Ethics

(from http://info.nwmissouri.edu/~rfield/274overview.html)

This course deals with the area of philosophical discussion and inquiry known as "ethics" or "moral philosophy." As these terms suggest, the primary focus of this area of inquiry is issues that arise in ethical or moral situations, situations which raise questions concerning what we ought or should do when the issue is not a matter purely of self-interest, but of right and wrong. An ethicist attempts to bring some clarity of thought to these issues: to define clearly the language that is used to discuss them, to reveal the forms of inference that underlie our reasoning about them, and to determine and justify principles that can provide guidance in resolving these issues by bringing into consistency our best thoughts and intuitions on these matters.
Ethics is therefore reflective and critical: it does not simply attempt to codify beliefs concerning moral questions, but attempts to find the grounds for reasonable moral beliefs. Because of this, ethics should be distinguished from what we commonly call "morality," which is simply a set of beliefs accepted by a given culture concerning what we ought or ought not to do in moral situations, whether these beliefs are a product of critical reflection or not. Although many people do at times consider the cogency of their moral beliefs in a critical manner, the philosophical ethicist attempts to do this in a manner that is broader in scope and more systematic in methodology than is typical in common moral reflection.

Ethical Relativism

    Before considering the various questions and issues of ethics, we should note that some moral philosophers, and some nonphilosophers, have denied the possibility of an objective moral philosophy on the basis of the contention that there are no objective standards that can be applied to moral judgment. The position that makes this claim is commonly known as "ethical relativism." If the ethical relativists are right, then there are no universal standards of moral judgment, and so the ethicist, who would try to define such standards, is working in vain.
    There are a couple of different versions of ethical relativism. One version, individual relativism, claims that moral standards are relative to individual moral beliefs--that in effect what one believes is right is right with respect to one's own actions--and thus no sound moral argument condemning the actions of a moral agent can be offered if the conclusion of the argument is inconsistent with the moral beliefs of the agent. A typical way in which this position is expressed is the following: "everyone has different moral values, and will make different moral judgments in the same circumstances, so there's no point in trying to find a common moral standard, because there is none." Another version of ethical relativism is so-called cultural relativism. According to this view, moral standards are relative to cultural moral beliefs. Thus although one can justifiably condemn the actions of a person that are inconsistent with the moral beliefs of that person's culture, no condemnation of the actions of a person of a given culture can be justified if those actions are consistent with the moral beliefs of that person's culture. Typically this position has been offered to support the claim that we should respect the beliefs and practices of other cultures in order to avoid allowing our own cultural beliefs to be the basis of unfair assessments of these cultures. Thus the position might be expressed in this manner: "various cultures throughout the world have different moral standards, and it is simply a prejudice of our own cultural perspective to find fault with these views."
    Although there are a number of good arguments that can be offered against ethical relativisms of either sort, one of the most straightforward ways of suggesting the implausibility of ethical relativism is to note the implications of the view. It is particularly difficult to be a consistent relativist when one is harmed or injured by others. I will offer here two hypothetical situations, one corresponding to each of the versions of ethical relativism, and state the implications of the respective versions in these cases. The extremity of the actions considered in these cases is meant simply to make the difficulty of accepting relativist conclusions clear; similar difficulties would arise in the consideration of less extreme moral offenses. Place yourself in these situations and consider whether you could accept the implications of ethical relativism.

Individual Relativism

The Situation:

The Implications of Relativism: So long as the psychopath does not believe he has done anything wrong, he has indeed done nothing wrong. You have no basis to complain about his actions, even if the psychopath acted with full knowledge that you and your family objected to his actions, and that society views such actions as grossly immoral. Although you might wish to avenge his actions by harming him, if you do so your actions are no more praiseworthy (or blameworthy) than his. You may appeal to the law, but no court would be justified on a moral basis to convict or imprison the psychopath. If this is done, the actions of the court are no more praiseworthy (or blameworthy) than those of the psychopath. In fact, a legal system which would condemn the actions of the psychopath would be no better on moral grounds than one that allowed such actions, or even one that would reward the psychopath for his actions by paying him $3 million from public funds.

Cultural Relativism
The Situation: There is a country, Xenophobia, that contains two cultural groups: the majoritarians and the minoritarians. The majoritarians make up 90% of the population, the minoritarians the remaining 10%. There is a long history of suspicion and hatred in majoritarian culture against the minoritarians. According to majoritarian cultural history, the majoritarians are a culturally superior race that were the original inhabitants of Xenophobia, and they therefore see minoritarians as inferior and usurpers of their native lands. You are a minoritarian. The fragile truce between the majoritarians and minoritarians disintegrates over a murder case in which a minoritarian is charged with the assassination of a prominent majoritarian politician. There is a quick move in the legislature of Xenophobia to round up all minoritarians and place them in internment camps and to suspend judicial procedures in all cases where minoritarians are charged with crimes. The bill is quickly approved, and you and your family are interned. Your brother was charged with a robbery some years ago, and because the repressive law against minoritarians is retroactive, the commander of the camp takes your brother to the firing range where he is executed by firing squad.

The Implications of Relativism: So long as the actions taken by the majoritarians are consistent with their cultural beliefs, there is nothing wrong with their actions. You have no moral basis upon which to complain about their actions, even if the majoritarians understand that world opinion condemns their actions. You and other minoritarians might wish the world community (e.g., the United Nations) to place economic sanctions against the majoritarians, or even intervene militarily, but if it did, this action against the majoritarians would be no more praiseworthy (or blameworthy) than those of the majoritarians. Alternatively, you and other minoritarians might believe that you are justified in taking up arms against the majoritarians, if you can manage it. But an armed revolt against the majoritarians would not be just or right in any significant moral sense at all. Morally speaking, such an action would be no more meritorious than the repressive actions of the majoritarians to which you react.

If you find these implications objectionable then you cannot accept ethical relativism.
    Although there are theoretical reasons why some philosophers (a minority historically) have accepted moral relativism, most people who adopt relativism do so on the basis of reasons that involve unguarded judgment or simple conceptual confusions. As I noted above, some people in the past have adopted cultural relativism as a basis for insisting that people should respect the beliefs and traditions of other cultures, even if they are not consistent with those of one's own culture. But ironically cultural relativism undermines any moral basis upon which one might justify this normative claim. Upon a relativist view, if the people of a given culture believe that it is quite proper to annihilate another culture completely, there is no justification for objection.
    Another common reason that people adopt ethical relativism is the erroneous view that if one rejects relativism, then the only alternative is to accept a position that they find unacceptable, commonly known as moral absolutism: the view that there are a certain set of moral rules that apply in all relevant cases without exception. According to moral absolutism, for example, lying to others is always wrong, even in cases where, for example, not lying would result in great harm to others. But rejecting ethical relativism does not require the acceptance of moral absolutism, but the acceptance of a broader position commonly called moral objectivism or moral realism. This view simply makes the claim that normative judgments can be justified on objective (nonrelativistic) grounds, but a moral objectivist is not necessarily committed to the claim that moral standards are absolute. Common moral standards can be understood to apply in different ways depending on the circumstances of particular moral situations. So a lie might be justified under certain circumstances.
    Sometimes people embrace relativism as a reaction against traditional moral beliefs that they regard as oppressive and odious. It certainly is the case that people in the past, as many people of the present, have held certain moral beliefs that from a more enlightened point of view are clearly objectionable, such as the moral permissibility of slavery, the moral impermissibility of treating women as equals, and the like. But the rejection of ethical relativism does not imply that traditional moral beliefs must be accepted. In fact, the acceptance of traditional beliefs for no better reason than that they are traditional is a fallacy of moral reasoning, and quite antithetical to any reasoned moral position. Furthermore, the claim that traditional moral beliefs are wrong is a normative one, and thus can only be justified from a nonrelativist or objectivist standpoint. So those who embrace relativism as a reaction against moral conventions undercut any grounds upon which they can justify their reaction.
    Another reason some people adopt relativism is from a pessimistic scepticism concerning the possibility of any definitive resolution of moral issues. They hear different views voiced on contemporary issues, all supported by what appear to be convincing arguments, and throw up their hands in frustration, concluding that no truth can be found: "its all a matter of how you look at it." But this reaction is premature: there is no reason to believe that because there are different and quite reasonable views on important moral issues, and the debates have yet to be resolved, that therefore they are irresolvable. Most important issues in any area of serious discussion--in science, mathematics, political thought--are resolved only after a time, often a lengthy time, of vigorous debate when reasonable people disagree on the issue. There is no reason to believe that ethical issues should be any easier to resolve; in fact, the complexity of these issues suggests that they should be quite difficult to resolve in any easy manner. The scepticism also looses sight of the fact that historically many moral issues that were hotly debated in the past have been settled in ways that no reasonable person would object to today: that slavery is immoral, that women should have the same legal rights as men, that racism is immoral, that religious freedom should be protected by law, etc. Moral argument played a crucial role in the resolution of these issues. But from the point of view of moral relativism, we would have to conclude that the adoption of these beliefs in fact effected no advance in moral understanding--that if these beliefs had been rejected, our society would be none the worse for it.
    The common reasons, then, offered for adopting ethical relativism are, on close examination, quite unconvincing, and in practice it is quite difficult for any reasonable person to adopt the view consistently. At any rate, in this course we will accept moral objectivism as the basis of our discussions: simply put, that moral positions can be justified on the basis of rationally supportable and objective criteria.

Ethical Theory

For the first several weeks of this course we will be considering general ethical theory as a preliminary to the discussion of particular ethical issues later on. Ethical theory, broadly speaking, is an attempt to reflect in a reasonable and consistent manner on the various concepts, ideas, criteria, principles, etc., that have been or may be applied in our consideration of all moral questions and issues. It is thus distinguished from the area known as applied ethics (which will be our focus in the latter part of this course) that deals with specific moral issues that are of contemporary concern in our society. Typically ethicists distinguish two forms of ethical theory: theoretical normative ethics and metaethics.

Theoretical Normative Ethics

Theoretical normative ethics is the attempt to find general principles which specify the criteria that ought to be used in moral judgment, and the grounds, in reasoned arguments, for these principles. Thus if one asks the question with respect to a moral judgment, such as "One ought not to harm others," "Why not?" the attempt to provide an answer on the basis of reasoned argument, in a way that is consistent with reasonable answers that one might give to similar questions concerning other moral judgments, would be an investigation in normative ethics.

It is important to note that the question being asked, and which is addressed by normative ethicists, is not "Why do people believe that we ought not do such and such?" This question is factual or descriptive, not normative: it has to do with what people in fact think about a moral issue, not, as the question above, with what people should think. Although the former question can be quite relevant to the issues of normative ethics, it cannot fully address these issues. It is not hard to see why. For one thing, people disagree concerning what actions are right and wrong, and even if two people agree that a given action is wrong, they can disagree concerning why the action is wrong. Thus attempting to answer the question of why we ought or ought not to perform certain actions on the basis of what people believe alone would lead us into inconsistency and confusion. But more importantly, there is no reason to believe, in ethics as in any other area of human concern, that whatever someone thinks must be right. People's moral beliefs can be based on superstition, prejudice, or whim, none of which recommends a belief for acceptance on rational grounds. Since rational discussion and inquiry rejects such reasons for accepting beliefs, normative ethics cannot be guided by people's beliefs alone.

Metaethics

The second area of ethical theory, metaethics, deals with certain basic questions that do not concern the determination of general principles of moral judgment, but the way that we talk and think about moral questions. For example, what does it mean to say that an action is 'right' or 'obligatory'? What sorts of rules govern inferences that we make concerning our moral obligations from the acceptance of more basic moral judgments?

There are still many questions yet to be resolved in metaethics, and in the light of this the long history of normative ethical discussion (reaching back to the time of the Ancient Greeks) might appear misguided: How can we begin to attempt to address the questions of normative ethics if we are not even certain what the terms we use in our discussions on these questions mean, or what the principles of moral reasoning are? Actually this situation is not all that peculiar. A similar situation holds in mathematics. Mathematicians have been discovering mathematical principles for many centuries, but serious discussion concerning the foundations of mathematics is a relatively recent development. Suffice it to say that when we enter into discussion of normative ethical issues, we must be aware that we are making certain assumptions about the meaning of our terms and the validity of our inferences the basis of which can only be adequately addressed in more fundamental forms of inquiry.
We will have little to say about metaethics in this course. In the first part of this course, however, our primary focus will be to consider various normative ethical theories. There are a great many such theories that have been proposed in the roughly two millennia of serious ethical discussion. We will only be concerned with a few of the theories that have gained the widest acceptance, or garnered some serious consideration, in recent times.

Normative Ethical Theories

Two approaches to normative ethical theory have predominated in the last two hundred years or so: the teleological and the deontological approaches. The basic distinction between these two approaches is to be found in the different ways that they understand what determines the moral status of an action, that is the status of a given action of being either morally right or wrong, permissible or impermissible.

The teleological approach (also known as "consequentialism") determines the moral status of action by the causal consequences or outcomes of action. That is, an action is right or wrong according to whether it leads to good or bad consequences. Thus, judging whether a given action is right or wrong requires that one consider the actual or probable consequences of the action. Is stealing wrong? A teleologist will say that we should consider what comes of stealing: who is benefitted? who is harmed? We will be considering two normative theories that take this approach: ethical egoism and utilitarianism.

On the other hand, the deontological approach denies what the teleological approach affirms: it denies that the moral status of an action is determined by the consequences of the action, in favor of a view that human rights must be respected and moral obligations fulfilled even if an optimal outcome is not achieved. Deontology thereby claims that some criterion other than consequential values determines the moral status of actions and should be used in making moral judgments. There have been a great variety of suggestions as to the moral criterion that should be used. We will consider two of these suggestions stemming from the most prominent deontological ethical theories in modern times: Kantianism (named after its founder, the philosopher Immanuel Kant), and contractarianism (also known as contractualism).

A short sketch of each of these theories is offered below. In class we will consider the theories, and possible problems and objections to these theories, in greater detail.

Teleological Theories

Ethical Egoism

The theory of ethical egoism has not garnered many proponents among ethicists. Ayn Rand and Robert Olsen are two philosophers who often are considered ethical egoists, but even in their cases this classification is doubtful. But the view has been the focus of intense discussion, and is worthy of our consideration, because it challenges a premise underlying most ethical discussion--that moral obligation is not always consistent with self-interest, that is, that at times our moral responsibilities require us to act in ways that do not further our own interests. An ethical egoist asserts that to the contrary we are morally obligated to act for our own best interest, or, stated as an ethical principle:

One ought to do whatever is in one's own best interests.

There can be considerable disagreement, of course, about what constitutes our interest. Certainly survival is something that all of us could agree upon, and there are other things that readily come to mind: economic security, health, good social relationships, etc. Ethical egoism itself does not address this issue, but it does argue that whatever conditions do constitute our personal interests are those that we have a moral obligation to pursue, regardless of the effects of this pursuit on other people.

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism has been the most influential normative ethical theory taking the teleological approach in modern times. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), a British ethical and legal philosopher, first proposed this theory in his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). However today the short treatise Utilitarianism (1863), written by the British philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-73), is considered the classic statement of the theory. Utilitarianism continues to be one of the most widely used normative theories in current work by moral philosophers.

According to utilitarianism, the moral status of an action is determined by the actual or probable consequences that the action will have for everyone whose lives are affected by that action. The moral agent has the obligation to perform that action that will bring about the best consequences overall. The value or usefulness of an action in promoting good and preventing evil is known as the "utility" of the action, and so the basic principle of utilitarianism is known as the Principle of Utility, which can be stated in this manner:

One ought to seek to produce the greatest possible balance of good over evil, or the least possible balance of evil over good, for all who will be affected by one's actions.

Significant questions have been raised concerning what constitutes the good that we ought to promote in our actions, and the evil we ought to prevent, that is, what constitutes right- making nonmoral values. The classical utilitarians, such as Mill, argued that happiness is the fundamental good, suffering the fundamental evil, and interpreted happiness as the feeling of pleasure and the absence of pain, and suffering as the opposite. The view that pleasure and pain are the fundamental right-making values is known as ethical hedonism. There has been considerable criticism offered against this view, and most utilitarians today reject it in favor of a broader understanding of good and evil. The details of the debate need not concern us; a broad understanding of good as that which makes our lives worth living and evil as that which detracts from the overall value of our lives will suffice for our purposes.

We will consider two forms of utilitarianism in this class. One, known as act utilitarianism argues that we should seek to produce the best consequences overall that are possible for each situation where our action will have a significant effect. Thus we are obligated to apply the standard of the principle of utility in all such situations. An alternative position, rule utilitarianism, asserts that we ought as a society to adopt rules of action which, if consistently followed by everyone in society, will achieve the best outcome in the long run. We will consider the merits and problems of these views in class.

Deontological Theories

Kantianism

One of the most prominent deontological ethical theorists of modern times was the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724- 1804). Kant's moral theory has had a tremendous influence on ethical thought, and the broad framework of his approach to ethics is still widely used today as a guide to ethical discussion. Kant argued that the moral status of an action is not determined by its consequences. We are not morally obligated to seek the best overall outcome by our actions, but rather we are obligated to perform those actions that accord with our moral duty--the fundamental demand that we should treat others, and ourselves, in a manner that is consistent with human dignity and worth. Thus if, for example, lying to another person might lead to a better outcome overall than telling the truth, we would still be obligated not to lie because the act of lying does not respect the humanity of the person to whom we tell the lie.

How, then, can we determine what actions are consistent with a moral respect for ourselves and others? Kant believed that our capacity for rational thought, thought that is consistent, is sufficient to determine where our moral duties lie. The basic idea is this: whenever I act in an intentional manner, my action implicitly warrants or recommends (or "wills" in Kant's language) the same action for others, and if I act in a manner that is consistent with my moral duties (that is, if my action is morally permissible), then I act in a way that I could rationally (that is, consistently) recommend (or will) for all other rational agents.

Take, for example, the act of brushing one's teeth. Teeth brushing is conducive to good dental health, which in turn enables one to eat a healthy diet and also avoid the dental pain associated with tooth decay. It is therefore good for any person to brush their teeth, and the fact that I brush my teeth shows that I believe this and thus implicitly recommends the practice to others. Furthermore, there is nothing irrational about this recommendation: I in no way contradict any other desire or wish that I have and cannot give up by recommending that others brush their teeth, nor is their anything absurd about wanting everyone to do the same. Put in another way, in the language that Kant himself used, I can as a rational agent will that everyone brush their teeth, which means for Kant that my own action of brushing my teeth is consistent with my moral duties (that is, I do nothing morally wrong by brushing my teeth, the action is permissible).

But now consider another example. Let us first assume, as Kant did, that every rational agent has a fundamental desire for self-preservation, a desire to live, that they cannot renounce. (This assumption might be questioned in the case of the suicide, but even in this case it might be thought that the suicide on a basic level wants to live, he or she simply doesn't want to live with emotional trauma or whatever is making life at the moment unbearable.) Now, consider in the light of this assumption whether I as a rational agent could recommend the act of intentionally killing another human being for any other rational agent who desires to murder someone. Clearly not, Kant would say. For if I recommend that people kill others, then I am recommending that others (if they want to) kill me, and that is inconsistent with my desire for self-preservation. Thus it would be inconsistent for me to recommend others to murder (Kant calls this a "contradiction of will"), and furthermore I could not consistently, as a rational agent, intentionally kill someone else, because, as we saw, this act itself implicitly entails the recommendation of this act for others. Thus I know that it would also be immoral for me to kill others, and that it is my moral duty not to kill others.

It is necessary to consider one more step in Kant's argument before we can consider his fundamental moral principle. Kant believed that rational agents, when they perform an action intentionally (rather than, say, out of blind impulse), act according to rules, or what Kant called maxims, that they adopt as guides for their behavior. When I intentionally brush my teeth, I am following the maxim "One should brush one's teeth," or if I were to kill someone for personal gain, I would be following the maxim "One should kill others whenever it is expedient to do so." Thus, the implicit warrant or recommendation that I offer to other rational agents whenever I, as a rational agent, act intentionally is in effect a recommendation that others adopt the very same maxim that I am adopting for my action. Now a rule or maxim that everyone must follow would be a law, a practical rule of action that is universal. Above we noted Kant's view that an intentional action is rational and thus moral only if one could rationally recommend it to others. We now understand that another way to say this is that my action is rational and morally permissible only if I could will that the maxim of my action become a universal law. This, then, is the basic moral principle for human action, what Kant called the Categorical Imperative. Kant's imperative can be translated as follows,

I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim become a universal law.

I can rationally will that the maxim "One should brush one's teeth" become a universal law, and therefore I know that it is morally permissible to act upon this maxim; I cannot rationally will, however, that the maxim "One should kill others whenever it is expedient to do so" become universal law, and therefore I know that it is morally impermissible (morally wrong) to act upon this maxim, and morally obligatory that I adopt and act on the contradictory maxim, "One should not kill."

Kant offered several other versions of the Categorical Imperative, all of which he believed were equivalent to the one we considered above, which is often called the Universal Law Formulation. Kant's demonstration of the equivalency of the other formulations with the Universal Law Formulation is long and quite complicated, and we need not consider it for the purposes of this class. But there is one other formulation of the Categorical Imperative that has been quite influential in ethical discussion, the so-called End-in-Itself Formulation. Kant stated it in the following manner:

So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end, never as a means only.

Here we return to Kant's fundamental point: we are obligated to respect the humanity, the human worth, of others by our actions. We will be considering the meaning and significance of this formulation in class.

Contractarianism (Contractualism)

Contractarianism as an ethical theory derives from the social contract political theory of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes believed that the fundamental warrant of the legal obligations that a state imposes upon its citizens stems from a tacit agreement that those citizens have with the state to the effect that the citizens will obey the laws of the state in exchange for the security, comfort, and prosperity that the state affords its citizens. In Hobbes' view, we should obey the laws of our government for the same reason that parties to a contract should follow the terms of their contract: a voluntary agreement binds individuals to uphold, in both cases, certain obligations. The one crucial difference is that in the case of the citizens' contract with the state, the agreement is tacit. We do not as citizens sign a contract with the state, or pledge an oath to follow the laws of the state, rather our voluntary choice to live within the boundaries of the state and reap the benefits of the civilized life that it provides constitutes a tacit acceptance of the terms of the agreement, the social contract.

There have been many criticisms of social contract theory, criticisms that show it to be all but untenable as a political theory in the way that Hobbes presented it. But the general notion that our relationships with others within society do entail, or it least may be fruitfully understood to entail, implicit agreements or contracts between individuals is still cogent in the views of many moral philosophers. When we believe that we have been treated wrongly by a friend who has betrayed us, we might provide a warrant for this belief by suggesting that a friendship involves certain reasonable expectations concerning how friends will treat each other, that no reasonable person would enter into a friendship with another person if they believed that these expectations would not be met, that our friend understands the content of these expectations, and therefore that these expectations have the force of an agreement that might be, although it hardly ever is in any particular case, stated explicitly as a set of rules: one should help a friend in need, not violate confidences, etc. Similar expectations pertain to other social relationships: we expect that parents will care for their children, that children will care for elderly parents to the extent of their means, that doctors will use every viable means available and appropriate to cure their patients, etc. These expectations define our social relationships, and account for the ways in which our social connections with others aid us in living a more productive and satisfying life. In each case, if these expectations are not met, we might not only feel aggrieved, but believe that the offending person has broken a trust with us, and thus has acted in violation of their moral duty to us. This is a moral judgment. We are making the basic judgment that it is not only explicitly stated agreements between individuals, such as legal contracts, that bind by mutual obligation, but also tacit agreements constituted by mutual, reasonable expectations that we all understand when entering into social relationships with one another.

This is the heart of the ethical theory known as contractarianism or contractualism. Moral obligations stem from those basic rules that underlie and sustain our social lives, rules that reasonable persons would agree are necessary to define the minimal standards of behavior within given social relationships, and therefore rules that no reasonable person would consent to the violation of by others in these relationships. We can state, then, the basic moral principle of the theory in this manner:

One ought to abide by those rules that rational moral agents would agree to observe when entering into a social relationship for their mutual benefit.