

CURRICULUM VITAE

Thomas R. Palfrey, III

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Education:

Ph.D. Social Sciences, Caltech, 1981
M.A. Political Science, University of Michigan, 1976
B.A. Political Science (magna cum laude), University of Michigan, 1975

Primary positions:

2002-2005, 2006-	Flintridge Foundation Professor of Economics and Political Science, Caltech
2004-2006	Professor of Politics and Economics, Princeton University
1986-2002	Professor of Economics and Political Science, Caltech
1985-1986	Professor of Economics and Political Economy, GSIA, Carnegie-Mellon University
1983-1985	Associate Professor of Economics, GSIA, Carnegie-Mellon University
1980-1983	Assistant Professor of Economics, GSIA, Carnegie-Mellon University

Other Positions:

2021-	Associate Fellow, Quantitative and Analytical Political Economy Center, Warwick University
2019	Wesley Clair Mitchell Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2019-	Visiting Research Professor, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
2017-20	Director of Graduate Studies, HSS Division, Caltech
2017-20	Option Representative, Social Sciences PhD Program, Caltech
2016-19	Fellow, AGORA Center for Institutional, Market, and Organizational Design
2016	PER visitor, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2014-15	Visiting Scholar, Russell Sage Foundation
2013-	Research Associate, NBER
2012-2016	International Fellow, ESEI Center for Market Design, Zurich
2010-2016	Scientific Council, Institute for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Toulouse
2009-14	Director, Hacker Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL), Caltech
2008-13	Co-Director, California Social Science Experimental Laboratory (CASSEL), UCLA
2006-7	Chaire d'Excellence Pierre de Fermat, Université de Toulouse
2006	Martha and Jonathan Cohen Distinguished Visitor, University of Pennsylvania
2005	Visiting Scholar, GREQAM, Université d'Aix-Marseilles
2005	Directeur d'Etudes, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
2004-6	Founding Director, Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS)
2003	Visiting Scholar, Institut d'Analisi Economica, Universitat Autònoma, Barcelona, Spain
2003	Visiting Professor of Economics, GREMAQ, Université de Toulouse
2002-4	Director Hacker Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL), Caltech
2002-3	Visiting Professor of Economics, Princeton University
2002-3	Visiting Scholar in Economics, Columbia University
2002	Visiting Scholar in Economics, New York University
2001-2	Executive Officer for the Social Sciences, HSS Division, Caltech
2001-2	Visiting Professor of Economics, UCLA
2001-2	Visiting Professor of Economics, GREMAQ, Université de Toulouse
2001	Visiting Professor of Economics, GREQAM, Université d'Aix-Marseilles

2000-4 Founding Co-Director, California Social Science Experimental Laboratory (CASSEL), UCLA
2000-2 Founding Co-Director, Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project
1999 Visiting Professor of Economics, GREQAM, Université d'Aix-Marseille
1998-2000 Founding Director, Hacker Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL), Caltech
1995-96 Chargé de Mission, Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle, CREST-INSEE
1995-96 Chercheur Invité, CERAS, Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées
1995-96 Chercheur Invité, IDEI, Université de Toulouse
1995 Visiting Professor of Economics, GREQAM, Université d'Aix-Marseille
1992 Kirby Distinguished Visiting Professor, Texas A&M University
1990 Visiting Professor of Economics, GREMAQ, Université de Toulouse
1990 Directeur d'Etudes, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales

Research Areas:

Political Economy, Experimental Economics and Political Science, Formal Political Theory, Game Theory, Voting and Elections, Mechanism Design, Public Economics

Teaching:

Undergraduate, MBA, PhD, and Executive Training courses in: Game Theory, Economic Theory, Microeconomics, Economics of Information and Uncertainty, Mechanism Design, Industrial Organization, Experimental Economics, Decision Theory, Voting Theory, Electoral Politics, Political Economy, Formal Political Theory, Social Choice Theory, and General Equilibrium Theory.

Awards and Grants:

William H. Riker Prize in Political Science, 2021
Fellow, Game Theory Society, elected 2017
Fellow, Russell Sage Foundation, Visiting Scholar in residence 2014-15
Economic Theory Fellow, Society for the Advancement in Economic Theory, elected 2011
Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, elected 2008
Fellow, Econometric Society, elected 1995
Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Visiting Scholar in residence 1986-87
Carnegie-Mellon University Undergraduate Teaching Award in Economics, 1985
National Science Foundation Grant SES-8208397, 1982-1984
National Science Foundation Grant IST-8406296, 1984-1986
National Science Foundation Grant SES-8608118, 1986-1988
National Science Foundation Grant SES-8718650, 1988-1990
National Science Foundation Grant SES-8815097, 1988-1990
National Science Foundation Grant SES-9011828, 1990-1992
National Science Foundation Grant SES-9224787, 1993-1996
National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9223701, 1993-1996
National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9631627, 1996-1999
National Science Foundation Grant MRI-9977244, 1999-2002
National Science Foundation Grant INT-9815573, 1999-2002
National Science Foundation Grant SES-0079301, 2000-2003
National Science Foundation Grant SES-0094800, 2001-2006
National Science Foundation Grant SES-0214013, 2002-2005
National Science Foundation Grant SES-0617820, 2006-2009
National Science Foundation Grant SES-0962802, 2010-2013
National Science Foundation Grant SES-1426560, 2014-2018
National Science Foundation Grant SES-2243268, 2023-2024

Professional Service:

Econometric Society: Program Chair, 1997 North American Summer Meetings; Program Committee: 1990 World Congress, 2004 North American Winter Meeting, 2004 North American Summer Meeting, 2005 World Congress, 2006 European Meeting, 2006 North American Winter Meeting, 2007 North American Winter Meeting, 2010 World

Congress, 2013 North American Summer Meeting; Various administrative and nomination committees. Invited Keynote and Plenary Lectures: 1990 World Congress, Barcelona; 1994 European Meeting, Maastricht; 2006 Far Eastern Meeting, Beijing; 2006 Latin American Meeting, Mexico City; Colin Clark Lecture, 2016 Australian Meeting, Sydney.

Economic Science Association: Executive Board (1988-99); President-Elect (1993-1995); President (1995-1997); Vice President (1997-1999). Keynote Speaker: 2000 Annual meeting, New York; 2007 Asia-Pacific Meeting, Shanghai; 2011 North American Meeting, Tucson; 2017 Asia-Pacific Meeting, Taipei; 2017 World Meeting, San Diego.

Game Theory Society: Charter Member. Council 2009-2016. Oskar Morgenstern Lecture 2016 World Congress, Maastricht.

American Political Science Association: Various committees in the Experimental Research section.

NSF Advisory Panel (Economics): 1987-89.

European Public Choice Society: Keynote Speaker 2007 Annual Meeting, Amsterdam.

Australasian Public Choice Society: Keynote Speaker 2009 Annual Meeting, Melbourne.

Conference Co-Organizer: Priorat Conference on Theoretical Political Science 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016.

Conference Co-Organizer: Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Workshop on Political Economic Theory 2020, 2021, 2022.

Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory: Program Committee 2013 Annual Meeting, Paris.

Society for Economic Dynamics: Program Committee 1999 Annual Meeting, Alghero.

Society for Public Economic Theory: Keynote Speaker, 2010 Annual Meeting, Istanbul.

ECORE Summer School in Economics: Lectures in Political Economy, 2013, Leuven.

Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory: Political Economy Lectures, 2010, Jerusalem.

Refereeing: scientific journals in economics, political science, marketing, finance, and related fields in the social and management sciences; research foundations; academic publishing houses.

Editorial Positions:

Econometrica: Associate Editor, 1989-1998; 2004-2007

Games and Economic Behavior: Editor 2007-2015. Associate Editor 1992-2007. Guest editor: July 1995 (Special Issue on Experimental Game Theory), May 2005 (Special Issue in Honor of Richard D. McKelvey), January 2017 (Special Issue in Honor of John O. Ledyard)

Review of Economic Design: Associate Editor, 1992-2010; Advisory Board, 2010-

Economic Theory: Editorial Board, 1995-1999

Experimental Economics: Editorial Board, 1997-2014

Journal of Public Economics: Associate Editor, 1998-2003

Economics Bulletin: Associate Editor, 2000-2003

NAJ Economics: Editorial Board, 2001-2010

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics: Associate Editor, 2007- 2020

Political Analysis: Editorial Board 2010-2017

Journal of Experimental Political Science: Editorial Board, 2014-17

Journal of the Economic Science Association: Advisory Editor, 2014-

PUBLICATIONS

Books

Quantal Response Equilibrium: A Statistical Theory of Games (with J. Goeree and C. Holt). Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2016.

Voting: What is, What Could Be (with Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project), 2001.

Bayesian Implementation (with S. Srivastava), Harwood Academic Publishers: New York, 1993.

Experimental Foundations of Political Science (with Donald Kinder), University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1993.

Laboratory Research in Political Economy, University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1991.

Published Articles

Multiple Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, Management Science, September 1980, 26(9):935-46.

Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market, (with R. E. Forsythe and C. R. Plott), Econometrica, May 1982, 50(3):537-67).

An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods, (with J. A. Ferejohn, R. E. Forsythe and R. G. Noll), in Research in Experimental Economics 2, Vernon Smith (ed.) JAI Press (1982) pp. 175-99.

Risk Advantages and Information Acquisition, Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1982, 13(1):219-24.

Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information, Econometrica, March 1983, 51(2): 463-83. Reprinted in Klemperer, P., The Economic Theory of Auctions, 2000.

A Strategic Calculus of Voting (with H. Rosenthal), Public Choice, 1983, 41:7-53).

Warranties, Performance, and the Resolution of Buyer-Seller Disputes, (with T. Romer) Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1983, 14(1):97-117.

Spatial Equilibrium with Entry, Review of Economic Studies January 1984, 51:139-56.

Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysis, (with H. Rosenthal) Journal of Public Economics, 1984, 24:171-93.

Futures Markets and Informational Efficiency: A Laboratory Examination, (with R. E. Forsythe and C. R. Plott) The Journal of Finance, 1984, 39(4):955-81.

Buyer Behavior and the Welfare Effects of Bundling by a Multiproduct Monopolist: A Laboratory Test, in Research in Experimental Economics 3, Vernon Smith (ed.) JAI Press 1985 pp. 73-104.

Uncertainty Resolution, Private Information Aggregation, and the Cournot Competitive Limit, Review of Economic Studies, January 1985, 51:69-83.

Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty, (with H. Rosenthal) American Political Science Review, March 1985, 79:62-78.

Pareto Optimality in Spatial Voting Models, (with P. Coughlin) Social Choice and Welfare. 1985, 1:307-19.

Repeated Insurance Contracts and Learning, (with C. Spatt) Rand Journal of Economics. Autumn 1985, 16(3):356-67.

An Experimental Study of Warranty Coverage and Dispute Resolution in Competitive Markets, (with T. Romer), in Empirical Approaches to Consumer Protection Economics, P. Ippolito and D. Scheffman (eds.) Federal Trade Commission: Washington, DC, 1986, pp. 307-72.

Private Information in Large Economies, (with S. Srivastava) Journal of Economic Theory (special issue on Strategic Behavior and Competition). June 1986, 39(1):34-58.

Institutional Social Choice in Representative Systems, Public Choice. 1986, 50:211-19.

The Relationship Between Constituency Size and Turnout: Using Game Theory to Estimate the Cost of Voting, (with S. Hansen and H. Rosenthal) Public Choice. 1987, 52(1):15-34.

On Bayesian Implementable Allocations, (with S. Srivastava) Review of Economic Studies. April 1987, 54:193-208.

The Relationship Between Information, Ideology, and Voting Behavior, (with K. Poole) American Journal of Political Science. August 1987, 31(3):511-30.

Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas: The Effects of Incomplete Information and Altruism, (with H. Rosenthal) Journal of Public Economics. April 1988, 35:309-32.

Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information, (with P. Ordeshook) American Journal of Political Science. May 1988, 32(2):441-66.

Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies, (with S. Srivastava) Econometrica. January 1989, 57(1):115-34.

Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem, (with S. Srivastava) Journal of Political Economy. June 1989, 97(31):668-91.

Effects of Insider Trading Disclosures on Speculative Activity and Futures Prices, (with R. Jagannathan) Economic Inquiry. July 1989, 27:411-30.

A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law, in Models of Strategic Choice in Politics (Peter C. Ordeshook, ed.) University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor 1989, pp. 69-91.

Theories and Tests of Blind Bidding in Sealed-bid Auctions, (with R. E. Forsythe and R. M. Isaac) Rand Journal of Economics. Summer 1989, 20(2):214-38.

Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs, (with P. Cramton) International Economic Review. February 1990, 31(1):17-47.

Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information, (with H. Rosenthal) Games and Economic Behavior. 1991, 3:183-220.

Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies, (with S. Srivastava) Econometrica. 1991, 59(2):479-501.

Testing Game-Theoretic Models of Free Riding: New Evidence on Probability Bias and Learning, (with H. Rosenthal) in Laboratory Research in Political Economy (Thomas R. Palfrey, ed.), University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 1991, pp. 239-67.

Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-play Communication, (with S. Srivastava) Journal of Economic Theory. 1991, 55(1):17-40.

An Experimental Political Science? Yes, an Experimental Political Science, (with D. Kinder), The Political Methodologist. Spring 1991, 4(1):2-8.

An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game, (with R. McKelvey) Econometrica. 1992, 60(4):803-36.

Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium Problem in Mechanism Design, (in Advances in Economic Theory Vol. 1 (J.-J. Laffont ed.), Econometric Society Monographs No. 20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 283-323.

On Behalf of an Experimental Political Science (with D. Kinder), in Experimental Foundations of Political Science (D. Kinder and T. Palfrey, eds.), University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 1993, pp. 1-39.

The Conflict Between Private Incentives and the Public Good (with D. Kinder), in Experimental Foundations of Political Science (D. Kinder and T. Palfrey, eds.), University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 1993, pp. 211-20.

Signal and Noise in Democratic Conversation (with D. Kinder), in Experimental Foundations of Political Science (D. Kinder and T. Palfrey, eds.), University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 1993, pp. 305-12.

Agendas and Decisions in Government, in Experimental Foundations of Political Science (D. Kinder and T. Palfrey, eds.), University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 1993, pp. 389-98.

A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games (with M. El-Gamal and R. McKelvey) Journal of the American Statistical Association 1993.

Computational Issues in the Statistical Design and Analysis of Experimental Games, (with M. El-Gamal and R. McKelvey) The International Journal of Supercomputer Applications, 1993, 7(3):189-200.

Undominated Nash Implementation with Bounded Mechanisms, (with M. Jackson and S. Srivastava) Games and Economic Behavior. 1994, 6:474-501.

Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms, (with J. Ledyard) Review of Economic Studies. 1994, 61:327-55.

Learning in Experimental Games, (with M. El-Gamal and R. McKelvey) Economic Theory. 1994, 4:901-22.

Repeated Play, Cooperation, and Coordination: An Experimental Study, (with H. Rosenthal) Review of Economic Studies. 1994, 61:545-65.

Vertigo: Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in Experimental Games, (with M. El-Gamal) Games and Economic Behavior. 1995, 8:322-48.

The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information (with R. McKelvey) in Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics (W. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles, N. Schofield eds.) Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995, pp. 321-49.

Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement, (with P. Cramton) Games and Economic Behavior. 1995, 10:255-83.

Quantal Response Equilibria in Normal Form Games, (with R. McKelvey) Games and Economic Behavior. (special issue on Experimental Game Theory). 1995, 10:6-38.

Introduction: Experimental Game Theory, (with J. Ledyard) Games and Economic Behavior (special issue on

Experimental Game Theory). 1995, 10:1-5.

Experiments on the Constant Sum Centipede Game, (with M. Fey and R. McKelvey) International Journal of Game Theory. 1996, 25:269-87.

Altruism, Reputation, and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments, (with J. Prisbrey) Journal of Public Economics 1996, 61:409-27.

Economical Experiments: Bayesian Efficient Experimental Design, (with M. El-Gamal) International Journal of Game Theory. 1996, 25: 495-517.

In or Out? Centralization by Majority Vote, (with J. Crémer) European Economic Review (special issue on The Domain of the State), 1996, 40: 43-60.

A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games, (with R. McKelvey) Japanese Economic Review. 1996, 47(2):186-209.

Endogeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game, (with R. McKelvey) Journal of Economic Theory. 1997, 73(2):425-37.

Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why? (with J. Prisbrey) American Economic Review, December 1997, 87(5):829-46.

Campaign Spending and Incumbency: An Alternative Simultaneous Equations Approach, (with R. Erikson) Journal of Politics, May 1998, 60(2):355-73.

Quantal Response Equilibria in Extensive Form Games, (with R. McKelvey) Experimental Economics, Inaugural Issue, 1998, 1:9-41.

Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining, (with M. Jackson) Econometrica. 1998, 66(6):1353-88.

A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods, (with J. Ledyard) Econometrica. March 1999, 67(2):435-48.

Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem, (with J. Ledyard) in Social Organization and Mechanism Design. (C. d'Aspremont, ed.) (1999), pp. 239-61.

Political Confederation, (with J. Crémer) American Political Science Review. March 1999, 93(1):69-83.

The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2x2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria, (with R. McKelvey and R. Weber) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2000, 42:523-48.

Federal Mandates by Popular Demand, (with J. Crémer) Journal of Political Economy, October 2000, 108(5):905-27.

An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules, (with R. McKelvey and S. Guarnaschelli) American Political Science Review. June 2000, 94(2):407-23.

Equilibrium Effects in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data, (with R. Erikson) American Political Science Review. 2000, 94(3):595-609.

Voluntary Implementation, (with M. Jackson) Journal of Economic Theory. May 2001, 98(1):1-25. Corrigendum, May 2003, 110(1): 204-5.

The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes. (with J. Ledyard) Journal

of Public Economics, February 2002, 83(2):153-72.

Implementation Theory, in Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. III (R. Aumann and S. Hart eds.), 2002.

Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate, (with E. Aragonès) Journal of Economic Theory. (Special issue on Political Science), March 2002, 103(1):131-61.

Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in First Price Auctions, (with J. Goeree and C. Holt) Journal of Economic Theory. (Special Issue on Experimental Game Theory), May 2002, 104(1):247-72.

Federal Mandates with Local Agenda Setters, (with J. Crémer) Review of Economic Design. (Special Issue on Electoral System Design), November 2002, 7(3):279-96.

Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information, (with D. Laussel) Journal of Public Economic Theory, July 2003, 5(3):449-78.

Risk Averse Behavior in Generalized Matching Pennies Games, (with J. Goeree and C. Holt) Games and Economic Behavior. October 2003, 45(1):97-113.

Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: An Experimental Study, (with E. Aragonès) American Political Science Review. March 2004. 98:77-90.

An Experimental Comparison of Collective Choice Procedures for Excludable Public Goods, (with S. Gailmard), Journal of Public Economics. August 2005. 89(8):1361-98.

Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information. (with E. Aragonès), in Social Choice and Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Scot Banks. D. Austen-Smith and J. Duggan eds. Springer: Berlin. 2005, pp. 93-112.

Richard Drummond McKelvey, Biographical Memoirs, National Academy of Sciences: Washington, DC. 2005.

Introduction: Special Issue in Honor of Richard D. McKelvey, Games and Economic Behavior. May 2005, 51(2):237-42.

Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium (with J. Goeree and C. Holt), Experimental Economics, 2005, 8:347-67.

Social Learning with Private and Common Values, (with J. Goeree and B. Rogers). Economic Theory. June 2006, 28(2):254-64.

An Experimental Study of Storable Votes, (with A. Casella and A. Gelman) Games and Economic Behavior. October 2006, 57(1):123-54.

An Equilibrium Model of Federalism with Externalities, (with J. Crémer) Journal of Public Economics, November 2006, 90(10-11):2091-2106.

Laboratory Experiments, in Handbook of Political Economy. B. Weingast and D. Wittman eds., Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006, pp. 915-36.

McKelvey and Quantal Response Equilibrium, in A Positive Change in Political Science: The Legacy of Richard D. McKelvey's Most Influential Writings. J. Aldrich, J. Alt, and A. Lupia eds., University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 2007, pp. 425-40.

A General Characterization of Interim Efficient Mechanisms for Independent Linear Environments, (with J. Ledyard) Journal of Economic Theory, March 2007, 133(1):441-66.

The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study, (with D. Levine) American Political Science Review,

February 2007, 101:143-58.

Political Reputations and Campaign Promises, (with E. Aragonés and A. Postlewaite) Journal of the European Economic Association, June 2007, 5(4):846-884.

Self-Correcting Information Cascades, (with J. Goeree, B. Rogers, and R. McKelvey) Review of Economic Studies, July 2007, 74(3):733-62.

Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms, (with M. Battaglini and R. Morton) American Political Science Review, August 2007, 101:409-424.

Storable Votes: Giving Voice to Minority Preferences Without Sacrificing Efficiency, (with A. Casella and R. Riezman) Journal for Institutional Comparisons, Autumn 2007, 5(3):17-22.

The Selection Effect in Auctions with Endogenous Entry: An Experimental Study, (with S. Pevnitskaya) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, June 2008, 66(3-4):731-747.

Quantal Response Equilibria: A Brief Synopsis, (with R. McKelvey), in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, C. Plott and V. Smith eds. 2008.

Quantal Response Equilibria, (with J. Goeree and C. Holt) in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, second edition, 2008, 783-787. Reprinted in Behavioral and Experimental Economics, S. Durlauf and L. Blume eds., 2010, 234-42, Palgrave Macmillan: London.

Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections, (with M. Battaglini and R. Morton) American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 2008, 98(2):194-200.

Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees, (with N. Ali, J. Goeree, and N. Kartik). American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 2008, 98(2):181-6.

Minorities and Storable Votes, (with A. Casella and R. Riezman) Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2008, 3(2):165-200.

A Citizen Candidate Model with Private Information, (with J. Grosser) in The Political Economy of Democracy (Aragonés, E. Bevia, C. and Schofield, N. eds.), Proceedings of the Barcelona Workshop on the Political Economy of Democracy, Fundación BBVA: Bilbao, 2009, pp. 15-29.

The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory, (with J. Carrillo) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Inaugural Issue, February 2009 1(1):151-81.

Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium, (with B. Rogers and C. Camerer) Journal of Economic Theory, July 2009, 144(4):1440-67.

On Eliciting Beliefs in Strategic Games, (with S. Wang) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, August 2009, 71(2):98-109.

Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy, Annual Review of Political Science, 2009, 12:379-88.

The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory, (with M. Battaglini and R. Morton) Review of Economic Studies, January 2010, 77(1):61-89.

No Trade, (with J. Carrillo) Games and Economic Behavior, January 2011, 71(1):66-87.

Network Architecture, Salience, and Coordination, (with S. Choi, D. Gale, and S. Kariv) Games and Economic Behavior, September 2011, 73(1):76-90.

The Dynamics of Distributive Politics, (with M. Battaglini) Economic Theory, April 2012, 49(3):739-777.

Information Gatekeepers: Theory and Experimental Evidence, (with I. Brocas and J. Carrillo) Economic Theory, 2012, 51:649–676.

Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment, (with M. Battaglini and S. Nunnari) American Political Science Review, May 2012, 106(2):407-429.

Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes, (with A. Casella and A. Llorente-Saguer) Journal of Political Economy, August 2012, 120(4):593-658.

Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets with Information Flows, (with S. Wang) Econometrica, September 2012, 80(5):1937-76.

Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Anti-Median Voter Theorem, (with J. Grosser) American Journal of Political Science, January 2014, 58(1):127-43.

Turnout and Power Sharing, (with H. Herrera and M. Morelli) Economic Journal, February 2014, 124:131-62.

Reporting Guidelines for Experimental Research: A Report from the Experimental Research Section Standards Committee, (with K. Arceneaux, C. Boudreau, C. Dowling, S. Hillygus, D. R. Biggers, and D. J. Hendry, Journal of Experimental Political Science, March 2014, 1(1):81–98.

Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders, (with A. Casella and S. Turban) Journal of Public Economics, April 2014, 112:115–128.

Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments, (with M. Battaglini and S. Nunnari) American Economic Review, 2014, 104(9):2858-71.

Symmetric play in repeated allocation games, (with C. Kuzmics and B. Rogers) Journal of Economic Theory, November 2014, 154:25–67.

Equilibrium Tax Rates and Income Redistribution, (with M. Agranov), Journal of Public Economics, October 2015, 130: 45–58.

Experiments in Political Economy, in The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. II, (Kagel, J. and A. Roth, eds.), Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 2016, pp. 347-434.

Quantal Response and Non-equilibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions, (with C. Camerer and S. Nunnari) Games and Economic Behavior, July 2016, 98: 243–63.

The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study, (with M. Battaglini and S. Nunnari) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2016, 8(November): 268–308.

Static and Dynamic Underinvestment, (with M. Agranov, G. Frechette, and E. Vespa) Journal of Public Economics, November 2016, 143: 125–41.

Introduction: Special Issue in Honor of John O. Ledyard (with Y. Chen) Games and Economic Behavior, January 2017, 101: 1-5.

How Cheap Talk Enhances Efficiency in Threshold Public Goods Games (with H. Rosenthal and N. Roy) Games and Economic Behavior, January 2017, 101: 234-59.

External Validation of Voter Turnout Models by Concealed Parameter Recovery (with A. Merlo), Public Choice, (Special Issue Honoring Keith T. Poole), July 2018, 176(1-2): 297-314.

Rank-Dependent Choice Equilibrium (with J. Goeree, C. Holt, P. Louis, and B. Rogers), in A. Schram and A. Ule eds., The Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Experimental Economics, 2019, 252-268.

Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party, (with K. Pogorelskiy), Economic Journal, February 2019, 129(618): 961-990.

Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Experimental Study (with Jens Grosser), American Political Science Review, February 2019, 113(1): 209-225.

Trading Votes for Votes: A Dynamic Theory (with A. Casella), Econometrica, March 2019, 87(2): 631-52.

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