

# On behavioral complementarity and its implications

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## Complementary goods



## Complementary goods

Coffee and Sugar  
Tea and Lemon  
Peanut butter and Jelly  
Cheese and Wine  
Beer and Pretzels  
Gin and Tonic

Matters for IO models and practical problems.  
(e.g. firms' pricing policy).

# Consumer Theory

Explain consumer behavior: choices of *consumption bundles*

$$x \in X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$$

# Consumer Theory


Postulate a *utility function*

$$u : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

Consumer behaves as if

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & u(x) \\ & x \in \{y \in X : p \cdot y \leq m\} \end{aligned}$$

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Consider data  $(x^k, p^k)$ ,  $k = 1, \dots, K$  on prices and consumption.  
Say that  $u$  *rationalizes* the data if, for all  $k$ ,

$$y \neq x^k \text{ and } p^k \cdot y \leq p^k \cdot x^k \Rightarrow u(y) < u(x^k)$$



# Consumer Theory


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Can we rationalize *anything* choosing the appropriate  $u$  ?

Two observations:  $(x^1, p^1), (x^2, p^2)$



## Afriat (1967)

Consider data  $(x^k, p^k)$ ,  $k = 1, \dots, K$ .

### Theorem

*The following are equivalent*

- 1. The data can be rationalized.*
- 2. The data satisfy GARP.*
- 3. The data can be rationalized by a weakly monotonic, continuous, and concave utility.*


## Back to complementary goods



How do **choices** between  
Coffee and Sugar  
and between  
Coffee and Tea  
differ ?  
(**choices** → testing)


How do **preferences** differ ?  
(**preferences** → modeling)

# Complementarity in utility (Edgeworth-Pareto)




$$u(x) - u(x \wedge y) \leq u(x \vee y) - u(y)$$

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### Theorem (Chambers & Echenique (2006))

Data,  $(x^k, p^k)$ ,  $k = 1, \dots, K$ , can be rationalized if and only if it can be rationalized by a supermodular utility

## Behavioral complementarity

The standard notion of complementarities based on utility has no implication for (observable) choices.


So we study a *behavioral* notion.

## Behavioral complementarity

↓ price of coffee  $\Rightarrow$  ↑ demand for sugar.

“Behavioral”  $\neq$  condition on preferences.

## Behavioral complementarity



# Behavioral complementarity

Essentially a property of **pairs of goods**.

Ex: Coffee, Tea and Sugar.

Use more sugar for tea than for coffee.

## What if have $n$ goods ?

Standard practice: estimate cross elasticity assuming demand functional form.

We need separability in preferences (and possibly aggregation).

e.g. heating and housing.

# Demand

A *demand* is a function  $D : \mathbb{R}_{++}^2 \times \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+^2$  s.t.

- ▶  $p \cdot D(p, I) = I$  (Walras Law).
- ▶  $\forall t > 0, D(tp, tI) = D(p, I)$  (Homogeneity of degree zero)

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i.e.  $\exists$  w. mon.  $u$  with

$$D(p, I) = \operatorname{argmax}_{\{x: p \cdot x \leq I\}} u(x)$$



## Behavioral complementarity – Two Models

- ▶ Demand:  $D(p, I)$  (Nominal Income).

$D$  satisfies *complementarity* if

$$p \leq p' \Rightarrow D(p', I) \leq D(p, I).$$

- ▶ Demand:  $D(p, p \cdot \omega)$  (Endowment Income)

$D$  satisfies (*weak*) *complementarity* if, for every  $p, \omega$  there is a  $p'$  such that

$$[D_1(p', p' \cdot \omega) - D_1(p, p \cdot \omega)] [D_2(p', p' \cdot \omega) - D_2(p, p \cdot \omega)] \geq 0$$


## Results (vaguely)

- ▶ Necessary and sufficient condition for **observed** demand to be consistent with complementarity (testable implications).
- ▶ Necessary and sufficient condition (within domains) for **preferences** to generate complements in demand.
- ▶ Differences in Nom. Income vs. Endowment Income.


## Nominal Income – Testable Implications

Expenditure data:  $(x, p)$   $(x', p')$   
(Samuelson (1947), Afriat (1967), etc.)


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
# Nominal Income – Testable Implications



## Nominal Income – Testable Implications

So  $x \vee x' \notin B \vee B'$

# Nominal Income – Testable Implications







## Nominal Income – Testable Implications

Necessary condition 1 :  $x \vee x' \in B \vee B'$

# Nominal Income – Testable Implications



# Nominal Income – Testable Implications



## Nominal Income – Testable Implications

Necessary condition 2 : a strengthening of WARP.

## Nominal Income

By homogeneity,  $D(p/l, 1) = D(p, l)$ .

So fix income  $l = 1$  and write  $D(p)$ .

Note:  $B \vee B'$  is budget with  $p \wedge p'$  and  $l = 1$ .

# Nominal Income

An *observed demand function* is a function  $D : P \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+^2$

- ▶  $P \subseteq \mathbb{R}_{++}^2$  is finite
- ▶  $p \cdot D(p) = 1$

# Nominal Income

Let  $D : P \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+^2$  be an observed demand.

## Theorem (Observable Demand)

$D$  is the restriction to  $P$  of a rational demand that satisfies complementarity iff  $\forall p, p' \in P$

1.  $(p \wedge p') \cdot (D(p) \vee D(p')) \leq 1$ .
2. If  $p' \cdot D(p) \leq 1$  and  $p'_i > p_i$  then  $D(p')_j \geq D(p)_j$  for  $j \neq i$ .

# Nominal Income

## Theorem (Continuity)

*Let  $D : \mathbb{R}_{++}^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+^2$  be a rationalizable demand function which satisfies complementarity. Then  $D$  is continuous. Furthermore,  $D$  is rationalized by an upper semicontinuous, quasiconcave and weakly monotonic utility function.*



# Nominal Income

## Theorem (Continuity)


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
## Remark

*We extend the data to a demand, and then find it's rational. Difference from Afriat's approach of constructing a utility.*


# Theorem 1

Suppose we observe  $(p, x)$  and  $(p'', x'')$ .  
Find demand at prices  $p'$  (extend demand).







# Theorem (Observed Demand)



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## Nominal Income

Let  $u$  be a  $C^2$  utility.

$$m(x) = \frac{\partial u(x)/\partial x_1}{\partial u(x)/\partial x_2}$$

is the *marginal rate of substitution* of  $u$  at an interior point  $x$ .



# Nominal Income


Let  $D$  a demand w/ interior range and monotone increasing,  $C^2$ , and strictly quasiconvex rationalization.

## Theorem (Smooth Utility)

$D$  satisfies complementarity iff

$$\frac{\partial m(x)/\partial x_1}{m(x)} \leq \frac{-1}{x_1} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial m(x)/\partial x_2}{m(x)} \geq \frac{1}{x_2}$$

# Theorem (Smooth Utility)



## Nominal Income

Separability:  $u(x, y) = f(x) + g(y)$ .

Then complementarity iff  $f$  and  $g$  more concave than log.

Expect. util.:  $\pi_1 U(x) + \pi_2 U(y)$ .

Then complementarity iff  $RRA \geq 1$ .

Analogous result for subst. due to Wald (1951) and Varian (1985).

## Endowment Income

$D$  satisfies *complementarity* if, for all  $(p, \omega)$  and all  $p'$ ,

$$[D_1(p', p' \cdot \omega) - D_1(p, p \cdot \omega)] [D_2(p', p' \cdot \omega') - D_2(p, p \cdot \omega)] \geq 0. \quad (1)$$

$D$  satisfies *weak complementarity* if, for every  $(p, \omega)$ , there is *one* price  $p' \neq p$  satisfying (1).

# Endowment Income

Let  $D$  be a rational demand.

## Theorem (Endowment Model)


*The following are equivalent:*

- 1.  $D$  satisfies complementarity.*
- 2.  $D$  satisfies weak complementarity.*
- 3.  $\exists$  cont. strictly monotone,  $f_i : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup \{\infty\}$ ,  $i = 1, 2$ , at least one of which is everywhere real valued ( $f_i(\mathbb{R}_+) \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ ), s.t.*


$$u(x) = \min \{f_1(x_1), f_2(x_2)\}$$

*is a rationalization of  $D$ .*

# Endowment Income



# Endowment Income



Conclusions:

