

Savage in the Market

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- ▶ Model / Utility
- ▶ Data / Behavior

This paper:

- ▶ SEU
- ▶ Market behavior


Utility and behavior


Model:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{x \in \mathbf{R}_+^S} \quad & U(x) \\ & p \cdot x \leq I \end{aligned}$$

Utility and behavior

Market behavior:





Utility and behavior

- ▶ Q: When is observable behavior consistent with utility max.?
- ▶ A: When SARP is satisfied.

This paper: *Subjective Expected Utility (SEU)*

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
Where

$$U(x) = \sum_{s \in S} \mu_s u(x_s)$$

- ▶ $u : \mathbf{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$ st. inc. and concave;
- ▶ $\mu \in \Delta(S)$ a subjective prior.

This paper.

Market behavior:



- ▶ State-contingent consumption (monetary acts);
- ▶ complete markets;

This paper.

- ▶ Q: When is observable behavior consistent with SEU?
- ▶ A: When SARSEU is satisfied.

Warmup



Warmup

The 2×2 case.

- ▶ 2 states
- ▶ 2 observations



What is the **meaning** of this:

$$\begin{aligned} \max \mu_1 u(x_1) + \mu_2 u(x_2) \\ p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 \leq I \end{aligned}$$

model for market behavior ?

Unobservables:

- ▶ Utility $u : \mathbf{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$
- ▶ Prior (μ_1, μ_2)

Observable:

- ▶ choices at different budgets









Figure : A violation of WARP.















Axiom 1
Not:



Axiom 2
Not:



END of Warmup



Now: K observations and S states.

Main theorem:

A dataset is SEU rationalizable iff it satisfies the Strong Axiom of Revealed Subjective Expected Utility (SARSEU).

Plug

Echenique, Imai, Saito (2014)

- ▶ Discounting: $\sum \delta^t u(x_t)$
- ▶ Quasi-hyperbolic discounting $u(x_0) + \beta \sum \delta^t u(x_t)$.
- ▶ Empirical application to Andreoni-Sprenger's data.

Model

- ▶ Finite set S of states.
- ▶ Monetary acts: $x \in \mathbf{R}_+^S$.
- ▶ Price vectors: $p \in \mathbf{R}_{++}^S$.

Notation: S is also the number of states.

Data

A *dataset* is a collection $(x^k, p^k)_{k=1}^K$ s.t.

- ▶ x^k is a monetary act;
- ▶ p^k is a price vector.

Notation

Let

- ▶ $\Delta_{++}^S = \{\mu \in \mathbf{R}_{++}^S \mid \sum_{s=1}^S \mu_s = 1\}$
- ▶ $\mathcal{C} = \{u : \mathbf{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbf{R} \mid u \text{ is st. increasing and concave}\}$
- ▶ $B(p, l) = \{y \in \mathbf{R}_+^S \mid p \cdot y \leq l\}$

Model

SEU

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{x \in \mathbf{R}_+^S} \quad & \sum_{s \in S} \mu_s u(x_s) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{s \in S} p_s x_s \leq I \end{aligned}$$

SEU rational

$(x^k, p^k)_{k=1}^K$ is *subjective exp. utility rational (SEU rational)* if

- ▶ $\exists \mu \in \Delta_{++}^S$;
- ▶ and $u \in \mathcal{C}$ s.t.

$$\sum_{s \in S} \mu_s u(y_s) \leq \sum_{s \in S} \mu_s u(x_s^k),$$

for all $y \in B(p^k, p^k \cdot x^k)$ and all k .

Previous work:

- ▶ Varian
- ▶ Green & Srivastava
- ▶ Kubler, Selden & Wei

All assume **observable** μ .

Derive SARSEU; $K = 1$ and μ is *known*.

Derivation of SARSEU.

- ▶ $K = 1$
- ▶ μ *objective and known*
- ▶ u differentiable.

Derive SARSEU; $K = 1$ and μ is *known*.

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{x \in \mathbb{R}_+^S} \quad & \sum_{s \in S} \mu_s u(x_s) \\ \sum_{s \in S} p_s x_s \leq & I \end{aligned}$$

FOC:

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_s u'(x_s) &= \lambda p_s \\ u'(x_s) &= \lambda (p_s / \mu_s) = \lambda \rho_s \end{aligned}$$

Here ρ is observable.

Derive SARSEU; $K = 1$ and μ is *known*.

$$u'(x_s) = \lambda(p_s/\mu_s) = \lambda\rho_s$$

So,

$$\frac{u'(x_s)}{u'(x_{s'})} = \frac{\lambda\rho_s}{\lambda\rho_{s'}} = \frac{\rho_s}{\rho_{s'}}$$

Derive SARSEU; $K = 1$ and μ is *known*.

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So,

$$\frac{u'(x_s)}{u'(x_{s'})} = \frac{\lambda\rho_s}{\lambda\rho_{s'}} = \frac{\rho_s}{\rho_{s'}}$$

Axiom (Downward sloping demand):

$$x_s > x_{s'} \Rightarrow \frac{\rho_s}{\rho_{s'}} \leq 1$$

Derive SARSEU - general K and subjective μ

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{x \in \mathbf{R}_+^S} \quad & \sum_{s \in S} \mu_s u(x_s) \\ \sum_{s \in S} p_s x_s \quad & \leq I \end{aligned}$$

FOC:

$$\mu_s u'(x_s) = \lambda p_s.$$

Derive SARSEU - general K and subjective μ

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{x \in \mathbf{R}_+^S} \quad & \sum_{s \in S} \mu_s u(x_s) \\ \sum_{s \in S} p_s x_s \leq & I \end{aligned}$$

FOC:

$$\mu_s u'(x_s) = \lambda p_s.$$

Hence,

$$\frac{u'(x_s^k)}{u'(x_{s'}^{k'})} = \frac{\mu_{s'}}{\mu_s} \frac{\lambda^k}{\lambda^{k'}} \frac{p_s^k}{p_{s'}^{k'}}.$$

$$\frac{u'(x_s^k)}{u'(x_{s'}^{k'})} = \frac{\mu_{s'} \lambda^k p_s^k}{\mu_s \lambda^{k'} p_{s'}^{k'}}.$$

Idea: Choose $(x_{s_i}^{k_i}, x_{s'_i}^{k'_i})$ so that unobservable μ_s and λ^k **cancel out**.

Example

Choose:

$$x_{s_1}^{k_1} > x_{s_2}^{k_2}, \quad x_{s_2}^{k_3} > x_{s_3}^{k_1}, \quad \text{and} \quad x_{s_3}^{k_2} > x_{s_1}^{k_3}.$$

Then:

$$\frac{u'(x_{s_1}^{k_1})}{u'(x_{s_2}^{k_2})} \cdot \frac{u'(x_{s_2}^{k_3})}{u'(x_{s_3}^{k_1})} \cdot \frac{u'(x_{s_3}^{k_2})}{u'(x_{s_1}^{k_3})} = \left(\frac{\mu_{s_2}}{\mu_{s_1}} \frac{\lambda^{k_1}}{\lambda^{k_2}} \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1}}{p_{s_2}^{k_2}} \right) \cdot \left(\frac{\mu_{s_3}}{\mu_{s_2}} \frac{\lambda^{k_3}}{\lambda^{k_1}} \frac{p_{s_2}^{k_3}}{p_{s_3}^{k_1}} \right) \cdot \left(\frac{\mu_{s_1}}{\mu_{s_3}} \frac{\lambda^{k_2}}{\lambda^{k_3}} \frac{p_{s_3}^{k_2}}{p_{s_1}^{k_3}} \right)$$

Example

Choose:

$$x_{s_1}^{k_1} > x_{s_2}^{k_2}, \quad x_{s_2}^{k_3} > x_{s_3}^{k_1}, \quad \text{and } x_{s_3}^{k_2} > x_{s_1}^{k_3}.$$

Then:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{u'(x_{s_1}^{k_1})}{u'(x_{s_2}^{k_2})} \cdot \frac{u'(x_{s_2}^{k_3})}{u'(x_{s_3}^{k_1})} \cdot \frac{u'(x_{s_3}^{k_2})}{u'(x_{s_1}^{k_3})} &= \left(\frac{\mu_{s_2} \cancel{\lambda^{k_1}} p_{s_1}^{k_1}}{\cancel{\mu_{s_1}} \lambda^{k_2} p_{s_2}^{k_2}} \right) \cdot \left(\frac{\mu_{s_3} \lambda^{k_3} p_{s_2}^{k_3}}{\mu_{s_2} \cancel{\lambda^{k_1}} p_{s_3}^{k_1}} \right) \\ &\quad \cdot \left(\frac{\cancel{\mu_{s_1}} \lambda^{k_2} p_{s_3}^{k_2}}{\mu_{s_3} \lambda^{k_3} p_{s_1}^{k_3}} \right) \\ &= \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1} p_{s_2}^{k_3} p_{s_3}^{k_2}}{p_{s_2}^{k_2} p_{s_3}^{k_1} p_{s_1}^{k_3}} \end{aligned}$$

So by **concavity** of u ,

$$\frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1} p_{s_2}^{k_3} p_{s_3}^{k_2}}{p_{s_2}^{k_2} p_{s_3}^{k_1} p_{s_1}^{k_3}} \leq 1$$

SARSEU

(Strong Axiom of Revealed Subjective Utility (SARSEU))

For any $(x_{s_i}^{k_i}, x_{s'_i}^{k'_i})_{i=1}^n$ s.t.

1. $x_{s_i}^{k_i} > x_{s'_i}^{k'_i}$
2. s appears as s_i (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears as s'_i (on the right);
3. k appears as k_i (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears as k'_i (on the right):

$$\prod_{i=1}^n \frac{p_{s_i}^{k_i}}{p_{s'_i}^{k'_i}} \leq 1.$$

Main result

Theorem

A dataset is SEU rational if and only if it satisfies SARSEU.

The 2×2 case again



The 2×2 case again

Data:

$$\frac{u'(x_{s_1}^{k_1})}{u'(x_{s_2}^{k_1})} \frac{u'(x_{s_2}^{k_2})}{u'(x_{s_1}^{k_2})} = \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1}}{p_{s_2}^{k_1}} \frac{p_{s_2}^{k_2}}{p_{s_1}^{k_2}}$$

Two cases:

The 2×2 case again

Data:

$$\frac{u'(x_{s_1}^{k_1})}{u'(x_{s_2}^{k_1})} \frac{u'(x_{s_2}^{k_2})}{u'(x_{s_1}^{k_2})} = \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1}}{p_{s_2}^{k_1}} \frac{p_{s_2}^{k_2}}{p_{s_1}^{k_2}}$$

Two cases:


$$x_{s_1}^{k_1} > x_{s_2}^{k_1} \text{ and } x_{s_2}^{k_2} > x_{s_1}^{k_2} \Rightarrow \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1}}{p_{s_2}^{k_1}} \frac{p_{s_2}^{k_2}}{p_{s_1}^{k_2}} \leq 1$$

$$x_{s_1}^{k_1} > x_{s_1}^{k_2} \text{ and } x_{s_2}^{k_2} > x_{s_2}^{k_1} \Rightarrow \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1}}{p_{s_2}^{k_1}} \frac{p_{s_2}^{k_2}}{p_{s_1}^{k_2}} \leq 1$$

The 2×2 case again

$$\frac{u'(x_{s_1}^{k_1})}{u'(x_{s_2}^{k_1})} \frac{u'(x_{s_2}^{k_2})}{u'(x_{s_1}^{k_2})} = \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1} p_{s_2}^{k_2}}{p_{s_2}^{k_1} p_{s_1}^{k_2}}$$


$$x_{s_1}^{k_1} > x_{s_1}^{k_2} \text{ and } x_{s_2}^{k_2} > x_{s_2}^{k_1} \Rightarrow \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1} p_{s_2}^{k_2}}{p_{s_2}^{k_1} p_{s_1}^{k_2}} \leq 1$$



The 2×2 case again

$$\frac{u'_{s_1}(x_{s_1}^{k_1})}{u'_{s_2}(x_{s_2}^{k_1})} \frac{u'_{s_2}(x_{s_2}^{k_2})}{u'_{s_1}(x_{s_1}^{k_2})} = \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1}}{p_{s_2}^{k_1}} \frac{p_{s_2}^{k_2}}{p_{s_1}^{k_2}}$$

$$x_{s_1}^{k_1} > x_{s_1}^{k_2} \text{ and } x_{s_2}^{k_2} > x_{s_2}^{k_1} \Rightarrow \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1}}{p_{s_2}^{k_1}} \frac{p_{s_2}^{k_2}}{p_{s_1}^{k_2}} \leq 1$$



(Strong Axiom of Revealed Subjective Utility (SARSEU))

For any $(x_{s_i}^{k_i}, x_{s'_i}^{k'_i})_{i=1}^n$ s.t.

1. $x_{s_i}^{k_i} > x_{s'_i}^{k'_i}$
2. s appears as s_i (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears as s'_i (on the right);
3. k appears as k_i (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears as k'_i (on the right):

$$\prod_{i=1}^n \frac{p_{s_i}^{k_i}}{p_{s'_i}^{k'_i}} \leq 1.$$

(Strong Axiom of Revealed **State-dependent** Utility)

For any $(x_{s_i}^{k_i}, x_{s'_i}^{k'_i})_{i=1}^n$ s.t.

1. $x_{s_i}^{k_i} > x_{s'_i}^{k'_i}$
2. $s_i = s'_i$.
3. k appears as k_i (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears as k'_i (on the right):

$$\prod_{i=1}^n \frac{p_{s_i}^{k_i}}{p_{s'_i}^{k'_i}} \leq 1.$$

Equivalently ...

(Strong Axiom of Revealed **State-dependent** Utility)

For any cycle:

$$\begin{aligned}x_{s_1}^{k_1} &> x_{s_1}^{k_2} \\x_{s_2}^{k_2} &> x_{s_2}^{k_3} \\&\vdots \\x_{s_n}^{k_n} &> x_{s_n}^{k_1},\end{aligned}$$

it holds that:


$$\prod_{i=1}^n \frac{p_{s_i}^{k_i}}{p_{s_i}^{k_{i+1}}} \leq 1$$

(using addition mod n).

The 2×2 case again

$$\frac{u'(x_{s_1}^{k_1})}{u'(x_{s_2}^{k_1})} \frac{u'(x_{s_2}^{k_2})}{u'(x_{s_1}^{k_2})} = \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1} p_{s_2}^{k_2}}{p_{s_2}^{k_1} p_{s_1}^{k_2}}$$


$$x_{s_1}^{k_1} > x_{s_2}^{k_1} \text{ and } x_{s_2}^{k_2} > x_{s_1}^{k_2} \Rightarrow \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1} p_{s_2}^{k_2}}{p_{s_2}^{k_1} p_{s_1}^{k_2}} \leq 1$$



The 2×2 case again

$$\frac{u'_{k_1}(x_{s_1}^{k_1})}{u'_{k_1}(x_{s_2}^{k_1})} \frac{u'_{k_2}(x_{s_2}^{k_2})}{u'_{k_2}(x_{s_1}^{k_2})} = \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1} p_{s_2}^{k_2}}{p_{s_2}^{k_1} p_{s_1}^{k_2}}$$

$$x_{s_1}^{k_1} > x_{s_2}^{k_1} \text{ and } x_{s_2}^{k_2} > x_{s_1}^{k_2} \Rightarrow \frac{p_{s_1}^{k_1} p_{s_2}^{k_2}}{p_{s_2}^{k_1} p_{s_1}^{k_2}} \leq 1$$



Discussion

- ▶ Checking SARSEU
- ▶ \exists data
- ▶ Prob. sophistication (Epstein)
- ▶ Maxmin
- ▶ Objective EU
- ▶ Savage

Checking SARSEU

Proposition

There is an algorithm that decides (in polynomial time) whether a dataset satisfies SARSEU.

Data

Need:

- ▶ obj. identifiable states
- ▶ complete asset markets (and no-arbitrage)

Turns out such data are routinely used in empirical finance.

Recent example: S. Ross “*The recovery theorem*” (J. of Finance, forth.). Such data is also used by Rubinstein (1998), Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998) and many others.

Epstein (2000)

Necessary Condition for prob. sophistication: if $\exists (x, p)$ and (x', p')

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{(i) } p_1 \geq p_2 \quad \text{and} \quad p'_1 \leq p'_2 \quad \text{with at least one strict ineq.} \\ \text{(ii) } x_1 > x_2 \quad \text{and} \quad x'_1 < x'_2 \end{array} \right]$$

\Rightarrow Not Probability Sophisticated

Epstein (2000)

Necessary Condition for prob. sophistication: if $\exists (x, p)$ and (x', p')

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{(i) } p_1 \geq p_2 \quad \text{and} \quad p'_1 \leq p'_2 \quad \text{with at least one strict ineq.} \\ \text{(ii) } x_1 > x_2 \quad \text{and} \quad x'_1 < x'_2 \end{array} \right]$$


\Rightarrow Not Probability Sophisticated


$\{(x_1, x_2), (x'_2, x'_1)\}$ satisfy conditions in SARSEU: so must have


$$\frac{p_1}{p_2} \frac{p'_2}{p'_1} \leq 1,$$


hence can't violate Epstein's condition.


A probabilistically sophisticated data set violating SARSEU.








































































































Maxmin

$$U(x) = \min_{\mu \in M} \sum_{s \in S} \mu_s u(x_s)$$

M is a convex set of priors.

Maxmin

$(x^k, p^k)_{k=1}^K$ is *maxmin rational* if \exists

▶ convex set $M \subseteq \Delta_{++}$

▶ and $u \in \mathcal{C}$ s.t.

$$y \in B(p^k, p^k \cdot x^k) \Rightarrow \min_{\mu \in M} \sum_{s \in S} \mu_s u(y_s) \leq \min_{\mu \in M} \sum_{s \in S} \mu_s u(x_s^k).$$

Maxmin

Proposition

Let $S = K = 2$. Then a dataset is max-min rational iff it is SEU rational.

Example with $S = 2$ and $K = 4$ of a dataset that is max-min rational and violates SARSEU.

Objective Probabilities

$$\max \sum \mu_s u(x_s)$$
$$p \cdot x \leq I$$

- ▶ Observables: μ, p, x
- ▶ Unobservables: u

Varian (1983), Green and Srivastava (1986), and Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2013)

Objective Probabilities

Varian (1983), Green and Srivastava (1986): FOC

$$\mu_s u'(x_s) = \lambda p_s, \text{ (linear "Afriat" inequalities).}$$

Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2013): axiom on data.

Objective Probabilities

$$u'(x_s^k) = \lambda^k \frac{p_s^k}{\mu_s} = \lambda^k \rho_s^k,$$

- ▶ $\rho_s^k = p_s^k / \mu_s$ is a “risk neutral” price.

Objective Probabilities

(Strong Axiom of Revealed Exp. Utility (SAREU))

For any $(x_{s_i}^{k_i}, x_{s_i}^{k'_i})_{i=1}^n$ s.t.

1. $x_{s_i}^{k_i} > x_{s_i}^{k'_i}$
2. each k appears in k_i (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears in k'_i (on the right):

we have:

$$\prod_{i=1}^n \frac{\rho_{s_i}^{k_i}}{\rho_{s_i}^{k'_i}} \leq 1.$$

Theorem

A dataset is EU rational if and only if it satisfies SAREU.

Savage

Primitives:

infinite S ;

\succeq on acts: information on all pairwise comparisons.

Define \succeq to be the *rev. preference relation* defined from a finite dataset (x^k, p^k) :

- ▶ $x^k \succeq y$ if $y \in B(p^k, p^k \cdot x^k)$
- ▶ $x^k \succ y$ if ...
- ▶ note: \succeq is incomplete.

Savage

Axioms:

- ▶ P1
- ▶ P2
- ▶ P3
- ▶ P4
- ▶ P5
- ▶ P6
- ▶ P7

Proposition

If a data set violates P2, P4 or P7, then it violates SARSEU. No data can violate P3 or P5.

Ideas in the proof

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_s u'(x_s^k) &= \lambda^k p_s^k \\ x_s^k > x_s^k &\Rightarrow u'(x_s^k) \leq u'(x_s^k)\end{aligned}$$

quadratic equations \Rightarrow linearize by logs.

$$\begin{aligned} \log \mu_s + \log u'(x_s^k) &= \log \lambda^k + \log p_s^k \\ x_s^k > x_{s'}^{k'} &\Rightarrow \log u'(x_{s'}^{k'}) \leq \log u'(x_s^k) \end{aligned}$$

When $\log p_s^k \in \mathbf{Q}$, the integer version of Farkas's lemma gives our axiom.

When $\log p_s^k \notin \mathbf{Q}$: approximation result.

$$\log v_s^k + \log \mu_s - \log \lambda^k - \log p_s^k = 0, \quad (1)$$

$$x_s^k > x_{s'}^{k'} \Rightarrow \log v_s^k \leq \log v_{s'}^{k'} \quad (2)$$

In the system (3)- (4), the unknowns are the real numbers $\log v_s^k$, $\log \mu_s$, $\log \lambda^k$, $k = 1, \dots, K$ and $s = 1, \dots, S$.

$$S1 : \begin{cases} A \cdot u = 0, \\ B \cdot u \geq 0, \\ E \cdot u \gg 0. \end{cases}$$

Matrix A :

$$\begin{array}{r} \begin{array}{c} (1,1) \\ \vdots \\ (k,s) \\ \vdots \\ (K,S) \end{array} \left[\begin{array}{ccccc} (1,1) & \dots & (k,s) & \dots & (K,S) \\ 1 & \dots & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 0 & \dots & 1 & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 0 & \dots & 0 & \dots & 1 \end{array} \right. \left. \begin{array}{ccccc} 1 & \dots & s & \dots & S \\ 1 & \dots & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 0 & \dots & 1 & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 0 & \dots & 0 & \dots & 1 \end{array} \right| \begin{array}{cc} 1 & \dots \\ -1 & \dots \\ \vdots & \\ 0 & \dots \\ \vdots & \\ 0 & \dots \end{array} \end{array}$$

$$S2 : \begin{cases} \theta \cdot A + \eta \cdot B + \pi \cdot E = 0, \\ \eta \geq 0, \\ \pi > 0. \end{cases}$$

Lemma

Let $(x^k, p^k)_{k=1}^K$ be a dataset. The following statements are equivalent:

1. $(x^k, p^k)_{k=1}^K$ is SEU rational.
2. \exists strictly positive numbers v_s^k, λ^k, μ_s , s.t.

$$\mu_s v_s^k = \lambda^k p_s^k$$

$$x_s^k > x_s^{k'} \Rightarrow v_s^k \leq v_s^{k'}.$$

Lemma

Let data $(x^k, p^k)_{k=1}^K$ satisfy SARSEU. Suppose that $\log(p_s^k) \in \mathbf{Q}$ for all k and s . Then there are numbers v_s^k, λ^k, μ_s , for $s = 1, \dots, S$ and $k = 1, \dots, K$ satisfying (2) in Lemma 3.

Lemma

Let data $(x^k, p^k)_{k=1}^K$ satisfy SARSEU. Then for all positive numbers $\bar{\epsilon}$, there exists $q_s^k \in [p_s^k - \bar{\epsilon}, p_s^k]$ for all $s \in S$ and $k \in K$ such that $\log q_s^k \in \mathbf{Q}$ and the data $(x^k, q^k)_{k=1}^K$ satisfy SARSEU.

Lemma

Let data $(x^k, p^k)_{k=1}^K$ satisfy SARSEU. Then there are numbers v_s^k, λ^k, μ_s , for $s = 1, \dots, S$ and $k = 1, \dots, K$ satisfying (2) in Lemma 3.

Lemma

Let A be an $m \times n$ matrix, B be an $l \times n$ matrix, and E be an $r \times n$ matrix. Suppose that the entries of the matrices A , B , and E belong to a commutative ordered field \mathbf{F} . Exactly one of the following alternatives is true.

1. There is $u \in \mathbf{F}^n$ such that $A \cdot u = 0$, $B \cdot u \geq 0$, $E \cdot u \gg 0$.
2. There is $\theta \in \mathbf{F}^r$, $\eta \in \mathbf{F}^l$, and $\pi \in \mathbf{F}^m$ such that $\theta \cdot A + \eta \cdot B + \pi \cdot E = 0$; $\pi > 0$ and $\eta \geq 0$.

Proof

$$\log v_s^k + \log \mu_s - \log \lambda^k - \log p_s^k = 0, \quad (3)$$

$$x_s^k > x_{s'}^{k'} \Rightarrow \log v_s^k \leq \log v_{s'}^{k'} \quad (4)$$

In the system (3)- (4), the unknowns are the real numbers $\log v_s^k$, $\log \mu_s$, $\log \lambda^k$, $k = 1, \dots, K$ and $s = 1, \dots, S$.

Proof:

$$S1 : \begin{cases} A \cdot u = 0, \\ B \cdot u \geq 0, \\ E \cdot u \gg 0. \end{cases}$$

Proof:

Matrix A :

$$\begin{array}{cccccc|cccc|cc} & (1,1) & \dots & (k,s) & \dots & (K,S) & 1 & \dots & s & \dots & S & 1 & \dots \\ (1,1) & \left[\begin{array}{cccccc} 1 & \dots & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 0 & \dots & 1 & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 0 & \dots & 0 & \dots & 1 \end{array} \right. & & \left. \begin{array}{cccccc} 1 & \dots & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 0 & \dots & 1 & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 0 & \dots & 0 & \dots & 1 \end{array} \right. & & \left. \begin{array}{cc} -1 & \dots \\ \vdots & \\ 0 & \dots \\ \vdots & \\ 0 & \dots \end{array} \right. & & \end{array}$$

Proof:

$$S2 : \begin{cases} \theta \cdot A + \eta \cdot B + \pi \cdot E = 0, \\ \eta \geq 0, \\ \pi > 0. \end{cases}$$



L. Savage

If I have seen less than other men, it is because I have walked in the footsteps of giants.

P. Chernoff