

Lemma 1: If \underline{r}^* is the optimal solution to (P) under (3), then for any feasible rate vector \underline{r} ,

$$\sum_{g \in S} \frac{r_g - r_g^*}{r_g^{*\alpha}} \leq 0$$

(\underline{r}^* is called α -proportionally fair)

Proof:

$$\sum_l P_l \sum_{g \in S_l} r_g \leq \sum_l P_l c_l \quad \text{by (1)}$$

$$= \sum_l P_l \sum_{g \in S_l} r_g^* \quad \text{by (5)}$$

$$\Rightarrow 0 \geq \sum_l P_l \sum_{g \in S_l} (r_g - r_g^*)$$

$$= \sum_g \sum_{l \in L_g} P_l (r_g - r_g^*)$$

$$= \sum_g (r_g - r_g^*) \frac{\partial U}{\partial r_g} \Big|_{r^*} \quad \text{by (4)}$$

$$= \sum_g (r_g - r_g^*) (r_g^*)^{-\alpha} \quad \text{by (3)} \quad \square$$

To show $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$ gives the MMF alloc,
let $\underline{r}(\alpha)$ be the optimal solution
to (P), & let \underline{r} be a feasible
rate vector st. $\underline{r} \neq \underline{r}^*$ & for
some session j , $r_j > r_j^*(\alpha)$
for $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$

from Lemma 1,

$$\sum_{g \in S} \frac{r_g - r_g^*(\alpha)}{(r_g^*(\alpha))^\alpha} \leq 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{r_j - r_j^*(\alpha)}{(r_j^*(\alpha))^\alpha} \leq - \sum_{g \neq j} \frac{r_g - r_g^*(\alpha)}{(r_g^*(\alpha))^\alpha}$$

$$\Rightarrow 1 \leq - \sum_{g \neq j} \frac{r_g - r_g^*(\alpha)}{(r_g^*(\alpha))^\alpha} \frac{(r_j^*(\alpha))^\alpha}{r_j - r_j^*(\alpha)}$$

since $r_j - r_j^*(\alpha) > 0$

$$\leq \sum_{g \neq j} - \frac{r_g - r_g^*(\alpha)}{r_j - r_j^*(\alpha)} \left(\frac{r_j^*(\alpha)}{r_g^*(\alpha)} \right)^\alpha$$

positive terms only

$\Rightarrow r_j^*(\alpha) \geq r_k^*(\alpha) \quad \text{for } \alpha \rightarrow \infty$
for some $k \neq j$, otherwise
all RHS terms would go
to 0 as $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$.

Also, since we consider only
strictly positive terms on the
RHS, & $r_j > r_j^*(\alpha)$ for $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$,

$$r_k < r_k^*(\alpha) \leq r_j^*(\alpha)$$

$\Rightarrow \underline{r}^*$ is MMF

Congestion control as a decentralized solution to resource allocation problem

- different types of congestion control mechanisms correspond to different utility functions & different distributed optimization algorithms
- TCP can be viewed as approximating a primal penalty function algorithm with utility function $\approx -\frac{1}{r_s d_s^2}$ for small RTT d_s & small loss probability.

Primal penalty function

algorithm

Problem (P'):

$$\max_{r \geq 0} V(\Sigma) = \sum_{s \in S} U_s(r_s) - \sum_{l \in L} \int_0^f h_l(y, \gamma_l) dy$$

- $h_l(\cdot)$ is the penalty (or price) function for link l
- assumption: for each $l \in L$, $h_l(y, \gamma_l)$ is a continuous nondecreasing function of y & a decreasing function of γ_l , st.

$\int_0^f h_l(y, \gamma_l) dy \rightarrow \infty$ as $f \rightarrow \infty$
 → since we have assumed $U_s(\cdot)$ is strictly concave,
 $V(\cdot)$ is strictly concave in Σ

- parameter γ_l is used to adapt the penalty according to congestion

- assumption: $\forall s \in S, U_s(r_s) \rightarrow -\infty$ as $r_s \rightarrow 0$
 → optimal solution satisfies $r_s > 0 \quad \forall s \in S$
- optimal Σ satisfies $\frac{\partial V}{\partial r_s} = 0 \quad \forall s \in S$
 $\Rightarrow \frac{\partial U}{\partial r_s} - \sum_{l \in L_s} h_l(f_l(\Sigma), \gamma_l) = 0 \quad \forall s \in S$

p_e : link (marginal) price

q_s : session s route price

- decentralized iterative algorithm:

- let $p_e(t) = h_e(f_e(\Sigma(t)), \gamma_e(t))$

$$q_s(t) = \sum_{e \in L_s} p_e(t)$$

be the link & route prices at time t

- for each $s \in S$,

$$\frac{dr_s}{dt} = k_s(r_s) \left(\frac{\partial U}{\partial r_s} - q_s(t) \right)^+ \quad (*)$$

where $k_s(r_s)$ is any nondecreasing continuous function st. $k_s(r_s) > 0 \quad \forall r_s > 0$

- for each $l \in L$,

$$\frac{d\gamma_l}{dt} = \alpha_l (c_l - f_l(r(t)))^+ \gamma_l$$

where $\alpha_l > 0$, c_l .

$$*(g(r))^+_r = \begin{cases} g(r) & \text{if } r > 0, \\ 0 & \text{or } r = 0 \text{ & } g(r) \geq 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } r = 0 \text{ & } g(r) < 0 \end{cases}$$

(if $c_l < f_l(r)$, $\gamma_l \downarrow \rightarrow$ link price \uparrow)