probability the incumbent is retained as a function of both the sabotage decision and policy success or failure. In both panels, the horizontal axis

⁴Sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982) is necessary to ensure that the voter does not “infer” something from sabotage off the equilibrium path that an uninformed saboteur cannot know.




Figure 2: Summary of equilibrium results when the saboteur is *uninformed* about the quality of the incumbent. The top panel depicts the probability of sabotage across the four popularity regions, while the bottom panels depict the probability the incumbent is retained.

captures the probability θ_C that the challenger is of high quality—varying this parameter over $[0, 1]$ generates the four popularity regions. In the bottom panel, the dashed (red) lines depict the probability that a low-quality incumbent is sabotaged, while the solid (green)

lines depict the probability that a high-quality incumbent is sabotaged.

The calculus of an uninformed saboteur is straightforward. He can allow the incumbent to proceed naturally, which will generate success with a probability associated with the policy's underlying quality. Alternatively, he can sabotage, which suppresses information about incumbent quality, but also destroys valence (in expectation). If the incumbent is very popular or very unpopular there is no benefit to sabotage; the voter's decision will be unaffected, so it simply results in foregone valence. When the incumbent is somewhat popular, sabotage actually *backfires*; not only would the voter retain the incumbent and the saboteur would lose valence, but sabotage eliminates the possibility that voter would learn through failure that she wishes to *replace* the incumbent. Only when the incumbent is *somewhat unpopular* does sabotage make sense. In this case, if the saboteur implements the policy, a success would lead the voter to retain. Sabotage thus deprives the voter of the opportunity to learn through success that she would actually prefer to retain the incumbent who she would have otherwise replaced, and is profitable if the saboteur's relative ideological value for the challenger's policy is sufficiently high.

5 An informed saboteur

When the saboteur is privately informed about the quality of the incumbent policy, the effect of sabotage on the voter's beliefs is more complicated. Sabotage suppresses the revelation of information about the policy via *outcomes*. However, since the voter understands that the decision to sabotage is strategic, sabotage may *itself* signal that the incumbent is high quality if the act represents the saboteur's attempt to conceal this fact. Similarly, the calculus of a privately informed saboteur is more complicated because he does not have an unambiguously greater incentive to sabotage one type of incumbent or the other. Instead, there are two competing forces, and which one dominates depends on exactly how the voter uses policy outcomes in her retention decisions.

The first force is the saboteur's intrinsic value on valence. Since a high quality incumbent is more likely to generate valence than a low quality one, more valence is lost (in expectation)

when a high quality incumbent is sabotaged. This force creates a greater willingness to sabotage a low quality incumbent versus a high quality one. In the preceding analysis this property is manifested in $\bar{\Delta}_H(\cdot) > \bar{\Delta}_L(\cdot)$; that is, a higher electoral impact of sabotage is necessary to induce sabotage of a high quality incumbent versus a low quality one.

The second force is the potentially greater electoral competitiveness of high quality incumbents. If their policies are implemented, high quality incumbents are more likely to succeed by virtue of their greater ability. If the voter is strongly basing her retention decision on success and failure ($\pi_1^1 - \pi_1^0$ is large) then high quality incumbents are therefore also more likely to be retained if not sabotaged. This force pushes in the direction of a greater willingness to sabotage a high quality incumbent versus a low quality one, as sabotage is more likely to block a successful outcome that would improve the incumbent’s electoral fortunes.

In equilibrium, what a rational voter infers from the decision to sabotage or not depends on which of these two forces dominates. As we will show, the presence of these competing forces can both *increase* or *decrease* the amount of sabotage that occurs relative to when the saboteur is uninformed. In addition, it is possible for a rational saboteur to engage in sabotage even though it *improves* the incumbent’s reputation.

Determining what a rational voter should infer from sabotage or effort also requires a way of determining the voter’s beliefs when she expects one action from the saboteur (e.g. always sabotage regardless of the incumbent’s quality), but instead sees the other (e.g. effort). For this we apply an equilibrium refinement in the spirit of D1 (Cho and Kreps 1987)—henceforth called simply D1. This effectively states that “off the equilibrium path,” the voter should believe that the incumbent is of a quality that would have induced the saboteur to take the unexpected action for the largest set of “reasonable” responses by the voter.⁵

⁵Determining the set of “reasonable” off-path responses for the voter requires a modification to D1 since nature has an intervening move after the saboteur’s decision. See the Appendix for details.

5.1 A Somewhat Unpopular Incumbent

We first discuss the arguably most interesting case, that of a somewhat unpopular incumbent. Such an incumbent will be replaced unless a policy success occurs that improves her reputation; recall that when the saboteur is uninformed, this induces him to sabotage. When the saboteur is informed, however, sabotage may backfire and improve the incumbent’s reputation if it signals that the incumbent is high quality. Can this effect induce a privately informed saboteur to refrain from sabotage in equilibrium that he would otherwise undertake if uninformed? The answer is “yes”:

Proposition 2 *If the saboteur is informed and the incumbent is somewhat unpopular, then the following equilibrium satisfies D1: the saboteur never sabotages, and the voter only replaces after seeing both implementation and failure.*

When the voter *expects* the saboteur to refrain from sabotage and the incumbent is somewhat unpopular (or somewhat popular), policy outcomes maximally influence her retention decision—she will retain the incumbent if and only if the policy succeeds ($\pi_1^1 - \pi_1^0 = 1$). This electoral behavior maximizes the saboteur’s incentive to sabotage a high quality incumbent, which in turn leads the voter to infer from *unexpected* sabotage that the incumbent is high quality and retain him, which then induces the saboteur to refrain from it.

We next ask whether it is also possible for a privately informed saboteur to always sabotage in equilibrium, *even though* the voter knows that she is privately informed about the incumbent’s quality. Somewhat surprisingly, the answer is also “yes”:

Proposition 3 *If the saboteur is informed and the incumbent is somewhat unpopular, then the following equilibrium satisfies D1: the saboteur always sabotages, the voter always replaces the incumbent, and should the voter unexpectedly see effort she retains.*

When the voter *expects* sabotage and the incumbent is somewhat unpopular, it will lead her to replace—not because she infers anything from sabotage itself, but precisely because she

does not. However, the effectiveness of sabotage on both low and high quality incumbents, combined with the greater intrinsic cost of sabotaging high quality incumbents, actually makes it costlier to sabotage a low quality incumbent. Consequently, should the saboteur unexpectedly decline to sabotage, the voter will infer that the incumbent is high quality and retain regardless of the policy, which in turn induces the saboteur to sabotage.

The preceding analysis illustrates the complexity of predicting what a rational voter should infer from sabotage or its absence, and thus what the saboteur will do—what the voter will think depends strongly on what she expects. However, both of the preceding equilibria have the undesirable property that one action is “off the equilibrium path,” which requires a criteria (D1) for determining what the voter should believe if she sees an unexpected action. As it turns out, there exists an equilibrium in which both sabotage and its absence occur:

Proposition 4 *If the saboteur is informed and the incumbent is somewhat unpopular, then the following is an equilibrium:*

- *The saboteur’s probability of implementation for each type of incumbent is*

$$0 < e_H = \left(\frac{q_L}{q_H - q_L} \right) \left(\frac{\bar{\theta}_C(\cdot) - \theta_I}{\theta_I(1 - \bar{\theta}_C(\cdot))} \right) < e_L = \left(\frac{q_H}{q_H - q_L} \right) \left(\frac{\bar{\theta}_C(\cdot) - \theta_I}{\bar{\theta}_C(\cdot)(1 - \theta_I)} \right) < 1$$

- *The voter’s probabilities of retaining after failure, sabotage, and success are*

$$\pi_1^0 = 0 < \pi_0^0 = \frac{q_L \bar{\Delta}_H(\cdot) - q_H \bar{\Delta}_L(\cdot)}{q_H - q_L} < \pi_1^1 = \frac{\bar{\Delta}_H(\cdot) - \bar{\Delta}_L(\cdot)}{q_H - q_L} < 1$$

We label this equilibrium the “sometimes sabotage” equilibrium, and its structure is as follows. First, the saboteur sometimes sabotages *both* high and low quality incumbents; somewhat surprisingly, however, he is actually *more likely* to sabotage a high quality one! Sabotage thus perversely *improves* the incumbent’s reputation, leading the voter to sometimes retain them. Conversely, the absence of sabotage harms the incumbent’s reputation, but not so much that a policy success cannot overcome it. An incumbent who succeeds is retained with a higher probability than an incumbent who is sabotaged, but an incumbent who fails is always replaced.

In the “sometimes sabotage” equilibrium, both forces that potentially influence the saboteur’s incentive to sabotage each type of incumbent operate. The saboteur’s value for quality makes sabotaging a high quality incumbent more costly. Simultaneously, the voter’s use of outcomes in her retention decisions makes sabotaging a high quality incumbent more electorally damaging. In equilibrium, these forces exactly balance each other out, leading the saboteur to sometimes sabotage both types of incumbents.

We summarize this equilibrium in Figure 3, which parallels Figure 2 except that it summarizes the results when the saboteur is informed of the incumbent’s quality. For purposes of comparison, the figure also present the results with an informed saboteur from the other three popularity regions, which are discussed below. Notably, as compared to when the saboteur is uninformed, sabotage is not as electorally damaging; sabotage by an uninformed saboteur always leads the voter to replace, but sabotage by an informed saboteur only sometimes does so due to the reputational bump that sabotage generates. Conversely, a policy success when the saboteur is informed is also not as electorally beneficial; success when the saboteur is uninformed ensures reelection, but success when the saboteur is informed only sometimes leads to reelection due to the reputational harm that sabotage’s absence inflicts.

Welfare and Comparative Statics

Having characterized three potential equilibria, we now ask whether it is possible to select one using a welfare criteria—is one equilibrium superior for both players? Unfortunately, the answer is no; the voter is better off in equilibria with less sabotage, while the saboteur is better off in equilibria with more.

Proposition 5 *Pooling on implementation is best for the voter and worst for the saboteur. Pooling on sabotage is best for the saboteur and worst for the voter. Sometimes sabotaging is intermediate for both players.*

An interesting implication of Proposition 5 is that the saboteur does not benefit from (and can even be harmed by) having superior information, as it can cause sabotage to backfire.




Figure 3: Summary of equilibrium results when the saboteur is *informed* about the quality of the incumbent. The top panel depicts the probability of sabotage across the four popularity regions, while the bottom panels depict the probability the incumbent is retained.

Despite the absence of a rigorous criterion for selection, the equilibrium in which sabotage sometimes occurs has a certain empirical plausibility, as it is the only one in which both sabotage and its absence occur on the equilibrium path. Consequently, we later connect

this equilibrium to the real world politics of the Affordable Care Act. It is also the most interesting, as it clearly illustrates how all of the following are possible: a rational voter can understand the saboteur’s greater incentive to sabotage a high quality incumbent; the voter can respond to it by sometimes reelecting such an incumbent; yet the saboteur may nevertheless sometimes pursue sabotage.

We conclude this section by examining comparative statics in this equilibrium (behavior is invariant to the underlying model parameters in the two pooling equilibria). We first consider the saboteur’s probability of sabotaging.

Proposition 6 *When the incumbent is somewhat unpopular, the probability $1 - e_{\lambda_I}$ that the saboteur sabotages both types of incumbents is:*

- *decreasing in the challenger’s reputation, θ_C , and in the voter’s weight on quality γ_V*
- *increasing in the voter’s spatial preference for the incumbent $U(x_V; x_I, x_C)$ and the incumbent’s reputation θ_I*

When the incumbent is somewhat unpopular, the key determinant of the likelihood that each type of incumbent is sabotaged is the need to keep the voter indifferent to retaining the incumbent in the face of both sabotage *and* policy success. If the voter becomes more inclined *ex ante* to *replace* the incumbent *ceteris paribus* (higher θ_C or γ_V , lower $U(x_V; x_I, x_C)$ or θ_I), then sabotage must become stronger “good news” about the incumbent to make the voter willing to sometimes retain after sabotage. Simultaneously, implementation must become weaker “bad news” about the incumbent to make the voter willing to sometimes reelect after success. Thus, the presence of sabotage must become more informative about the incumbent’s quality, but its absence less informative, so that the total amount of information communicated by the saboteur’s behavior is constant. This can only be accomplished by having the probability of sabotage decrease for both types.

We next examine the voter’s retention probabilities.

Proposition 7 *When the incumbent is somewhat unpopular, the voter’s probability of retaining the incumbent after both success π_1^1 and after sabotage π_0 , as well as the difference between them $\pi_1^1 - \pi_0$, is decreasing in the saboteur’s relative value $-\frac{U(x_S; x_I, x_C)}{\gamma_S}$ for the challenger policy, his weight on the future δ , and the challenger’s reputation θ_C .*

The key determinant of the probabilities that the incumbent is retained following both success and sabotage is the need to keep the saboteur indifferent over sabotaging both types of incumbents. In the “sometimes sabotage” equilibrium, the impact of effort on the probability an incumbent of each type is retained is $\Delta_{\lambda_i} = q_{\lambda_I} \pi_1^1 - \pi_0$. Recalling that $\bar{\Delta}_{\lambda_I}$ is the impact probability that makes the saboteur indifferent to sabotaging an incumbent of quality λ_I , equilibrium requires that $\bar{\Delta}_{\lambda_I} = q_{\lambda_I} \pi_1^1 - \pi_0 \forall \lambda_i$.

To understand the comparative statics, we first note (and prove in the Appendix) that $\bar{\Delta}_{\lambda_I}$, $\bar{\Delta}_H - \bar{\Delta}_L$, and $\bar{\Delta}_H - \frac{q_H}{q_L} \bar{\Delta}_L$ are all decreasing in $-\frac{U(x_S; x_I, x_C)}{\gamma_S}$, δ , and θ_C . In words, as the saboteur’s weight on ideology, the future, or the challenger’s reputation increases, his willingness to sabotage both types of incumbents both increases and becomes more similar. These observations imply the desired comparative statics. First, the voter’s probability of retention after success π_1^1 determines how *different* is the electoral impact of effort for a high versus low quality incumbent, since they have different likelihoods of succeeding. When the difference $\bar{\Delta}_H - \bar{\Delta}_L$ in the thresholds that trigger sabotage for each type decrease, so too must π_1^1 . For a similar reason, the probability of retaining after sabotage π_0 must decrease in $\bar{\Delta}_H - \frac{q_H}{q_L} \bar{\Delta}_L$. Finally, the difference in the probability of retaining after success and sabotage $\pi_1^1 - \pi_0$ effectively captures the electoral impact of effort for both incumbent types; so as both thresholds $(\bar{\Delta}_H, \bar{\Delta}_L)$ for sabotage decrease, so too must $\pi_1^1 - \pi_0$.

5.2 A Very Popular Incumbent

We now transition to the case where the saboteur is uninformed and the incumbent is very popular. A key finding from the preceding section is that being more informed about the incumbent’s quality may cause the saboteur to engage in sabotage less often. We now show that when the incumbent is very popular, the opposite is true: an informed saboteur

will sabotage *more* than an uninformed one.

Recall that an uninformed saboteur never sabotages a very popular incumbent because nothing can be accomplished from doing so—the voter will simply retain them. For the same reason, it cannot be an equilibrium for an informed saboteur to *always* (that is, regardless of the incumbent’s quality) sabotage a very popular incumbent—the voter will neither observe outcomes nor infer anything from sabotage, and will thus retain the incumbent for sure.

The logic breaks down, however, when considering whether it is an equilibrium for the informed saboteur to *never* sabotage a very popular incumbent. When the voter knows that the saboteur is privately informed about the incumbent’s quality, the unexpected presence of sabotage itself contains information about that quality. The effectiveness and equilibrium incidence of sabotage thus hinges on a simple question—what should the voter infer about the incumbent’s quality in the face of unexpected sabotage?

For a very popular incumbent, the answer is simple: she should infer that the incumbent is low quality and replace him. Somewhat counterintuitively, the reason is that the saboteur intrinsically values quality. If the incumbent is so popular *ex ante* that he will be retained even after policy failure, then there is *no greater electoral benefit* to sabotaging a high quality incumbent than a low quality one—the former will succeed with a higher probability than the latter, but both will be retained regardless. Since it is intrinsically costlier to sabotage a high quality incumbent than a low quality one (as more valence will be lost) the voter will infer that an incumbent who is unexpectedly sabotaged is definitely low quality. But should she make this inference, sabotage will indeed harm the incumbent’s reputation enough to induce the voter to replace, and the saboteur will always want to sabotage the incumbent. This logic implies that in equilibrium, some sabotage *must* occur.

In this case there is a unique equilibrium that satisfies D1; it is partially separating and takes the following form. First, sabotage must sometimes occur and harm the incumbent’s electoral prospects, and so must credibly communicate *some* negative information about the incumbent’s quality. However, it cannot perfectly communicate that the incumbent is low

quality; if it did, then sabotage would cause the incumbent to be replaced for sure, and the saboteur would always want to sabotage regardless of the incumbent's quality. Thus, the saboteur must *always* sabotage a low quality incumbent ($e_L = 0$), and *sometimes* sabotages a high quality one ($e_H > 0$). With this strategy, the absence of sabotage perfectly reveals that the incumbent is high quality and ensures the incumbent's reelection regardless of whether she succeeds or fails. The presence of sabotage, in contrast, credibly but *imperfectly* reveals that the incumbent is low quality, triggering replacement with an interior probability. Formally, the equilibrium is as follows.

Proposition 8 *Suppose that the saboteur is informed and the incumbent is very popular. Then there is a unique equilibrium satisfying refinement (D1) that takes the following form.*

- *The saboteur always sabotages a low quality incumbent policy ($e_L = 0$) and implements a high quality incumbent policy with probability $e_H = \frac{\theta_I - \bar{\theta}_C(\cdot)}{\theta_I(1 - \bar{\theta}_C(\cdot))}$*
- *The voter always retains the incumbent absent sabotage regardless of the outcome ($\pi_1^0 = \pi_1^1 = 1$), and retains after sabotage with an interior probability equal to $\pi_0^0 = 1 - \bar{\Delta}_H(\cdot)$*

The equilibrium thus exhibits a great deal of sabotage that would not occur if the saboteur were uninformed, and here sabotage definitively harms the incumbent's electoral prospects.

Comparative Statics We first consider the saboteur's probability of sabotaging.

Corollary 1 *When the incumbent is very popular, the saboteur always sabotages a low quality incumbent. The probability he sabotages a high quality incumbent is:*

- *increasing in the challenger's reputation, θ_C , and in the importance to the voter $\gamma_V (q_H - q_L)$ of having a high quality incumbent.*
- *decreasing in the voter's spatial preference for the incumbent $U(x_V; x_I, x_C)$ and the incumbent's reputation θ_I*

When the incumbent is very popular, the key determinant of the likelihood of sabotage is the need to keep the voter indifferent to retaining the incumbent in the face of sabotage. If the voter's propensity to retain the incumbent after sabotage increases *ceteris paribus* (higher $U(x_V; x_I, x_C)$ or θ_I), sabotage must become a more credible signal that the incumbent is low quality, and thus the saboteur must sabotage a high quality incumbent less. Conversely, if the voter's propensity to reelect the incumbent after sabotage decreases *ceteris paribus* (higher θ_C or $\gamma_V(q_H - q_L)$) sabotage must become a less credible signal that the incumbent is low quality, and thus the saboteur must sabotage a high quality incumbent more.

We last examine the voter's likelihood of retaining a sabotaged incumbent.

Corollary 2 *When the incumbent is very popular, the voter's probability of retaining the incumbent after sabotage is:*

- *increasing in the saboteur's relative value $-\frac{U(x_S; x_I, x_C)}{\gamma_S}$ for the challenger policy, his weight on the future δ , the challenger's reputation θ_C , and the likelihood q_L that a low quality incumbent produces quality.*
- *decreasing in the likelihood q_H that a high quality incumbent produces quality.*

When the incumbent is very popular, what determines the likelihood that the incumbent is retained after sabotage is the need to keep the saboteur indifferent to sabotaging a high quality incumbent. The higher is the likelihood that the incumbent is *still* retained despite sabotage, the lower is the saboteur's incentive to engage in it. Thus, if the saboteur's electoral incentive to sabotage a high quality incumbent goes up (due to a greater spatial value for the challenger $-U_S(\cdot)$, a greater weight on the future δ , a higher quality challenger θ_C , or a decreased importance of selecting high quality politicians q_L), the voter's likelihood of retaining the incumbent post-sabotage must increase to diminish his incentive to sabotage. Conversely, if the saboteur becomes less willing to sabotage because the importance of selecting high quality incumbents goes up (higher q_H or γ_S), the likelihood of retaining the incumbent post-sabotage must decrease to make sabotage more electorally effective.

5.3 Very Unpopular and Somewhat Popular Incumbents

We last consider the cases of very unpopular and somewhat popular incumbents. As it turns out, in these cases the behavior of an informed saboteur is exactly the same as an uninformed one: he never sabotages.

First consider a very unpopular incumbent, and recall the reason an uninformed saboteur never sabotages—he will get his desired electoral outcome either way. By the same logic, when the saboteur is informed, it remains an equilibrium to never sabotage regardless of the incumbent’s quality; since the incumbent already has no electoral prospects, sabotage cannot make them any worse.⁶

Proposition 9 *If saboteur is informed and the incumbent is very unpopular, then there is a unique Pareto-dominant equilibrium among those satisfying refinement (D1) in which the saboteur never sabotages and the incumbent is always replaced.*

We next consider a somewhat popular incumbent. Recall that an uninformed saboteur also never sabotages a somewhat popular incumbent because it will simply prevent the voter from learning via failure that she wishes to replace the incumbent. Never sabotage remains an equilibrium when the saboteur is informed, but for somewhat more subtle reasons. Similar to the somewhat unpopular case, the voter would infer from *unexpected* sabotage that the incumbent is *definitely* high quality and should be retained due to the saboteur’s greater electoral incentive to sabotage a high quality incumbent. As a result, the saboteur knows that sabotage would backfire and avoids it.⁷

⁶There are also two additional equilibria that satisfy D1—one in which the saboteur sometimes sabotages a low quality incumbent, and one in which he always sabotages both types of incumbents. However, because both of these equilibria are Pareto-dominated by the equilibrium in which the saboteur never sabotages, we omit their consideration from the main text.

⁷There are again two additional equilibria satisfying D1—one in which the saboteur always sabotages a low quality incumbent and sometimes sabotages a high quality one, and another in which he sometimes sabotages both types. However, because both of these equilibria are Pareto-dominated by the equilibrium in which the saboteur never sabotages, we again omit consideration from the main text.

Proposition 10 *Suppose that the saboteur is informed and the incumbent is somewhat popular. Then there is a unique Pareto-dominant equilibrium among those satisfying refinement (D1) in which the saboteur never sabotages.*

6 Empirical Implications

What empirical implications can we draw from the model? On the one hand, the presence of multiple equilibria makes it difficult to draw crisp implications from the totality of the results. On the other hand, the model with an uninformed saboteur makes a clear prediction about the likelihood of sabotage. If the saboteur values getting rid of an incumbent more than he values policy valence, Figure 2A shows that the probability of sabotage is non-monotonic with respect to the popularity of the incumbent: it should only occur in the “middle region” where the incumbent is somewhat unpopular, but *too* unpopular.

In addition, we believe that the results under an informed saboteur do produce new empirical insights. To see this, we return to our motivating example, the Republican Party’s sabotage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), aka Obamacare. To sensibly apply our model requires that its fundamental assumptions about the competing motivations of the saboteur hold. That is, it must have been the case that pivotal Republican decision-makers were at least in part motivated by “good policy” considerations such as increases in coverage and reductions in cost—and thus preferred the ACA to achieve these outcomes *if it would be law forevermore*. (In other words, it must be plausible that the policy generated some valence utility for Republicans.) This assumption is plausible given the origins of the architecture of the ACA in conservative think-tanks, which also helped inspire the passage of “Romneycare” in Massachusetts in 2006 (Cooper 2012). However, it must *also* be the case that Republicans found the resulting design of the law sufficiently unpalatable ideologically that they strongly preferred a more right-leaning approach if one were possible, and were willing to impede the short term success of the ACA to get one. This too appears highly plausible given the overtly stated goal of Republican party leaders to induce electoral turnover and a policy




Figure 4: Public opinion on Obamacare, 2010-2018. The data comes from the Kaiser Family Foundation (2018), which has regularly asked Americans the following question: “As you may know, a health reform bill was signed into law in 2010. Given what you know about the health reform law, do you have a generally favorable or generally unfavorable opinion of it?” The solid (black) line shows the percent of respondents with a favorable opinion; the dotted (red) line shows the percent of respondents with an unfavorable opinion; the bottom (purple) line shows the percent who answer “don’t know.” The shaded region shows the period in which Trump has been president.

change through their strategies. Most famously, then Senate Minority Leader (and now Majority Leader) Mitch McConnell proclaimed in 2010, “The single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president” (Barr 2010).

Moving to the politics and popularity of the ACA, as is well known, the passage of the Affordable Care Act was highly contentious, and the bill was approved effectively on a party-line vote. Perhaps not surprisingly, public support for the law was mixed from its inception. Figure 4 shows the proportion of Americans with a “Favorable”/“Unfavorable”/“Don’t Know” opinion of the law from March 2010 to August 2018 (see the caption for the source of the data and the exact question wording). Soon after passage, fewer than 50% of Americans approved of the law—though this number was slightly higher than the percentage who

disapproved. Thus, during this period the law appeared to be somewhat unpopular, in the sense that voters were unfavorably disposed toward it but only weakly so.

As is well documented, the law faced intense and immediate opposition from the Republican party. The day the House passed the bill in March 2010, Republican officials in numerous states filed lawsuits designed to block the implementation of the bill (CNN 2010). These challenges eventually resulted in the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in *National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius* (567 U.S. 519), which, while upholding the bill’s individual mandate as constitutional, ruled unconstitutional a provision of the bill that mandated that states expand their Medicaid program (or risk losing existing Medicaid funding). Following this decision, a number of states—mostly controlled by Republicans—opted not to expand their Medicaid programs, even though the federal government would fund about 90% of the increased costs. This led to a “coverage gap” in non-expansion states, which resulted in an estimated 2.2 million people not having health insurance (compared to the counter-factual under which every state took part in the expansion) (Garfield, Damico and Orgera 2018).

This is just one of a number of steps Republicans took to sabotage the law (Norris 2017). In 2014, House Republicans filed a lawsuit challenging a provision in the law that provided cost-sharing subsidies to lower income Americans. Under the ACA, the federal government reimburses health insurers for the additional coverage provided by the subsidies; Republicans alleged that the executive branch did not have the authority to distribute these reimbursements, since they were not specifically appropriated by the ACA. Consider also the ACA’s inclusion of “risk corridors,” which were designed to stabilize the individual markets by transferring funds from insurers to lower-than-expected claims to ones with higher-than-expected claims. According to (Norris 2017):

[In 2014], Republican lawmakers, led by Senator Marco Rubio, added language to a must-pass budget bill that retroactively made the risk corridors program budget neutral. This was after 2014 coverage had been provided for nearly the full year, and after 2015 open enrollment was already underway, with rates long-since locked-in.

Claims were indeed higher than expected in 2014. When the dust settled,

carriers with higher-than-expected claims were owed a total of \$2.87 billion, while carriers with lower-than-expected claims only contributed \$362 million to the program. HHS took that money—which they could no longer supplement with federal funding due to a [different spending bill]—and spread it around to all the insurers that were owed money, but they were only able to pay them 12.6 percent of what was owed.

Finally, Republicans launched a multi-year effort to argue that the text of the ACA implied that tax credits could be applied only in states with state-run exchanges, and not federally run exchanges. This interpretation, which would have profoundly affected coverage in the many states that chose not to set up their own exchanges, was rejected by the Supreme Court in 2015 in the case *King v. Burwell*.

Consider these acts of policy blocking—all of which were quite observable—from the perspective of the model. As noted above, the policy was somewhat unpopular at its inception. Republicans clearly had their eye on defeating Obama in the 2012 election—Obama himself had sufficiently moderate approval ratings that reelection was neither assured (i.e. he was not very popular) nor highly unlikely (i.e. he was not very unpopular). Thus, preventing the smooth implementation of Obamacare would make it less likely that the success of the policy would help propel him to victory. At the same time, it seems plausible that many voters nevertheless disapproved of the act of sabotaging—yet not enough to prevent sabotage from being optimal for Republicans. This interplay of incentives nicely illustrates the “Sometimes Sabotage” equilibrium described above in Proposition 4. Our reading is that Republicans did not sabotage *because* they thought doing so would harm the incumbent’s reputation. Rather, they engaged in sabotage *despite* the fact that it might improve Obama’s reputation, fearing that the absence of sabotage and a policy success would improve that reputation even more.

Of course, despite these initial efforts at sabotage, Obama was reelected in 2012. However, Republican opposition to Obamacare continued apace in his second term. With a presidential election upcoming in 2016, the incentives for Republicans had not really changed. And, indeed, Kogan and Wood (2017) present evidence suggesting that public response to the implementation problems with Obamacare may have shifted enough votes for Trump to defeat

Hillary Clinton. (To be sure, there were many “unforced errors” by the Obama administration, such as the disastrous rollout of `HealthCare.gov` in 2013, that also contributed to public disapproval of the policy).

7 Conclusion

We have presented a model of policy sabotage in which the ability of a saboteur to prevent implementation of a policy complicates a voter’s ability to select a politician who will perform the best in office. While many of the results are intuitive, we showed that the interaction of the possibility of sabotage and concerns over policy combine to create complicated incentives for a would-be saboteur and a challenging informational environment for voters. We motivated our inquiry with the following question: how can *observable* sabotage be rational for an out-party if the voter understands why such sabotage is occurring? Our model provides one answer. An opposition party does not sabotage because it thinks it will harm an incumbent’s reputation with rational voters. Rather, it sabotages *despite* the fact that sabotage will improve the incumbent’s reputation with rational voters, fearing that the absence of sabotage and a policy success will improve that reputation even more.

Our model, we believe, makes an important contribution to the general literature on democratic accountability discussed in Section 1. In addition, there is a connection between our results and a phenomenon called in the political agency literature called “gambling for resurrection” (Downs and Roche 1994). This occurs when a weak incumbent—that is, one who is somewhat unpopular in the language of our model—takes a risky action in the hopes that it will turn out well and get them over the electoral threshold (Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2017, Izzo 2018). In some sense, sabotage with an uninformed saboteur is the flipside of this—although the policy is exogenous, the equilibrium can be interpreted as an intermediary trying to intervene to *prevent* the incumbent from “gambling” that the policy valence will carry him to reelection.

Our model thus makes an initial step towards understanding the politics of sabotage—but it is surely far from the last. We chose to set our model within the broader literature on

democratic accountability. Yet other paths are available. For instance, certain actors—such as bureaucrats deep within the bowels of the federal bureaucracy—may be able to engage in sabotage without it being immediately observable to voters. This lack of detectability could both increase or decrease the amount of sabotage that occurs, as compared to the model we have analyzed.⁸ Sabotage may also have different effects from the one we have studied—for instance, it may change the status quo of a policy and/or the reversion point, thereby opening up opportunities for future bargaining. A “pivotal politics”-style model could pursue this path. Alternatively, where we modeled a single voter, sabotage may please some voters at the expense of others. Thus, a model with heterogeneous voters could produce additional insights. Finally, while we have focused on sabotage within the context of horizontally shared powers, the logic of our model could easily be extended to examine the incentives for sabotage in a system of federalism where local actors oppose national policies (Bulman-Pozen and Gerken 2008).

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⁸Under this scenario, the voter would only observe policy success or failure. Success would imply that the saboteur implemented the policy, but failure could occur either via sabotage or a “true” failure. As it turns out, the results when sabotage is unobservable are either more obvious or less interesting than the results from the variants we have presented. Unobservability has the obvious effect of increasing the saboteur’s incentive to engage in sabotage. However, it also makes it more difficult to credibly “signal” that the incumbent is low quality via sabotage because the signal is mixed up with signals of failure due to the incumbent’s ability. These two effects mean that making sabotage unobservable can both increase and decrease the equilibrium amount of sabotage, depending on the region. Perhaps most importantly, with observable sabotage, the saboteur will always be (weakly) more likely to sabotage low quality incumbents than high-quality ones, and thus in equilibrium policy success (failure) will always be a signal that the incumbent is high (low).

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Appendix

Notation: For simplicity we henceforth write the voter's net policy benefit for the incumbent policy $U(x_V; x_I, x_C)$ as $U_V \geq 0$ which is assumed to be positive, and write the agent's net benefit for the incumbent policy $U(x_S; x_I, x_C)$ as $-U_S$, where $U_S \geq 0$ denotes the agent's net utility for the challenger policy. We also write π_0^0 as just π_0 , π_1^1 as π_H , and π_1^0 as π_L . Finally, we suppress the explicit dependence of $\bar{\Delta}_{\lambda_I}(\cdot)$ and $\bar{\theta}_C(\cdot)$ on other quantities.

It is first helpful to show the property that $\bar{\Delta}_H > \frac{q_H}{q_L} \bar{\Delta}_L$, which furthermore has the implication that $\bar{\Delta}_H \leq q_H \rightarrow \bar{\Delta}_L < q_L$. This eliminates much of the parameter space and several potential types of equilibria. To see this, observe that the desired property is equivalent to

$$q_H \gamma + \delta \bar{\Delta}_L \frac{q_H}{q_L} \cdot (\gamma (q_H - q_L) (1 - \theta_C) - U_S) \geq 0$$

or

$$\frac{U_S - \gamma (q_H - q_L) (1 - \theta_C)}{U_S + \gamma \theta_C (q_H - q_L)} \leq 1$$

which clearly always holds.

A Preliminary Analysis

Equilibrium values of e_L and e_H in conjunction with the incumbent's initial popularity imply different possible restrictions on the retention probabilities π_0 , π_L , and π_H . These in turn imply different feasible pairs of (Δ_L, Δ_H) . Anticipating these restrictions, we first examine several relevant feasible sets of (π_0, π_L, π_H) and their implications for (Δ_L, Δ_H) . Specifically, for each type of triple (π_0, π_L, π_H) we characterize feasible Δ_L and then the feasible values of Δ_H given Δ_L . We then subsequently use this characterization in the equilibrium characterization.

In the subsequent case-by-base breakdown, (S) refers to "single mixing" (the voter mixes after one path of play) while (D) refers to "double-mixing" (the voter mixes after two paths of play).

Case S.1 ($\pi_0 \in (0, 1)$, $\pi_L = \pi_H = 1$), We have

$$\Delta_{\lambda_I} = 1 - \pi_0$$

Therefore feasible values of Δ_L are all $\Delta_L \in [0, 1]$ and $\Delta_H = \Delta_L$

Case S.2 ($\pi_0 = 0$, $\pi_L = 0$, $\pi_H \in (0, 1)$). We have

$$\Delta_{\lambda_I} = q_{\lambda_I} \pi_H$$

and it straightforward to show that $\Delta_L \in [0, q_L]$ and $\Delta_H = \frac{q_H}{q_L} \Delta_L$.

Case S.3 ($\pi_0 = 0$, $\pi_L \in (0, 1)$, $\pi_H = 1$). We have

$$\Delta_{\lambda_I} = q_{\lambda_I} + (1 - q_{\lambda_I}) \pi_L$$

and it is straightforward to show that $\Delta_L \in [q_L, 1]$ and $\Delta_H = q_H + \left(\frac{1 - q_H}{1 - q_L}\right) (\Delta_L - q_L)$ which is clearly $< \frac{q_H}{q_L} \Delta_L$.

Case S.4 ($\pi_0 \in [0, 1]$, $\pi_L = 0$, $\pi_H = 1$). We have

$$\Delta_{\lambda_I} = q_{\lambda_I} - \pi_0$$

so it is straightforward that $\Delta_L \in [0, q_L]$ and $\Delta_H = \Delta_L + (q_H - q_L)$.

Case D.1 ($\pi_0 \in [0, 1]$, $\pi_L = 0$, $\pi_H \in [0, 1]$). We have

$$\Delta_{\lambda_I} = -\pi_0 + q_{\lambda_I} \pi_H.$$

so it is straightforward that $\Delta_L \in [0, q_L]$. The potential values of Δ_H then fall in an interval that we will characterize. The minimum possible value of Δ_H occurs when $\pi_0 = 0$ which is case **S.2** and so $\Delta_H = \frac{q_H}{q_L} \Delta_L$. The maximum possible value of Δ_H occurs when when $\pi_H = 1$, which is **case S.4** and so the maximum value is $\Delta_H = \Delta_L + (q_H - q_L)$.

Summarizing, in Case D.1 we have $\Delta_L \in [0, q_L]$ and $\Delta_H \in \left[\frac{q_H}{q_L} \Delta_L, \Delta_L + (q_H - q_L) \right]$

Case D.2 ($\pi_0 \in [0, 1]$, $\pi_L \in [0, 1]$, $\pi_H = 1$). We have

$$\Delta_{\lambda_I} = q_{\lambda_I} + (1 - q_{\lambda_I}) \pi_L - \pi_0$$

so it is straightforward that we may have any $\Delta_L \in [0, 1]$. The minimum possible value of Δ_H occurs when $\pi_L = 1$ which implies $\Delta_H = \Delta_L$. The maximum possible value of Δ_H corresponds to the minimum possible value of π_L , which in turn depends on Δ_L . If $\Delta_L \in [0, q_L]$ then the minimum possible value of π_L is 0 and we are in case **S.4**, so $\Delta_H = \Delta_L + (q_H - q_L)$. If $\Delta_L \in [q_L, 1]$ then the minimum possible value of π_L must be > 0 ; the smallest feasible value corresponds with when $\pi_0 = 0$, so we are in case **S.3** and $\Delta_H = q_H + \left(\frac{1 - q_H}{1 - q_L} \right) (\Delta_L - q_L)$.

Summarizing, in case D.2 we have we have $\Delta_L \in [0, 1]$ and

- if $\Delta_L \in [0, q_L]$ then $\Delta_H = [\Delta_L, \Delta_L + (q_H - q_L)]$
- if $\Delta_L \in [q_L, 1]$ then $\Delta_H = \left[\Delta_L, q_H + \left(\frac{1 - q_H}{1 - q_L} \right) (\Delta_L - q_L) \right]$

B Equilibrium Characterization

This section proceeds by enumerating all the types of equilibria and deriving existence conditions for each. After this analysis the equilibria are summarized as a function of the primitive parameters.

B.1 Pooling on Effort Equilibria

We consider when pooling on effort is an equilibrium that satisfies D1 (Cho and Kreps 1987). Observe that when the voter observes sabotage, the only information he receives is from sabotage itself (since failure is assured). Consequently, when the saboteur is believed to be pooling on effort, any off-equilibrium path belief about the incumbent's type following sabotage $\tilde{\theta}_I^{0,0}(\cdot) \in [0, 1]$ satisfies sequential consistency (Kreps and Wilson 1982). Since the voter's reelection threshold $\bar{\theta}_C(\cdot) \in (0, 1)$, the voter's set of mixed best responses to consistent beliefs off the equilibrium path is *any* reelection probability $\pi_0 \in [0, 1]$. D1 thus requires the voter to assign probability weight 1 when one type of incumbent invites deviation for a strictly larger set of $\pi_0 \in [0, 1]$.

We now analyze the four popularity conditions.

A very unpopular policy ($\bar{\theta}_C \in \left[\frac{\theta_I q_H}{\theta_I q_H + (1-\theta_I) q_L}, 1 \right]$) We have $\pi_H^* = \pi_L^* = 0$ and $\Delta_L, \Delta_H \leq 0$, so it is indeed an equilibrium to pool on effort regardless of the voters off-path best response ($\pi_0^* \in [0, 1]$).

A somewhat (un)popular policy ($\bar{\theta}_C \in \left[\frac{\theta_I(1-q_H)}{\theta_I(1-q_H) + (1-\theta_I)(1-q_L)}, \frac{\theta_I q_H}{\theta_I q_H + (1-\theta_I) q_L} \right]$) Then $\pi_H = 1 > \pi_L = 0$ and potential off path behavior is $\pi_0 \in [0, 1]$. Now we ask what different values of π_0 imply for Δ_L and Δ_H —using case **S.3** the potential values of (Δ_L, Δ_H) are $\Delta_L \in [0, q_L]$ and $\Delta_H \in \Delta_L + (q_H - q_L)$.

If $\bar{\Delta}_L \geq q_L$ **then this is an equilibrium**; we know that this implies $\bar{\Delta}_H \geq q_H$ and so no off path beliefs can invite deviation; π_0^* may be anything.

If $\bar{\Delta}_L < q_L$, then **this is an equilibrium i.f.f.** $\bar{\Delta}_H \leq \bar{\Delta}_L + (q_H - q_L)$. In this case, the set of π_0 that invite deviation from a high type strictly contains the set that invite deviation from a low type, sabotage will be perceived as perfect good news (applying D1) and cause retention for sure so $\pi_0^* = 1$, and will therefore be undesirable.

Finally, if $\bar{\Delta}_L < q_L$ but $\bar{\Delta}_H > \bar{\Delta}_L + (q_H - q_L)$, then again applying D1 sabotage will be perceived as bad news or $\pi_0^* = 0$, implying $(\Delta_L = q_L, \Delta_H = q_H)$, the bureaucrat will want to deviate to sabotaging both types, and this is not an equilibrium.

Summarizing, for a somewhat unpopular or somewhat popular policy, pooling on effort is an equilibrium i.f.f.

- $\bar{\Delta}_L \geq q_L$ or $\bar{\Delta}_L < q_L$ and $\bar{\Delta}_H \leq \bar{\Delta}_L + (q_H - q_L)$

Equilibrium retention probabilities are $\pi_H^* = 1$, $\pi_L^* = 0$, and $\pi_0^* = 1$.

A very popular policy ($\bar{\theta}_C \in \left[0, \frac{\theta_I(1-q_H)}{\theta_I(1-q_H) + (1-\theta_I)(1-q_L)} \right]$) No news and failure leads to retention ($\pi_L = \pi_H = 1$). Then $\Delta_{\lambda_I} = 1 - \pi_0$ so $\Delta_L \in [0, 1]$ and $\Delta_H = \Delta_L$, the set of π_0 that invite deviation from a bad type is always strictly larger than the set inviting deviation from a good type, sabotage should be perceived as *bad news* and cause the policy to be tossed for sure, so $\pi_0^* = 0$, $\Delta_L = \Delta_H = 1$, sabotage will be desirable for both types and this is **not an equilibrium**.

Summary Pooling on effort is an equilibrium that satisfies D1 i.f.f.

- The policy is very unpopular, so $\pi_H^* = \pi_L^* = 0$ and any π_0^*
- The policy is somewhat unpopular or somewhat popular (so $\pi_H^* = 1 > \pi_L^* = 0$), and either $\bar{\Delta}_L \geq q_L$ (with any π_0^*) or $\bar{\Delta}_L < q_L$ and $\bar{\Delta}_H \leq \bar{\Delta}_L + (q_H - q_L)$ (with $\pi_0^* = 1$)

B.2 Pooling on Sabotage Equilibria

We consider when pooling on sabotage is an equilibrium that satisfies a modification of D1 (Cho and Kreps 1987). Specifically, when considering which incumbent type is more likely to invite deviation by the saboteur, we restrict attention to the set of off-equilibrium path mixed strategies by the voter that are best responses to sequentially consistent off-path beliefs (Kreps and Wilson 1982). Unlike the standard signalling game, sequential consistency imposes some constraints on the voter's off-equilibrium-path beliefs because nature sends an additional signal (success or failure) to the voter following the saboteur's move.

It is easily verified that when the saboteur is believed to be pooling on sabotage, any off equilibrium path belief about the incumbent's type $\tilde{\theta}_I^1(\cdot) \in [0, 1]$ prior to the observation of success and failure satisfy sequential consistency. However, these beliefs will then be updated following success and failure using Bayes rule and the knowledge that high type incumbents succeed with probability q_H while low types succeed with probability q_L . The set of sequentially consistent beliefs following success and failure are thus

$$\tilde{\theta}_I^{1,1} = \frac{\tilde{\theta}_I^1 q_H}{\tilde{\theta}_I^1 q_H + (1 - \tilde{\theta}_I^1) q_L} \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{\theta}_I^{1,0} = \frac{\tilde{\theta}_I^1 (1 - q_H)}{\tilde{\theta}_I^1 (1 - q_H) + (1 - \tilde{\theta}_I^1) (1 - q_L)}$$

for any value of $\tilde{\theta}_I^1 \in [0, 1]$. It is straightforward to verify that both $\tilde{\theta}_I^{1,1}$ and $\tilde{\theta}_I^{1,0}$ may each take any value $\in [0, 1]$, but $\tilde{\theta}_I^{1,1} = \tilde{\theta}_I^{1,0}$ if and only if $\tilde{\theta}_I^1 = 1$ or $\tilde{\theta}_I^1 = 0$; otherwise $\tilde{\theta}_I^{1,1} > \tilde{\theta}_I^{1,0}$. Consequently, when the saboteur is believed to be pooling on sabotage, the voter's off-equilibrium-path set of mixed best responses to consistent beliefs following effort and success or failure are (i) $\pi_L = 0$ and $\pi_H \in [0, 1)$, or (ii) $\pi_L \in (0, 1]$ and $\pi_H = 1$.

We now analyze the four popularity conditions.

An unpopular policy ($\bar{\theta}_C \leq \theta_P$) We argue pooling on sabotage is always an equilibrium. If the policy is unpopular then $\pi_0^* = 0$. Using that off-path actions are (i) $\pi_L = 0$ and $\pi_H \in [0, 1)$, or (ii) $\pi_L \in (0, 1]$ and $\pi_H = 1$ straightforwardly yields the contour of impact probabilities $\Delta_L \in [0, q_L]$ and $\Delta_H = \frac{q_H}{q_L} \Delta_L$, and $\Delta_L \in [q_L, 1]$ and $\Delta_H = q_H + \left(\frac{1-q_H}{1-q_L}\right) (\Delta_L - q_L)$ which is $< \frac{q_H}{q_L} \Delta_L$. Since we know $\bar{\Delta}_H > \frac{q_H}{q_L} \bar{\Delta}_L$, this implies the set of best responses inviting deviation from a high type is strictly larger than the set inviting deviation for a low type, implying effort should be interpreted as good news ($\pi_H^* = \pi_L^* = 1$) and cause the policy to be retained for sure, and is therefore an undesirable deviation, so this is an equilibrium.

A popular policy ($\bar{\theta}_C \geq \theta_P$) Then $\pi_0 = 1$ and pooling on sabotage is not an equilibrium, since sabotage gets the policy retained for sure and also destroys valence.

C (Partially) Separating Equilibria

We begin by ruling out certain types of strategy profiles.

First, we argue that $(e_L > 0, e_H = 0)$ cannot be an equilibrium (including both $e_L \in (0, 1)$ and $e_L = 1$, ruling out one type of separating equilibrium). Observe that effort is perfect bad news and causes policy to be tossed for sure ($\pi_L = \pi_H = 0$), so it will be strictly desirable to exert effort for both types, contradicting $e_H = 0$.

We next argue that $(e_L = 1, e_H < 1)$ cannot be an equilibrium. Observe that sabotage is perfect good news and causes the policy to be retained for sure ($\pi_0 = 1$), so effort will weakly decrease the chance policy is retained, so again it will be strictly desirable on both types, contradicting $e_H < 1$.

Last we argue that $(e_L = 0, e_H = 1)$ cannot be an equilibrium; combined with the above this rules out all separating equilibria. If so then effort perfectly reveals the incumbent is good while sabotage perfectly reveals the incumbent is bad; then $\pi_H = \pi_L = 1$ and $\pi_0 = 0$, but then the bureaucrat will strictly prefer to sabotage a good incumbent under our assumptions, contradicting $e_H = 1$.

The remaining possible equilibrium efforts are four types of partially separating equilibria:

- (P1) $e_L = 0, e_H \in (0, 1)$: effort is “perfect good news,” sabotage is “imperfect bad news”
- (P2) $e_L \in (0, 1), e_H = 1$: effort is “perfect bad news,” sabotage is “noisy good news”
- (P3) $0 < e_L < e_H < 1$: effort is “noisy good news,” sabotage is “noisy bad news”
- (P4) $0 < e_H < e_L < 1$: effort is “noisy bad news,” sabotage is “noisy good news”

We consider each and derive conditions under which it is an equilibrium satisfying D1.

(P1) $e_L = 0, e_H > 0$ Clearly $\pi_H = \pi_L = 1$. We first argue that for this to be an equilibrium requires the incumbent be popular or $\theta_I \geq \bar{\theta}_C$. If they are unpopular then $\pi_0 = 0$ and $\Delta_L = \Delta_H = 1$ and the agent will strictly prefer to sabotage a good policy, contradicting $e_H > 0$.

So suppose the incumbent is popular; we argue that it is always possible to derive an equilibrium of this form, and derive it. First, it is always possible to select e_H to generate principal indifference after sabotage generating $\pi_0 \in [0, 1]$, yielding case **S.1** from the preliminary analysis. This requires that

$$\bar{\theta}_C = \frac{\theta_I(1 - e_H)}{\theta_I(1 - e_H) + (1 - \theta_I)} \rightarrow e_H^* = \frac{\theta_I - \bar{\theta}_C}{(1 - \bar{\theta}_C)\theta_I}$$

Next, in S.1 we have $\Delta_H = 1 - \pi_0$, so to generate saboteur indifference with a high quality incumbent requires

$$\Delta_H = \bar{\Delta}_H \iff \pi_0 = 1 - \bar{\Delta}_H$$

Finally, we have $\Delta_L = \Delta_H = \bar{\Delta}_H > \bar{\Delta}_L$, so the saboteur strictly prefers to sabotage a low quality incumbent, supporting $e_L = 0$.

(P2) $e_L \in (0, 1), e_H = 1$ We have $\pi_0 = 0$. We first argue this cannot be an equilibrium if the incumbent is very popular. If so, then $\pi_H = \pi_L = 1$ (since effort is noisy good news), and the saboteur will strictly prefer to sabotage a high quality incumbent, contradicting $e_H = 1$.

Next suppose that the incumbent is somewhat (un)popular, implying that $\pi_H = 1$. We argue an equilibrium of this form exists in which $\pi_L \in (0, 1)$ i.f.f. $\bar{\Delta}_L \in [q_L, 1]$, and derive the equilibrium. First, it is always possible to select e_L to generate principal indifference

after effort and failure so that $\pi_L \in (0, 1)$, yielding case **S.3** from the preliminary analysis. This requires that

$$\bar{\theta}_C = \frac{\theta_I(1 - q_H)}{\theta_I(1 - q_H) + (1 - \theta_I)e_L(1 - q_L)} \rightarrow e_L^* = \frac{\theta_I(1 - q_H)}{(1 - \theta_I)(1 - q_L)} \bigg/ \frac{\bar{\theta}_C}{1 - \bar{\theta}_C}$$

Next, in S.3 we must have $\Delta_L \in [q_L, 1]$ and $\Delta_H = q_H + \left(\frac{1 - q_H}{1 - q_L}\right)(\Delta_L - q_L)$, which is clearly $< \frac{q_H}{q_L}\Delta_L$. So $\Delta_L = \bar{\Delta}_L \iff \bar{\Delta}_L \in [q_L, 1]$, the desired necessary condition. To derive π_L observe that

$$\bar{\Delta}_L = q_L + (1 - q_L)\pi_L \iff \pi_L = \frac{\bar{\Delta}_L - q_L}{1 - q_L}$$

Finally, $\Delta_H = q_H + \left(\frac{1 - q_H}{1 - q_L}\right)(\bar{\Delta}_L - q_L) < \frac{q_H}{q_L}\bar{\Delta}_L < \bar{\Delta}_H$, so the saboteur strictly prefers to exert effort for a high quality incumbent, supporting $e_H = 1$.

Finally, suppose that the incumbent is very unpopular, so e_L may be chosen to generate principal indifference after both failure ($\pi_L \in (0, 1)$ and $\pi_H = 1$) or success ($\pi_L = 0$ and $\pi_H \in (0, 1)$). Using the analysis in the somewhat (un)popular case, an equilibrium of the former type exists i.f.f. $\bar{\Delta}_L \in [q_L, 1]$, and the equilibrium quantities are as previously derived. We now argue that an equilibrium of the latter type exists i.f.f. $\bar{\Delta}_L \in [0, q_L]$. We must select e_L to generate principal indifference after effort and success so that $\pi_H \in (0, 1)$, yielding case **S.2** from the preliminary analysis. This requires that

$$\bar{\theta}_C = \frac{\theta_I q_H}{\theta_I q_H + (1 - \theta_I)e_L q_L} \rightarrow e_L^* = \frac{\theta_I q_H}{(1 - \theta_I)q_L} \bigg/ \frac{\bar{\theta}_C}{1 - \bar{\theta}_C}$$

Next, in S.2 we must have that $\Delta_L \in [0, q_L]$ and $\Delta_H = \frac{q_H}{q_L}\Delta_L$. So $\Delta_L = \bar{\Delta}_L \iff \bar{\Delta}_L \in [0, q_L]$, the desired necessary condition. To derive π_H observe that

$$\bar{\Delta}_L = q_L \pi_H \iff \pi_H = \frac{\bar{\Delta}_L}{q_L}$$

Finally, $\Delta_H = \frac{q_H}{q_L}\bar{\Delta}_L < \bar{\Delta}_H$, so the saboteur strictly prefers to exert effort for a high quality incumbent, supporting $e_H = 1$.

Summary There exists an equilibrium with $e_H = 1$ and $e_L \in (0, 1)$ i.f.f.

- The incumbent is very unpopular, somewhat unpopular, or somewhat popular and $\bar{\Delta}_L \in [q_L, 1]$. In the equilibrium

$$e_L^* = \frac{\theta_I(1 - q_H)}{(1 - \theta_I)(1 - q_L)} \bigg/ \frac{\bar{\theta}_C}{1 - \bar{\theta}_C}, \pi_0 = 0 < \pi_L = \frac{\bar{\Delta}_L - q_L}{1 - q_L} < \pi_H = 1$$

- The incumbent is very unpopular and $\bar{\Delta}_L \in [0, q_L]$. In the equilibrium

$$e_L^* = \frac{\theta_I q_H}{(1 - \theta_I)q_L} \bigg/ \frac{\bar{\theta}_C}{1 - \bar{\theta}_C}, \pi_0 = \pi_L = 0 < \pi_H = \frac{\bar{\Delta}_L}{q_L} < 1$$

(P3) $0 < e_L < e_H < 1$ First observe that when both $e_{\lambda_I} \in (0, 1) \forall \lambda_I$ we cannot have $\pi_H \in (0, 1)$ and $\pi_L \in (0, 1)$ since voter posterior beliefs after success are always strictly higher than posteriors after failure (unless effort is perfectly informative). Thus to generate saboteur mixing for both incumbent types requires $\pi_0 \in (0, 1)$ and either $0 = \pi_L < \pi_H < 1$ (case D.1) or $0 < \pi_L < 1 = \pi_H$ (case D.2).

We first argue that for an equilibrium with $0 < e_L < e_H < 1$ the following conditions are necessary and sufficient: (a) the incumbent is somewhat popular ($\bar{\theta}_C \in \left[\theta_I, \frac{\theta_I q_H}{\theta_I q_H + (1 - \theta_I) q_L} \right]$), (b) reelection probabilities are as in case D.2 ($0 < \pi_L < 1 = \pi_H$), (c) $\bar{\Delta}_L \in [0, q_L]$, and (d) $\bar{\Delta}_H \in [\bar{\Delta}_L, \bar{\Delta}_L + (q_H - q_L)]$.

If instead the incumbent were very popular then $\pi_H = \pi_L = 1$, a contradiction; if the incumbent were unpopular then $\pi_0 = 0$, also a contradiction. Finally, if the incumbent is somewhat popular then $\pi_H = 1$, so reelection probabilities must be as in case D.2.

Now if the incumbent is somewhat popular then it is always possible to select (e_L, e_H) to generate principal indifference after both sabotage and effort and failure. Equilibrium effort levels solve the following system of equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\theta_I e_H (1 - q_H)}{\theta_I e_H (1 - q_H) + (1 - \theta_I) e_L (1 - q_L)} &= \frac{1}{1 + \frac{(1 - \theta_I) e_L (1 - q_L)}{\theta_I e_H (1 - q_H)}} = \bar{\theta}_C \\ &= \frac{\theta_I (1 - e_H)}{\theta_I (1 - e_H) + (1 - \theta_I) (1 - e_L)} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{(1 - \theta_I) (1 - e_L)}{\theta_I (1 - e_H)}} \end{aligned}$$

which yields

$$\frac{e_L}{e_H} = \left(\frac{1 - q_H}{1 - q_L} \right) \left(\frac{\theta_I}{1 - \theta_I} \Big/ \frac{\bar{\theta}_C}{1 - \bar{\theta}_C} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{1 - e_L}{1 - e_H} = \frac{\theta_I}{1 - \theta_I} \Big/ \frac{\bar{\theta}_C}{1 - \bar{\theta}_C}$$

Solving then yields

$$e_L^* = \left(\frac{1 - q_H}{q_H - q_L} \right) \frac{(\theta_I - \bar{\theta}_C)}{\bar{\theta}_C (1 - \theta_I)} \quad \text{and} \quad e_H^* = \left(\frac{1 - q_L}{q_H - q_L} \right) \frac{(\theta_I - \bar{\theta}_C)}{\theta_I (1 - \bar{\theta}_C)}.$$

Finally, for the saboteur to mix on both types of incumbents requires that $\Delta_L = \bar{\Delta}_L$ and $\Delta_H = \bar{\Delta}_H$. We argue this implies $\bar{\Delta}_L \in [0, q_L]$, which in turn implies $\bar{\Delta}_H \in [\bar{\Delta}_L, \bar{\Delta}_L + (q_H - q_L)]$ from the preliminary analysis of case D.2. If instead $\bar{\Delta}_L \in [q_L, 1]$ then we must have $\bar{\Delta}_H \in \left[\bar{\Delta}_L, q_H + \left(\frac{1 - q_H}{1 - q_L} \right) (\bar{\Delta}_L - q_L) \right]$ (again from the preliminary analysis), but $\bar{\Delta}_H > \frac{q_H}{q_L} \bar{\Delta}_L > q_H + \left(\frac{1 - q_H}{1 - q_L} \right) (\bar{\Delta}_L - q_L)$, a contradiction. Finally, in case D.2 the retention probabilities are defined by the system $(\pi_L - \pi_0) + q_{\lambda_I} (1 - \pi_L) = \bar{\Delta}_{\lambda_I} \forall \lambda_I$ and we have

$$\pi_L = \frac{(q_H - \bar{\Delta}_H) - (q_L - \bar{\Delta}_L)}{q_H - q_L} \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_0 = \frac{(1 - q_L) (q_H - \bar{\Delta}_H) - (1 - q_H) (q_L - \bar{\Delta}_H)}{q_H - q_L}$$

(P4) $0 < e_H < e_L < 1$ We first argue that: (a) the incumbent must be somewhat unpopular ($\bar{\theta}_C \in \left[\frac{\theta_P (1 - q_H)}{\theta_P (1 - q_H) + (1 - \theta_P) (1 - q_L)}, \theta_I \right]$), (b) reelection probabilities are as in case D.1 ($\pi_0 \in (0, 1)$ and $0 = \pi_L < \pi_H < 1$), (c) $\bar{\Delta}_L \in [0, q_L]$, and (d) $\bar{\Delta}_H \leq \bar{\Delta}_L + (q_H - q_L)$.

As in the analysis in (P3) we must have $\pi_0 \in (0, 1)$ and either $0 = \pi_L < \pi_H < 1$ (case D.1) or $0 < \pi_L < 1 = \pi_H$ (case D.2). If the incumbent were very unpopular then we would have $\pi_L = \pi_H = 0$, a contradiction; if she were popular we would have $\pi_0 = 1$, also a contradiction;

she must therefore be somewhat unpopular, further implying $0 = \pi_L < \pi_H < 1$ (case D.1).

Now if the incumbent is somewhat unpopular then it is always possible to select (e_L, e_H) to generate principal indifference after both sabotage and effort and failure. Equilibrium effort levels solve the following system of equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\theta_I e_H q_H}{\theta_I e_H q_H + (1 - \theta_I) e_L q_L} &= \frac{1}{1 + \frac{(1 - \theta_I) e_L q_L}{\theta_I e_H q_H}} = \bar{\theta}_C \\ &= \frac{\theta_I (1 - e_H)}{\theta_I (1 - e_H) + (1 - \theta_I) (1 - e_L)} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{(1 - \theta_I) (1 - e_L)}{\theta_I (1 - e_H)}} \end{aligned}$$

which yields

$$\frac{e_L}{e_H} = \frac{q_H}{q_L} \cdot \left(\frac{\theta_I}{1 - \theta_I} \Big/ \frac{\bar{\theta}_C}{1 - \bar{\theta}_C} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{1 - e_L}{1 - e_H} = \frac{\theta_I}{1 - \theta_I} \Big/ \frac{\bar{\theta}_C}{1 - \bar{\theta}_C}$$

Solving yields the interior solution

$$e_L^* = \left(\frac{q_H}{q_H - q_L} \right) \frac{(\bar{\theta}_C - \theta_I)}{\bar{\theta}_C (1 - \theta_I)} \quad \text{and} \quad e_H^* = \left(\frac{q_L}{q_H - q_L} \right) \frac{(\bar{\theta}_C - \theta_I)}{\theta_I (1 - \bar{\theta}_C)}$$

Finally, for the saboteur to mix on both types of incumbents requires that $\Delta_L = \bar{\Delta}_L$ and $\Delta_H = \bar{\Delta}_H$. From the preliminary analysis of case D.1 this immediately implies $\bar{\Delta}_L \in [0, q_L]$ and $\bar{\Delta}_H \in [\bar{\Delta}_L, \bar{\Delta}_L + (q_H - q_L)]$. The retention probabilities are defined by the system $-\pi_0 + q_{\lambda_I} \pi_H = \bar{\Delta}_{\lambda_I} \forall \lambda_I$ which yields

$$\pi_H^* = \frac{\bar{\Delta}_H - \bar{\Delta}_L}{q_H - q_L} \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_0^* = \frac{q_L \bar{\Delta}_H - q_H \bar{\Delta}_L}{q_H - q_L}$$

D Additional Proofs

We now provide additional proofs that support stated results in the main text.

Sufficient condition for $\bar{\Delta}_H \leq \bar{\Delta}_L + (q_H - q_L)$

We prove that the inequality in the equilibrium statements for a somewhat (un)popular is a sufficient condition for both $\bar{\Delta}_L \leq q_L$ and $\bar{\Delta}_H \leq \bar{\Delta}_L + (q_H - q_L)$. These latter properties substantially simplify the equilibrium characterization by eliminating many possibilities.

From the definitions we have that

$$q_{\lambda_I} = \delta \bar{\Delta}_{\lambda_p} \left(\frac{U_S}{\gamma_S} - (\mathbf{1}_{\lambda_I=H} - \theta_C) (q_H - q_L) \right)$$

which is equivalent to

$$q_{\lambda_I} + \delta \bar{\Delta}_{\lambda_p} (q_H - q_L) = \delta \bar{\Delta}_{\lambda_p} \left(\frac{U_S}{\gamma_S} + \theta_C (q_H - q_L) \right)$$

Also observe that that $\bar{\Delta}_{\lambda_p} \leq \Delta_{\lambda_p} \iff$

$$\frac{U_S}{\gamma_S} \geq (\mathbf{1}_{\lambda_I=H} - \theta_C) (q_H - q_L) + \frac{1}{\delta} \frac{q_{\lambda_I}}{\Delta_{\lambda_p}}$$

Now define $\hat{\Delta}_H$ to be the quantity satisfying

$$q_H + \delta q_H (q_H - q_L) = \delta \hat{\Delta}_H \left(\frac{U_S}{\gamma_S} + \theta_C (q_H - q_L) \right)$$

or

$$q_H (1 + \delta (q_H - q_L)) = \delta \hat{\Delta}_H \left(\frac{U_S}{\gamma_S} + \theta_C (q_H - q_L) \right)$$

From the definitions, any value of $\hat{\Delta}_H$ corresponding to a value of $\bar{\Delta}_H < q_H$ must satisfy $\bar{\Delta}_H < \hat{\Delta}_H$. It is also straightforward to see that

$$\frac{\hat{\Delta}_H}{\bar{\Delta}_L} = \frac{q_H (1 + \delta (q_H - q_L))}{q_L} \iff \hat{\Delta}_H = \frac{q_H (1 + \delta (q_H - q_L))}{q_L} \bar{\Delta}_L$$

We now consider when we have $\hat{\Delta}_H \leq \bar{\Delta}_L + (q_H - q_L)$; this requires

$$\frac{q_H (1 + \delta (q_H - q_L))}{q_L} \bar{\Delta}_L \leq \bar{\Delta}_L + (q_H - q_L) \iff \bar{\Delta}_L \leq \frac{q_L}{1 + q_H \delta}$$

(which is stronger than $\bar{\Delta}_L \leq q_L$). From the definition this condition is equivalent to:

$$\frac{U_S}{\gamma_S} \geq \frac{1}{\delta} + (1 - \theta_C) (q_H - q_L) + q_L$$

Further, it is also easily verified that $\bar{\Delta}_H \leq q_H \iff$

$$\frac{U_S}{\gamma_S} \geq \frac{1}{\delta} + (1 - \theta_C) (q_H - q_L)$$

which is a weaker condition, so when the stated condition holds we have $\bar{\Delta}_H < \hat{\Delta}_H < \bar{\Delta}_L + (q_H - q_L)$ and this is sufficient for the desired properties. Finally, if we would like the condition to hold for *all* values of θ_C then we require $\frac{U_S}{\gamma_S} \geq \frac{1}{\delta} + q_H$.

Proof of Proposition 1

Sequential equilibrium ((Kreps and Wilson 1982)) straightforwardly implies that both on and off the equilibrium path, the voter's beliefs will be computed using Bayes' rule using nature's probabilities of success and failure and ignoring the behavior of the saboteur. Optimal behavior is thus straightforwardly described by the popularity conditions.

To see the incumbent strategy, it is straightforward that the saboteur will never sabotage when the incumbent is very (un)popular (since doing so would have no effect on the probability of retention) or when the saboteur is somewhat popular (since sabotage would be counterproductive and ensure retention).

If the incumbent is somewhat unpopular, the net benefit of exerting effort simply the expected value of the net benefit for each incumbent type:

$$(1 - \theta_I) (q_L \gamma_S + \delta q_L (V(\mathbf{0}, \theta_C; \gamma_S, q) + U(x_S; x_I, x_C))) \\ + \theta_I (q_H \gamma_S + \delta q_H (V(\mathbf{1}, \theta_C; \gamma_S, q) + U(x_S; x_I, x_C)))$$

and the saboteur will sabotage i.f.f. this is ≤ 0 .

This expression may be rewritten as

$$((1 - \theta_I) q_L + \theta_I q_H) \left(\frac{1}{\delta} - \theta_C (q_H - q_L) + \frac{U(x_S; x_I, x_C)}{\gamma_S} \right) + \theta_I q_H (q_H - q_L) \leq 0$$

which in turn is easily rearranged to the expression in the proposition.

Proof of Propositions 2-5

By the equilibrium characterization and the assumption that $-\frac{U(x_S; x_I, x_C)}{\gamma_S} \geq \frac{1}{\delta} + q_H$ there are three equilibria satisfying D1: (a) pooling on sabotage, (b) pooling on effort, and (c) the partially separating equilibrium (P4) with $0 < e_H < e_L < 1$.

Saboteur

We first show that the saboteur prefers pooling on sabotage to (P4) to pooling on effort.

To see that the saboteur strictly prefers pooling on sabotage to (P4), observe that deviating from her P4 strategy profile to pooling on sabotage yields her equilibrium utility due to the equilibrium indifference conditions; however, this involves the incumbent retained with strictly positive probability, and is therefore strictly worse than the equilibrium with pooling on sabotage in which the incumbent is replaced for sure.

To see that the saboteur strictly prefers (P4) to pooling on effort, observe that deviating from her (P4) strategy to pooling on effort yields her equilibrium utility, but the incumbent is retained after success with probability $\pi_H^{P4} < 1$; this is thus strictly better than the equilibrium with pooling on effort in which an incumbent who succeeds is retained for sure.

Voter

We now show that the voter prefers pooling on effort to P4 to pooling on sabotage.

To see that the voter strictly prefers pooling on effort to (P4), we make a sequence of changes altering the strategy profile in (P4) to that in the pooling on effort equilibrium that each weakly increase her utility. First, changing from $(\pi_0^{P4} \in (0, 1), \pi_L^{P4} = 0, \pi_H^{P4} \in (0, 1); e_L^{P4}, e_H^{P4})$ to $(\pi_0 = \pi_L = \pi_H = 0; e_L^{P4}, e_H^{P4})$ does not change the voter's utility due to the (P4) indifference conditions. Next changing to $(\pi_0 = \pi_L = \pi_H = 0; e_L = e_H = 1)$ strictly increases the voters's utility since first period quality increases with no change in selection. Finally, changing to $(0 = \pi_L = \pi_0 < \pi_H = 1; e_L = e_H = 1)$ strictly increases the voter's utility since retention is strictly optimal after success when effort is uninformative.

To see that the voter strictly prefers (P4) to pooling on sabotage, observe that a deviation in (P4) to $\pi_0 = \pi_L = \pi_H = 0$ (always replace) does not change her utility, which involves strictly positive effort levels; this is thus strictly better for the voter than the pooling on sabotage equilibrium which also involves always replacing, but with no effort.

Proof of Proposition 6

From the equilibrium characterization, we have that:

$$\frac{e_L}{e_H} = \frac{q_H}{q_L} \cdot \left(\frac{\theta_I}{1 - \theta_I} \bigg/ \frac{\bar{\theta}_C}{1 - \bar{\theta}_C} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{1 - e_H}{1 - e_L} = \frac{\bar{\theta}_C}{1 - \bar{\theta}_C} \bigg/ \frac{\theta_I}{1 - \theta_I}$$

The ratio $\frac{e_L}{e_H} \geq 1$ reflects the extent to which effort is “bad news” while the ratio $\frac{1 - e_H}{1 - e_L} \geq 1$ reflects the extent to which sabotage is “good news.” Now let $R(\bar{\theta}_C, \theta_I) = \frac{\bar{\theta}_C}{1 - \bar{\theta}_C} \bigg/ \frac{\theta_I}{1 - \theta_I}$; it is easily verified that this increases from 1 to $\frac{q_H}{q_L}$ as $\bar{\theta}_C$ increases from θ_I to $\bar{\theta}_I^1$. Rewriting we have that:

$$\frac{e_L}{e_H} = \frac{q_H/q_L}{R(\bar{\theta}_C, \theta_I)} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{1 - e_H}{1 - e_L} = R(\bar{\theta}_C, \theta_I)$$

First observe by multiplying the two equations that:

$$\frac{e_L}{1 - e_L} \bigg/ \frac{e_H}{1 - e_H} = \frac{q_H}{q_L}$$

This immediately yields that e_L and e_H must move strictly in the same direction as a function of $R(\bar{\theta}_C, \theta_I)$; otherwise the LHS could not be constant.

Next observe that $e_H = R(\bar{\theta}_C, \theta_I) \frac{q_L}{q_H} e_L$ and $1 - e_H = R(\bar{\theta}_C, \theta_I) (1 - e_L)$ so summing the equations yields:

$$1 = R(\bar{\theta}_C, \theta_I) \left(1 - \left(1 - \frac{q_L}{q_H} \right) e_L \right)$$

Thus e_L (and from the preceding e_H) are strictly increasing in $R(\bar{\theta}_C, \theta_I)$, which is in turn strictly decreasing in θ_I and strictly increasing in $\bar{\theta}_C$, which in turn is strictly increasing in θ_C and γ_V and strictly decreasing in $U(x_V; \cdot)$.

Proof of Proposition 7

Recall that

$$\bar{\Delta}_{\lambda_i} = \frac{q_{\lambda_I}}{\delta(B - 1_{\lambda_I=H}(q_H - q_L))}$$

where $B = \delta \left(\frac{-U(x_S; x_I, x_C)}{\gamma_S} + \theta_C (q_H - q_L) \right) > q_H - q_L$ by assumption (so $\bar{\Delta}_H < 1$). Now from the equilibrium characterization we have that

$$\pi_H = \frac{\bar{\Delta}_H - \bar{\Delta}_L}{q_H - q_L} \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_0 = \frac{q_L \bar{\Delta}_H - q_H \bar{\Delta}_L}{q_H - q_L}$$

Substituting in the definitions and algebra yields that

$$\pi_H = \frac{1 + \frac{q_L}{B}}{\delta(B - (q_H - q_L))} \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_0 = \frac{q_L q_H}{\delta(B - (q_H - q_L)) B}.$$

Both quantities are straightforwardly decreasing in B and δ . It is also easily verified that

$$\pi_H - \pi_0 = \frac{1 + \frac{q_L(1-q_H)}{B}}{\delta(B - (q_H - q_L))}$$

Thus all three quantities are straightforwardly decreasing in B and δ .

Proof of Proposition 8

Follows immediately from the equilibrium characterization.

Proof of Proposition 9

By the equilibrium characterization there are three equilibria satisfying D1: (1) pooling on effort, (2) pooling on sabotage, and (3) the partially separating equilibrium (P2) with $e_H = 1$ and $e_L \in (0, 1)$; the assumption also yields $0 = \pi_0 = \pi_L < \pi_H < 1$.

We now argue that pooling on effort is Pareto dominant. Pareto dominance of pooling on effort to pooling on sabotage is straightforward; both involve the incumbent being replaced with probability 1, and holding retention decisions fixed both players prefer higher effort to lower effort.

We next compare pooling on effort to (P2). With pooling on effort, we have $\pi_L = \pi_H = 0$ and the incumbent is always replaced. In (P2), we have equilibrium $(\pi_0^*, \pi_L^*, \pi_H^*)$ and (e_L^*, e_H^*) . To see that the saboteur strictly prefers the equilibrium with pooling on effort, observe that the retention probabilities yield indifference over effort on a low quality incumbent, so the saboteur gets the same utility by deviating to pooling on effort ($e_L = 1, e_H = 1$) with $(\pi_0^*, \pi_L^*, \pi_H^*)$, which involves retention with strictly positive probability and is therefore strictly worse.

To see that the voter strictly prefers the equilibrium with pooling on effort, observe that the voter still gets her equilibrium utility by deviating to always replace given the

bureaucrat's equilibrium effort levels, which in turn is worse than always replacing with maximum effort by the bureaucrat.

Proof of Proposition 10

By the equilibrium characterization and the assumption that $-\frac{U(x_S; x_I, x_C)}{\gamma_S} \geq \frac{1}{\delta} + q_H$ there are three equilibria satisfying D1: (1) the partially separating equilibrium (P1) with $e_L = 0$ and $e_H \in (0, 1)$, $0 < \pi_0 < 1 = \pi_L = \pi_H$, (2) pooling on effort ($0 = \pi_L < \pi_H = 1$), and (3) the partially separating equilibrium (P3) with $0 < e_L < e_H < 1$ and $\pi_0 \in (0, 1)$, $\pi_L \in (0, 1)$, $\pi_H = 1$.

We first compare pooling on effort to (P3). For the saboteur, in (P3) a deviation to pooling on effort would still yield her equilibrium utility but with $\pi_L^* > 0$, so her equilibrium utility is strictly worse in (P3).

For the voter, we make a sequence of changes altering the strategy profile in (P3) to that in the pooling on effort that each weakly increase her equilibrium utility. First, changing from $(\pi_0^{P3} \in (0, 1), \pi_L^{P3} \in (0, 1), \pi_H = 1; e_L^{P3}, e_H^{P3})$ to $(\pi_0 = \pi_L = \pi_H = 1; e_L^{P3}, e_H^{P3})$ does not change the voter's utility due to the (P3) indifference conditions. Next changing to $(\pi_0 = \pi_L = \pi_H = 1; e_L = e_H = 1)$ strictly increases the voters's utility since first period quality increases with no change in selection. Finally, changing to $(0 = \pi_L < \pi_0 = \pi_H = 1; e_L = e_H = 1)$ strictly increases the voter's utility since replacement is strictly optimal after failure when effort is uninformative.

We next compare (P3) to (P1). For the saboteur, a deviation to the both equilibrium effort levels in (P1) would yield her (P3) equilibrium utility holding retention probabilities fixed. We next argue that the equilibrium retention probabilities in P1 are uniformly higher, implying that the saboteur is worse off in the (P1) equilibrium than in the (P3) equilibrium. Clearly retention probabilities are higher in (P1) after success and failure; we need only argue that the retention probability is also higher after sabotage. From the equilibrium characterizations we have that

$$\pi_0^{P1} = 1 - \bar{\Delta}_H \text{ and } \pi_0^{P3} = (q_H + (1 - q_H)\pi_L^{P3}) - \bar{\Delta}_H$$

which shows the desired property since $q_H + (1 - q_H)\pi_L^{P3} < 1$.

For the voter, a deviation to always retain in (P1) still yields her (P1) equilibrium utility, and a deviation to always retain in (P3) still yields her (P3) equilibrium utility. Thus, it suffices to show $e_{\lambda_P}^{P3} > e_{\lambda_P}^{P1} \forall \lambda_P$. We immediately have $e_L^{P3} > 0 = e_L^{P3}$. In addition, in both equilibria $\pi_0 \in (0, 1)$ requires

$$\frac{\theta_I(1 - e_H)}{(1 - \theta_I)(1 - e_L)} = \frac{\bar{\theta}_C}{1 - \bar{\theta}_C},$$

but this immediately yields $e_L^{P3} > e_L^{P1} \rightarrow e_H^{P3} > e_H^{P1}$.