Dustin Beckett
Doctoral Candidate
California Institute of Technology
About
I am a doctoral student in Economics at the California Institute of Technology. My interests are in applied microeconomics, industrial organization, and experimental economics.
Here are my C.V., my research statement, and my teaching statement.
Job Market Paper
Extreme Participation: Product Ratings with Aggregation.
Abstract: Until now, the prevalence of extreme-valued ratings in online user-generating rating systems remained a puzzle. In this paper we show that if ratings are aggregated using the mean of sent-ratings, then with some constraints on equilibrium strategies, in all environments, the prevalence of extreme-valued ratings is driven by participation. That is, it is always the case that the more extremely a consumer feels about a product, the more likely she is to rate it. This is in contrast to hypotheses that extreme-valued ratings are simply accurate representative of consumers' valuations, or alternatively, that consumers distort their ratings towards the extreme. We prove this result in a two stage game in which messages from the first stage are aggregated and then sent to players acting in the second stage. The environment specifies a continuum of correlated types, and allows for an intrinsic valuation for messaging. We further apply this analysis to mechanisms in which sent-ratings are aggregated by their median, and to the class of mechanisms in which raters give a "thumbs up" or "thumbs down" rating.
Other Research
Product Ratings in the Lab. In Progress.
Voting Technology, Vote-by-Mail, and Residual Votes in California, 1990-2010, with Alvarez, R. Michael, and Stewart, Charles. Political Research Quarterly, Revise-and-resubmit.
[abstract]
Abstract: This paper examines how the growth in vote-by-mail and changes in voting technologies led to changes in the residual vote rate in California from 1990 to 2010. We find that in California’s presidential elections, counties that abandoned punch cards in favor of optical scanning enjoyed a significant improvement in the residual vote rate. However, these findings do not always translate to other races. For instance, we find that the InkaVote system in Los Angeles has been a mixed success, performing very well in presidential and gubernatorial races, fairly well for ballot propositions, and poorly in Senate races. We also conduct the first analysis of the effects of the rise of vote-by-mail on residual votes. Regardless of the race, increased use of the mails to cast ballots is robustly associated with a rise in the residual vote rate. The effect is so strong that the rise of voting by mail in California has mostly wiped out all the reductions in residual votes that were due to improved voting technologies since the early 1990s.
All in the family: Why non-democratic leaders have more children, with Hess, Gregory. Economics of Governance 9 (1): 1-21
[abstract]
Abstract: We provide a theory whereby non-benevolent non-democratic leaders increase their expected family size to raise the likelihood that a child will be a match at continuing the regime’s survival. As a consequence, having a larger family size raises the non-democratic leader’s expected rents that they can exploit from the citizenry. In contrast, democratic leaders have a lower desire to appropriate rents from the citizenry, and therefore have a diminished desire to have additional children for these purposes. We construct a data set of the number of children of country leaders as of August 31st , 2005. We find that in a sample of 221 country leaders, fully non-democratic leaders have approximately 1.5 to 2.5 more actual children as compared to if they are fully democratic. This empirical relationship is established controlling for full array of country specific as well as individual specific variables. Our finding also continues to hold when using alternative measures of family size.
Adjusting Chinese Bilateral Trade Data: How Big is China's Trade Surplus?, with Schindler, John. International Journal of Applied Economics, vol. 2 (September 2005), pp. 27-55.
[abstract]
Abstract: Hong Kong plays a prominent role as a re-exporter of a large percentage of trade bound for or coming from China. Current reporting practices in China and its trading partners do not fully reflect this role and therefore provide a misleading picture of the origin or ultimate destination of Chinese exports and imports. We adjust bilateral trade data for both China and its trading partners to correct for this problem. We also correct for differences due to markups in Hong Kong and different standards for reporting trade (c.i.f. versus f.o.b.). For 2003, we estimate that China’s overall trade surplus was between $53 billion and $126 billion, larger than that reported in official Chinese data, but smaller than that reported by China’s trading partners. We also provide evidence that, in general, the actual origin of a good that is transshipped through Hong Kong is correctly reported by the importing country, but the final destination of such goods is not correctly reported by the exporting country.
References
Thomas Palfrey
John Ledyard
Matias Iaryczower
Contact Info
California Institute of Technology
MC 228-77
Pasadena, CA 91125, US
(626) 395-3142 (office)
(909) 636-2728 (cell)
e-mail: dhb@caltech.edu
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